How to set host_data properly in QEMU
#6
Comments
|
It looks like the KVM support isn't copying the host data in snp_launch_finish() in arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c. I'll be sure to get that addressed. |
mdroth
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Mar 14, 2023
Fix warnings such:
disas/nanomips.c:3251:64: warning: format specifies type 'char *' but the argument has type 'int64' (aka 'long long') [-Wformat]
return img_format("CACHE 0x%" PRIx64 ", %s(%s)", op_value, s_value, rs);
~~ ^~~~~~~
%lld
To avoid crashes such (kernel from commit f375ad6):
$ qemu-system-mipsel -cpu I7200 -d in_asm -kernel generic_nano32r6el_page4k
...
----------------
IN: __bzero
0x805c6084: 20c4 6950 ADDU r13, a0, a2
0x805c6088: 9089 ADDIU a0, 1
Process 70261 stopped
* thread #6, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xfffffffffffffff0)
frame #0: 0x00000001bfe38864 libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_strlen + 4
libsystem_platform.dylib`:
-> 0x1bfe38864 <+4>: ldr q0, [x1]
0x1bfe38868 <+8>: adr x3, #-0xc8 ; ___lldb_unnamed_symbol314
0x1bfe3886c <+12>: ldr q2, [x3], #0x10
0x1bfe38870 <+16>: and x2, x0, #0xf
Target 0: (qemu-system-mipsel) stopped.
(lldb) bt
* thread #6, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xfffffffffffffff0)
* frame #0: 0x00000001bfe38864 libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_strlen + 4
frame #1: 0x00000001bfce76a0 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf + 4544
frame #2: 0x00000001bfd158b4 libsystem_c.dylib`_vasprintf + 280
frame #3: 0x0000000101c22fb0 libglib-2.0.0.dylib`g_vasprintf + 28
frame #4: 0x0000000101bfb7d8 libglib-2.0.0.dylib`g_strdup_vprintf + 32
frame #5: 0x000000010000fb70 qemu-system-mipsel`img_format(format=<unavailable>) at nanomips.c:103:14 [opt]
frame #6: 0x0000000100018868 qemu-system-mipsel`SB_S9_(instruction=<unavailable>, info=<unavailable>) at nanomips.c:12616:12 [opt]
frame #7: 0x000000010000f90c qemu-system-mipsel`print_insn_nanomips at nanomips.c:589:28 [opt]
Fixes: 4066c15 ("disas/nanomips: Remove IMMEDIATE functions")
Reported-by: Stefan Weil <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
ssuthiku-amd
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Apr 11, 2023
This is below memleak detected when to quit the qemu-system-x86_64 (with
vhost-scsi-pci).
(qemu) quit
=================================================================
==15568==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f00aec57917 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0xb4917)
#1 0x7f00ada0d7b5 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x517b5)
#2 0x5648ffd38bac in vhost_scsi_start ../hw/scsi/vhost-scsi.c:92
#3 0x5648ffd38d52 in vhost_scsi_set_status ../hw/scsi/vhost-scsi.c:131
#4 0x5648ffda340e in virtio_set_status ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036
#5 0x5648ff8de281 in virtio_ioport_write ../hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:431
#6 0x5648ff8deb29 in virtio_pci_config_write ../hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:576
#7 0x5648ffe5c0c2 in memory_region_write_accessor ../softmmu/memory.c:493
#8 0x5648ffe5c424 in access_with_adjusted_size ../softmmu/memory.c:555
#9 0x5648ffe6428f in memory_region_dispatch_write ../softmmu/memory.c:1515
#10 0x5648ffe8613d in flatview_write_continue ../softmmu/physmem.c:2825
#11 0x5648ffe86490 in flatview_write ../softmmu/physmem.c:2867
#12 0x5648ffe86d9f in address_space_write ../softmmu/physmem.c:2963
#13 0x5648ffe86e57 in address_space_rw ../softmmu/physmem.c:2973
#14 0x5648fffbfb3d in kvm_handle_io ../accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:2639
#15 0x5648fffc0e0d in kvm_cpu_exec ../accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:2890
#16 0x5648fffc90a7 in kvm_vcpu_thread_fn ../accel/kvm/kvm-accel-ops.c:51
#17 0x56490042400a in qemu_thread_start ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:505
#18 0x7f00ac3b6ea4 in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x7ea4)
Free the vsc->inflight at the 'stop' path.
Fixes: b82526c ("vhost-scsi: support inflight io track")
Cc: Joe Jin <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Feng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
|
was that resolved? |
I use |
mdroth
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Jan 10, 2024
There is no architectural requirement that SME implies SVE, but our implementation currently assumes it. (FEAT_SME_FA64 does imply SVE.) So if you try to run a CPU with eg "-cpu max,sve=off" you quickly run into an assert when the guest tries to write to SMCR_EL1: #6 0x00007ffff4b38e96 in __GI___assert_fail (assertion=0x5555566e69cb "sm", file=0x5555566e5b24 "../../target/arm/helper.c", line=6865, function=0x5555566e82f0 <__PRETTY_FUNCTION__.31> "sve_vqm1_for_el_sm") at ./assert/assert.c:101 #7 0x0000555555ee33aa in sve_vqm1_for_el_sm (env=0x555557d291f0, el=2, sm=false) at ../../target/arm/helper.c:6865 #8 0x0000555555ee3407 in sve_vqm1_for_el (env=0x555557d291f0, el=2) at ../../target/arm/helper.c:6871 #9 0x0000555555ee3724 in smcr_write (env=0x555557d291f0, ri=0x555557da23b0, value=2147483663) at ../../target/arm/helper.c:6995 #10 0x0000555555fd1dba in helper_set_cp_reg64 (env=0x555557d291f0, rip=0x555557da23b0, value=2147483663) at ../../target/arm/tcg/op_helper.c:839 #11 0x00007fff60056781 in code_gen_buffer () Avoid this unsupported and slightly odd combination by disabling SME when SVE is not present. Cc: [email protected] Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2005 Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> Message-id: [email protected]
mdroth
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…B changes
The old_bs variable in bdrv_next() is currently determined by looking
at the old block backend. However, if the block graph changes before
the next bdrv_next() call, it might be that the associated BDS is not
the same that was referenced previously. In that case, the wrong BDS
is unreferenced, leading to an assertion failure later:
> bdrv_unref: Assertion `bs->refcnt > 0' failed.
In particular, this can happen in the context of bdrv_flush_all(),
when polling for bdrv_co_flush() in the generated co-wrapper leads to
a graph change (for example with a stream block job [0]).
A racy reproducer:
> #!/bin/bash
> rm -f /tmp/backing.qcow2
> rm -f /tmp/top.qcow2
> ./qemu-img create /tmp/backing.qcow2 -f qcow2 64M
> ./qemu-io -c "write -P42 0x0 0x1" /tmp/backing.qcow2
> ./qemu-img create /tmp/top.qcow2 -f qcow2 64M -b /tmp/backing.qcow2 -F qcow2
> ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \
> --blockdev qcow2,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/top.qcow2 \
> <<EOF
> {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"}
> {"execute": "block-stream", "arguments": { "job-id": "stream0", "device": "node0" } }
> {"execute": "quit"}
> EOF
[0]:
> #0 bdrv_replace_child_tran (child=..., new_bs=..., tran=...)
> #1 bdrv_replace_node_noperm (from=..., to=..., auto_skip=..., tran=..., errp=...)
> #2 bdrv_replace_node_common (from=..., to=..., auto_skip=..., detach_subchain=..., errp=...)
> #3 bdrv_drop_filter (bs=..., errp=...)
> #4 bdrv_cor_filter_drop (cor_filter_bs=...)
> #5 stream_prepare (job=...)
> #6 job_prepare_locked (job=...)
> #7 job_txn_apply_locked (fn=..., job=...)
> #8 job_do_finalize_locked (job=...)
> #9 job_exit (opaque=...)
> #10 aio_bh_poll (ctx=...)
> #11 aio_poll (ctx=..., blocking=...)
> #12 bdrv_poll_co (s=...)
> #13 bdrv_flush (bs=...)
> #14 bdrv_flush_all ()
> #15 do_vm_stop (state=..., send_stop=...)
> #16 vm_shutdown ()
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
mdroth
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When vhost-user or vhost-kernel is handling virtio net datapath, QEMU should not touch used ring. But with vhost-user socket reconnect scenario, in a very rare case (has pending kick event). VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY is set by QEMU in following code path: #0 virtio_queue_split_set_notification (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8, enable=0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:511 #1 0x0000559d6dbf033b in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8, enable=0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:576 #2 0x0000559d6dbbbdbc in virtio_net_handle_tx_bh (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0, vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8) at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:2801 #3 0x0000559d6dbf4791 in virtio_queue_notify_vq (vq=0x7ff5f4c920a8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2248 #4 0x0000559d6dbf79da in virtio_queue_host_notifier_read (n=0x7ff5f4c9211c) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3525 #5 0x0000559d6d9a5814 in virtio_bus_cleanup_host_notifier (bus=0x559d703a6a20, n=1) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:321 #6 0x0000559d6dbf83c9 in virtio_device_stop_ioeventfd_impl (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3774 #7 0x0000559d6d9a55c8 in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=0x559d703a6a20) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:259 #8 0x0000559d6d9a53e8 in virtio_bus_grab_ioeventfd (bus=0x559d703a6a20) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:199 #9 0x0000559d6dbf841c in virtio_device_grab_ioeventfd (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:3783 #10 0x0000559d6d9bde18 in vhost_dev_enable_notifiers (hdev=0x559d707edd70, vdev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/virtio/vhost.c:1592 #11 0x0000559d6d89a0b8 in vhost_net_start_one (net=0x559d707edd70, dev=0x559d703a6aa0) at ../hw/net/vhost_net.c:266 #12 0x0000559d6d89a6df in vhost_net_start (dev=0x559d703a6aa0, ncs=0x559d7048d890, data_queue_pairs=31, cvq=0) at ../hw/net/vhost_net.c:412 #13 0x0000559d6dbb5b89 in virtio_net_vhost_status (n=0x559d703a6aa0, status=15 '\017') at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:311 #14 0x0000559d6dbb5e34 in virtio_net_set_status (vdev=0x559d703a6aa0, status=15 '\017') at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:392 #15 0x0000559d6dbb60d8 in virtio_net_set_link_status (nc=0x559d7048d890) at ../hw/net/virtio-net.c:455 #16 0x0000559d6da64863 in qmp_set_link (name=0x559d6f0b83d0 "hostnet1", up=true, errp=0x7ffdd76569f0) at ../net/net.c:1459 #17 0x0000559d6da7226e in net_vhost_user_event (opaque=0x559d6f0b83d0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../net/vhost-user.c:301 #18 0x0000559d6ddc7f63 in chr_be_event (s=0x559d6f2ffea0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../chardev/char.c:62 #19 0x0000559d6ddc7fdc in qemu_chr_be_event (s=0x559d6f2ffea0, event=CHR_EVENT_OPENED) at ../chardev/char.c:82 This issue causes guest kernel stop kicking device and traffic stop. Add vhost_started check in virtio_net_handle_tx_bh to fix this wrong VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY set. Signed-off-by: Yajun Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> [PMD: Use unlikely()] Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
mdroth
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This modification ensures that in scenarios where the buffer size is
insufficient for a zone report, the function will now properly set an
error status and proceed to a cleanup label, instead of merely
returning.
The following ASAN log reveals it:
==1767400==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 312 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x64ac7b3280cd in malloc llvm/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:129:3
#1 0x735b02fb9738 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5e738)
#2 0x64ac7d23be96 in virtqueue_split_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1612:12
#3 0x64ac7d23728a in virtqueue_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1783:16
#4 0x64ac7cfcaacd in virtio_blk_get_request hw/block/virtio-blk.c:228:27
#5 0x64ac7cfca7c7 in virtio_blk_handle_vq hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1123:23
#6 0x64ac7cfecb95 in virtio_blk_handle_output hw/block/virtio-blk.c:1157:5
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
mdroth
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This patch improves error handling in virtio_snd_handle_tx_xfer()
and virtio_snd_handle_rx_xfer() in the VirtIO sound driver. Previously,
'goto' statements were used for error paths, leading to unnecessary
processing and potential null pointer dereferences. Now, 'continue' is
used to skip the rest of the current loop iteration for errors such as
message size discrepancies or null streams, reducing crash risks.
ASAN log illustrating the issue addressed:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000000000b4
#0 0x57cea39967b8 in qemu_mutex_lock_impl qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:92:5
#1 0x57cea128c462 in qemu_mutex_lock qemu/include/qemu/thread.h:122:5
#2 0x57cea128d72f in qemu_lockable_lock qemu/include/qemu/lockable.h:95:5
#3 0x57cea128c294 in qemu_lockable_auto_lock qemu/include/qemu/lockable.h:105:5
#4 0x57cea1285eb2 in virtio_snd_handle_rx_xfer qemu/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c:1026:9
#5 0x57cea2caebbc in virtio_queue_notify_vq qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2268:9
#6 0x57cea2cae412 in virtio_queue_host_notifier_read qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3671:9
#7 0x57cea39822f1 in aio_dispatch_handler qemu/util/aio-posix.c:372:9
#8 0x57cea3979385 in aio_dispatch_handlers qemu/util/aio-posix.c:414:20
#9 0x57cea3978eb1 in aio_dispatch qemu/util/aio-posix.c:424:5
#10 0x57cea3a1eede in aio_ctx_dispatch qemu/util/async.c:360:5
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Manos Pitsidianakis <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
mdroth
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Jun 21, 2024
Replace qemu_bh_new_guarded() by virtio_bh_new_guarded()
so the bus and device use the same guard. Otherwise the
DMA-reentrancy protection can be bypassed:
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -display none -nodefaults \
-machine q35,accel=qtest \
-m 512M \
-device virtio-gpu \
-qtest stdio
outl 0xcf8 0x80000820
outl 0xcfc 0xe0004000
outl 0xcf8 0x80000804
outw 0xcfc 0x06
write 0xe0004030 0x4 0x024000e0
write 0xe0004028 0x1 0xff
write 0xe0004020 0x4 0x00009300
write 0xe000401c 0x1 0x01
write 0x101 0x1 0x04
write 0x103 0x1 0x1c
write 0x9301c8 0x1 0x18
write 0x105 0x1 0x1c
write 0x107 0x1 0x1c
write 0x109 0x1 0x1c
write 0x10b 0x1 0x00
write 0x10d 0x1 0x00
write 0x10f 0x1 0x00
write 0x111 0x1 0x00
write 0x113 0x1 0x00
write 0x115 0x1 0x00
write 0x117 0x1 0x00
write 0x119 0x1 0x00
write 0x11b 0x1 0x00
write 0x11d 0x1 0x00
write 0x11f 0x1 0x00
write 0x121 0x1 0x00
write 0x123 0x1 0x00
write 0x125 0x1 0x00
write 0x127 0x1 0x00
write 0x129 0x1 0x00
write 0x12b 0x1 0x00
write 0x12d 0x1 0x00
write 0x12f 0x1 0x00
write 0x131 0x1 0x00
write 0x133 0x1 0x00
write 0x135 0x1 0x00
write 0x137 0x1 0x00
write 0x139 0x1 0x00
write 0xe0007003 0x1 0x00
EOF
...
=================================================================
==276099==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60d000011178
at pc 0x562cc3b736c7 bp 0x7ffed49dee60 sp 0x7ffed49dee58
READ of size 8 at 0x60d000011178 thread T0
#0 0x562cc3b736c6 in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:180:42
#1 0x562cc3b7c40b in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response_nodata hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:192:5
#2 0x562cc3b7c40b in virtio_gpu_simple_process_cmd hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1015:13
#3 0x562cc3b82873 in virtio_gpu_process_cmdq hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1050:9
#4 0x562cc4a85514 in aio_bh_call util/async.c:169:5
#5 0x562cc4a85c52 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:216:13
#6 0x562cc4a1a79b in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:423:5
#7 0x562cc4a8a2da in aio_ctx_dispatch util/async.c:358:5
#8 0x7f36840547a8 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x547a8)
#9 0x562cc4a8b753 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:290:9
#10 0x562cc4a8b753 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:313:5
#11 0x562cc4a8b753 in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:592:11
#12 0x562cc3938186 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:782:9
#13 0x562cc43b7af5 in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14
#14 0x7f3683a6c189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#15 0x7f3683a6c244 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:381:3
#16 0x562cc2a58ac0 in _start (qemu-system-i386+0x231bac0)
0x60d000011178 is located 56 bytes inside of 136-byte region [0x60d000011140,0x60d0000111c8)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x562cc2adb662 in __interceptor_free (qemu-system-i386+0x239e662)
#1 0x562cc3b86b21 in virtio_gpu_reset hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1524:9
#2 0x562cc416e20e in virtio_reset hw/virtio/virtio.c:2145:9
#3 0x562cc37c5644 in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:2249:5
#4 0x562cc4233758 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5
#5 0x562cc4232eea in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x562cc2adb90e in malloc (qemu-system-i386+0x239e90e)
#1 0x7f368405a678 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5a678)
#2 0x562cc4163ffc in virtqueue_split_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1612:12
#3 0x562cc4163ffc in virtqueue_pop hw/virtio/virtio.c:1783:16
#4 0x562cc3b91a95 in virtio_gpu_handle_ctrl hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:1112:15
#5 0x562cc4a85514 in aio_bh_call util/async.c:169:5
#6 0x562cc4a85c52 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:216:13
#7 0x562cc4a1a79b in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:423:5
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free hw/display/virtio-gpu.c:180:42 in virtio_gpu_ctrl_response
With this change, the same reproducer triggers:
qemu-system-i386: warning: Blocked re-entrant IO on MemoryRegion: virtio-pci-common-virtio-gpu at addr: 0x6
Fixes: CVE-2024-3446
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xiao Lei <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yiming Tao <[email protected]>
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1888606
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
mdroth
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Jun 21, 2024
nand_command() and nand_getio() don't check @offset points into the block, nor the available data length (s->iolen) is not negative. In order to fix: - check the offset is in range in nand_blk_load_NAND_PAGE_SIZE(), - do not set @iolen if blk_load() failed. Reproducer: $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-arm -machine tosa \ -monitor none -serial none \ -display none -qtest stdio write 0x10000111 0x1 0xca write 0x10000104 0x1 0x47 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0xd7 write 0x1000ca01 0x1 0xe0 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0x71 write 0x1000ca00 0x1 0x50 write 0x1000ca04 0x1 0xd7 read 0x1000ca02 0x1 write 0x1000ca01 0x1 0x10 EOF ================================================================= ==15750==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61f000000de0 at pc 0x560e61557210 bp 0x7ffcfc4a59f0 sp 0x7ffcfc4a59e8 READ of size 1 at 0x61f000000de0 thread T0 #0 0x560e6155720f in mem_and hw/block/nand.c:101:20 #1 0x560e6155ac9c in nand_blk_write_512 hw/block/nand.c:663:9 #2 0x560e61544200 in nand_command hw/block/nand.c:293:13 #3 0x560e6153cc83 in nand_setio hw/block/nand.c:520:13 #4 0x560e61a0a69e in tc6393xb_nand_writeb hw/display/tc6393xb.c:380:13 #5 0x560e619f9bf7 in tc6393xb_writeb hw/display/tc6393xb.c:524:9 #6 0x560e647c7d03 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5 #7 0x560e647c7641 in access_with_adjusted_size softmmu/memory.c:554:18 #8 0x560e647c5f66 in memory_region_dispatch_write softmmu/memory.c:1514:16 #9 0x560e6485409e in flatview_write_continue softmmu/physmem.c:2825:23 #10 0x560e648421eb in flatview_write softmmu/physmem.c:2867:12 #11 0x560e64841ca8 in address_space_write softmmu/physmem.c:2963:18 #12 0x560e61170162 in qemu_writeb tests/qtest/videzzo/videzzo_qemu.c:1080:5 #13 0x560e6116eef7 in dispatch_mmio_write tests/qtest/videzzo/videzzo_qemu.c:1227:28 0x61f000000de0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3424-byte region [0x61f000000080,0x61f000000de0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x560e611276cf in malloc /root/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x7f7959a87e98 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57e98) #2 0x560e64b98871 in object_new qom/object.c:749:12 #3 0x560e64b5d1a1 in qdev_new hw/core/qdev.c:153:19 #4 0x560e61547ea5 in nand_init hw/block/nand.c:639:11 #5 0x560e619f8772 in tc6393xb_init hw/display/tc6393xb.c:558:16 #6 0x560e6390bad2 in tosa_init hw/arm/tosa.c:250:12 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow hw/block/nand.c:101:20 in mem_and ==15750==ABORTING Broken since introduction in commit 3e3d581 ("NAND Flash memory emulation and ECC calculation helpers for use by NAND controllers"). Cc: [email protected] Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1445 Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1446 Reported-by: Qiang Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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When the MAC Interface Layer (MIL) transmit FIFO is full, truncate the packet, and raise the Transmitter Error (TXE) flag. Broken since model introduction in commit 2a42499 ("LAN9118 emulation"). When using the reproducer from https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2267 we get: hw/net/lan9118.c:798:17: runtime error: index 2048 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t[2048]' (aka 'unsigned char[2048]') #0 0x563ec9a057b1 in tx_fifo_push hw/net/lan9118.c:798:43 #1 0x563ec99fbb28 in lan9118_writel hw/net/lan9118.c:1042:9 #2 0x563ec99f2de2 in lan9118_16bit_mode_write hw/net/lan9118.c:1205:9 #3 0x563ecbf78013 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5 #4 0x563ecbf776f5 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18 #5 0x563ecbf75643 in memory_region_dispatch_write system/memory.c:1521:16 #6 0x563ecc01bade in flatview_write_continue_step system/physmem.c:2713:18 #7 0x563ecc01b374 in flatview_write_continue system/physmem.c:2743:19 #8 0x563ecbff1c9b in flatview_write system/physmem.c:2774:12 #9 0x563ecbff1768 in address_space_write system/physmem.c:2894:18 ... [*] LAN9118 DS00002266B.pdf, Table 5.3.3 "INTERRUPT STATUS REGISTER" Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Will Lester Reported-by: Chuhong Yuan <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2267 Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]>
mdroth
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Per "SD Host Controller Standard Specification Version 3.00":
* 2.2.5 Transfer Mode Register (Offset 00Ch)
Writes to this register shall be ignored when the Command
Inhibit (DAT) in the Present State register is 1.
Do not update the TRNMOD register when Command Inhibit (DAT)
bit is set to avoid the present-status register going out of
sync, leading to malicious guest using DMA mode and overflowing
the FIFO buffer:
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 \
-display none -nographic -nodefaults \
-machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
-device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
-device sd-card,drive=mydrive \
-drive if=none,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
-qtest stdio
outl 0xcf8 0x80001013
outl 0xcfc 0x91
outl 0xcf8 0x80001001
outl 0xcfc 0x06000000
write 0x9100002c 0x1 0x05
write 0x91000058 0x1 0x16
write 0x91000005 0x1 0x04
write 0x91000028 0x1 0x08
write 0x16 0x1 0x21
write 0x19 0x1 0x20
write 0x9100000c 0x1 0x01
write 0x9100000e 0x1 0x20
write 0x9100000f 0x1 0x00
write 0x9100000c 0x1 0x00
write 0x91000020 0x1 0x00
EOF
Stack trace (part):
=================================================================
==89993==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x615000029900 at pc 0x55d5f885700d bp 0x7ffc1e1e9470 sp 0x7ffc1e1e9468
WRITE of size 1 at 0x615000029900 thread T0
#0 0x55d5f885700c in sdhci_write_dataport hw/sd/sdhci.c:564:39
#1 0x55d5f8849150 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1223:13
#2 0x55d5fa01db63 in memory_region_write_accessor system/memory.c:497:5
#3 0x55d5fa01d245 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18
#4 0x55d5fa01b1a9 in memory_region_dispatch_write system/memory.c:1521:16
#5 0x55d5fa09f5c9 in flatview_write_continue system/physmem.c:2711:23
#6 0x55d5fa08f78b in flatview_write system/physmem.c:2753:12
#7 0x55d5fa08f258 in address_space_write system/physmem.c:2860:18
...
0x615000029900 is located 0 bytes to the right of 512-byte region
[0x615000029700,0x615000029900) allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x55d5f7237b27 in __interceptor_calloc
#1 0x7f9e36dd4c50 in g_malloc0
#2 0x55d5f88672f7 in sdhci_pci_realize hw/sd/sdhci-pci.c:36:5
#3 0x55d5f844b582 in pci_qdev_realize hw/pci/pci.c:2092:9
#4 0x55d5fa2ee74b in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:510:13
#5 0x55d5fa325bfb in property_set_bool qom/object.c:2358:5
#6 0x55d5fa31ea45 in object_property_set qom/object.c:1472:5
#7 0x55d5fa332509 in object_property_set_qobject om/qom-qobject.c:28:10
#8 0x55d5fa31f6ed in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1541:15
#9 0x55d5fa2e2948 in qdev_realize hw/core/qdev.c:292:12
#10 0x55d5f8eed3f1 in qdev_device_add_from_qdict system/qdev-monitor.c:719:10
#11 0x55d5f8eef7ff in qdev_device_add system/qdev-monitor.c:738:11
#12 0x55d5f8f211f0 in device_init_func system/vl.c:1200:11
#13 0x55d5fad0877d in qemu_opts_foreach util/qemu-option.c:1135:14
#14 0x55d5f8f0df9c in qemu_create_cli_devices system/vl.c:2638:5
#15 0x55d5f8f0db24 in qmp_x_exit_preconfig system/vl.c:2706:5
#16 0x55d5f8f14dc0 in qemu_init system/vl.c:3737:9
...
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow hw/sd/sdhci.c:564:39
in sdhci_write_dataport
Add assertions to ensure the fifo_buffer[] is not overflowed by
malicious accesses to the Buffer Data Port register.
Fixes: CVE-2024-3447
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d7dfca0 ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
Buglink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=58813
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Chuhong Yuan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <CAFEAcA9iLiv1XGTGKeopgMa8Y9+8kvptvsb8z2OBeuy+5=NUfg@mail.gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
mdroth
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If a fragmented packet size is too short, do not try to
calculate its checksum.
Reproduced using:
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 -display none -nodefaults \
-machine q35,accel=qtest -m 32M \
-device igb,netdev=net0 \
-netdev user,id=net0 \
-qtest stdio
outl 0xcf8 0x80000810
outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
outl 0xcf8 0x80000804
outw 0xcfc 0x06
write 0xe0000403 0x1 0x02
writel 0xe0003808 0xffffffff
write 0xe000381a 0x1 0x5b
write 0xe000381b 0x1 0x00
EOF
Assertion failed: (offset == 0), function iov_from_buf_full, file util/iov.c, line 39.
#1 0x5575e81e952a in iov_from_buf_full qemu/util/iov.c:39:5
#2 0x5575e6500768 in net_tx_pkt_update_sctp_checksum qemu/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:144:9
#3 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_setup_tx_offloads qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:478:11
#4 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_tx_pkt_send qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:552:10
#5 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_process_tx_desc qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:671:17
#6 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_start_xmit qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:903:9
#7 0x5575e659f3e1 in igb_set_tdt qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:2812:5
#8 0x5575e657d6a4 in igb_core_write qemu/hw/net/igb_core.c:4248:9
Fixes: CVE-2024-3567
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Fixes: f199b13 ("igb: Implement Tx SCTP CSO")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2273
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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…coroutine()' failed. bdrv_activate_all() should not be called from the coroutine context, move it to the QEMU thread colo_process_incoming_thread() with the bql_lock protected. The backtrace is as follows: #4 0x0000561af7948362 in bdrv_graph_rdlock_main_loop () at ../block/graph-lock.c:260 #5 0x0000561af7907a68 in graph_lockable_auto_lock_mainloop (x=0x7fd29810be7b) at /patch/to/qemu/include/block/graph-lock.h:259 #6 0x0000561af79167d1 in bdrv_activate_all (errp=0x7fd29810bed0) at ../block.c:6906 #7 0x0000561af762b4af in colo_incoming_co () at ../migration/colo.c:935 #8 0x0000561af7607e57 in process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at ../migration/migration.c:793 #9 0x0000561af7adbeeb in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-106876144, i1=22042) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:175 #10 0x00007fd2a5cf21c0 in () at /lib64/libc.so.6 Cc: [email protected] Cc: Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]> Closes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2277 Fixes: 2b3912f ("block: Mark bdrv_first_blk() and bdrv_is_root_node() GRAPH_RDLOCK") Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhang Chen <[email protected]> Tested-by: Zhang Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
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For multi-bytes commands, our implementation uses the @data_start
and @data_offset fields to track byte access. We initialize the
command start/offset in buffer once. Malicious guest might abuse
by switching command while staying in the 'transfer' state, switching
command buffer size, and our implementation can access out of buffer
boundary. For example, CMD17 (READ_SINGLE_BLOCK) allows to read up to
512 bytes, and CMD13 (SEND_STATUS) up to 64 bytes. By switching from
CMD17 to CMD13 (see reproducer below), bytes [64-511] are out of the
'status' buffer.
Our implementation return R0 status code for unexpected commands.
Such in-transaction command switch is unexpected and returns R0.
This is a good place to reset the start/offset fields to avoid
malicious accesses.
Can be reproduced running:
$ export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
$ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 \
-display none -nographic \
-machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
-nodefaults \
-device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
-device sd-card,drive=mydrive \
-drive if=none,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
-qtest stdio -trace sd\* -trace -sdbus_read
outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
outw 0xcfc 0x02
write 0xe000002c 0x1 0x05
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x37
write 0xe000000a 0x1 0x01
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x29
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x02
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x03
write 0xe000000c 0x1 0x32
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x06
write 0xe0000005 0x1 0x01
write 0xe0000007 0x1 0x01
write 0xe0000003 0x1 0x00
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x11
write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x01
write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x02
write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x0d
write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x01
write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x02
EOF
hw/sd/sd.c:1984:15: runtime error: index 256 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t [64]'
#0 sd_read_byte hw/sd/sd.c:1984:15
#1 sdbus_read_data hw/sd/core.c:157:23
#2 sdhci_read_block_from_card hw/sd/sdhci.c:423:9
#3 sdhci_blkgap_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1074:13
#4 sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1195:13
#5 memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5
#6 access_with_adjusted_size softmmu/memory.c:554:18
#7 memory_region_dispatch_write softmmu/memory.c
#8 flatview_write_continue softmmu/physmem.c:2778:23
#9 flatview_write softmmu/physmem.c:2818:14
#10 address_space_write softmmu/physmem.c:2910:18
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior hw/sd/sd.c:1984:15
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/487
Buglink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=36240
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Kullu14
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ASan detected a global-buffer-overflow error in the aspeed_gpio_read()
function. This issue occurred when reading beyond the bounds of the
reg_table.
To enhance the safety and maintainability of the Aspeed GPIO code, this commit
introduces a reg_table_count member to the AspeedGPIOClass structure. This
change ensures that the size of the GPIO register table is explicitly tracked
and initialized, reducing the risk of errors if new register tables are
introduced in the future.
Reproducer:
cat << EOF | qemu-system-aarch64 -display none \
-machine accel=qtest, -m 512M -machine ast1030-evb -qtest stdio
readq 0x7e780272
EOF
ASAN log indicating the issue:
==2602930==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x55a5da29e128 at pc 0x55a5d700dc62 bp 0x7fff096c4e90 sp 0x7fff096c4e88
READ of size 2 at 0x55a5da29e128 thread T0
#0 0x55a5d700dc61 in aspeed_gpio_read hw/gpio/aspeed_gpio.c:564:14
#1 0x55a5d933f3ab in memory_region_read_accessor system/memory.c:445:11
#2 0x55a5d92fba40 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18
#3 0x55a5d92f842c in memory_region_dispatch_read1 system/memory.c:1426:16
#4 0x55a5d92f7b68 in memory_region_dispatch_read system/memory.c:1459:9
#5 0x55a5d9376ad1 in flatview_read_continue_step system/physmem.c:2836:18
#6 0x55a5d9376399 in flatview_read_continue system/physmem.c:2877:19
#7 0x55a5d93775b8 in flatview_read system/physmem.c:2907:12
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2355
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jeffery <[email protected]>
mdroth
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Oct 21, 2024
When the creds->username property is set we allocate memory
for it in qcrypto_tls_creds_psk_prop_set_username(), but
we never free this when the QCryptoTLSCredsPSK is destroyed.
Free the memory in finalize.
This fixes a LeakSanitizer complaint in migration-test:
$ (cd build/asan; ASAN_OPTIONS="fast_unwind_on_malloc=0" QTEST_QEMU_BINARY=./qemu-system-x86_64 ./tests/qtest/migration-test --tap -k -p /x86_64/migration/precopy/unix/tls/psk)
=================================================================
==3867512==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5624e5c99dee in malloc (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x218edee) (BuildId: a9e623fa1009a9435c0142c037cd7b8c1ad04ce3)
#1 0x7fb199ae9738 in g_malloc debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmem.c:128:13
#2 0x7fb199afe583 in g_strdup debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gstrfuncs.c:361:17
#3 0x5624e82ea919 in qcrypto_tls_creds_psk_prop_set_username /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../crypto/tlscredspsk.c:255:23
#4 0x5624e812c6b5 in property_set_str /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object.c:2277:5
#5 0x5624e8125ce5 in object_property_set /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object.c:1463:5
#6 0x5624e8136e7c in object_set_properties_from_qdict /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object_interfaces.c:55:14
#7 0x5624e81372d2 in user_creatable_add_type /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object_interfaces.c:112:5
#8 0x5624e8137964 in user_creatable_add_qapi /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object_interfaces.c:157:11
#9 0x5624e891ba3c in qmp_object_add /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:227:5
#10 0x5624e8af9118 in qmp_marshal_object_add /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qapi/qapi-commands-qom.c:337:5
#11 0x5624e8bd1d49 in do_qmp_dispatch_bh /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:128:5
#12 0x5624e8cb2531 in aio_bh_call /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/async.c:171:5
#13 0x5624e8cb340c in aio_bh_poll /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/async.c:218:13
#14 0x5624e8c0be98 in aio_dispatch /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/aio-posix.c:423:5
#15 0x5624e8cba3ce in aio_ctx_dispatch /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/async.c:360:5
#16 0x7fb199ae0d3a in g_main_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:3419:28
#17 0x7fb199ae0d3a in g_main_context_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:4137:7
#18 0x5624e8cbe1d9 in glib_pollfds_poll /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/main-loop.c:287:9
#19 0x5624e8cbcb13 in os_host_main_loop_wait /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/main-loop.c:310:5
#20 0x5624e8cbc6dc in main_loop_wait /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/main-loop.c:589:11
#21 0x5624e6f3f917 in qemu_main_loop /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../system/runstate.c:801:9
#22 0x5624e893379c in qemu_default_main /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../system/main.c:37:14
#23 0x5624e89337e7 in main /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../system/main.c:48:12
#24 0x7fb197972d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#25 0x7fb197972e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
#26 0x5624e5c16fa4 in _start (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x210bfa4) (BuildId: a9e623fa1009a9435c0142c037cd7b8c1ad04ce3)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 5 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
mdroth
pushed a commit
that referenced
this issue
Oct 21, 2024
In multifd_recv_setup() we allocate (among other things)
* a MultiFDRecvData struct to multifd_recv_state::data
* a MultiFDRecvData struct to each multfd_recv_state->params[i].data
(Then during execution we might swap these pointers around.)
But in multifd_recv_cleanup() we free multifd_recv_state->data
in multifd_recv_cleanup_state() but we don't ever free the
multifd_recv_state->params[i].data. This results in a memory
leak reported by LeakSanitizer:
(cd build/asan && \
ASAN_OPTIONS="fast_unwind_on_malloc=0:strip_path_prefix=/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../" \
QTEST_QEMU_BINARY=./qemu-system-x86_64 \
./tests/qtest/migration-test --tap -k -p /x86_64/migration/multifd/file/mapped-ram )
[...]
Direct leak of 72 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x561cc0afcfd8 in __interceptor_calloc (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x218efd8) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)
#1 0x7f89d37acc50 in g_malloc0 debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmem.c:161:13
#2 0x561cc1e9c83c in multifd_recv_setup migration/multifd.c:1606:19
#3 0x561cc1e68618 in migration_ioc_process_incoming migration/migration.c:972:9
#4 0x561cc1e3ac59 in migration_channel_process_incoming migration/channel.c:45:9
#5 0x561cc1e4fa0b in file_accept_incoming_migration migration/file.c:132:5
#6 0x561cc30f2c0c in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch io/channel-watch.c:84:12
#7 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:3419:28
#8 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_context_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:4137:7
#9 0x561cc3b21659 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:287:9
#10 0x561cc3b1ff93 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:310:5
#11 0x561cc3b1fb5c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:589:11
#12 0x561cc1da2917 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:801:9
#13 0x561cc3796c1c in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14
#14 0x561cc3796c67 in main system/main.c:48:12
#15 0x7f89d163bd8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#16 0x7f89d163be3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
#17 0x561cc0a79fa4 in _start (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x210bfa4) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)
Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x561cc0afcfd8 in __interceptor_calloc (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x218efd8) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)
#1 0x7f89d37acc50 in g_malloc0 debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmem.c:161:13
#2 0x561cc1e9bed9 in multifd_recv_setup migration/multifd.c:1588:32
#3 0x561cc1e68618 in migration_ioc_process_incoming migration/migration.c:972:9
#4 0x561cc1e3ac59 in migration_channel_process_incoming migration/channel.c:45:9
#5 0x561cc1e4fa0b in file_accept_incoming_migration migration/file.c:132:5
#6 0x561cc30f2c0c in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch io/channel-watch.c:84:12
#7 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:3419:28
#8 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_context_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:4137:7
#9 0x561cc3b21659 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:287:9
#10 0x561cc3b1ff93 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:310:5
#11 0x561cc3b1fb5c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:589:11
#12 0x561cc1da2917 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:801:9
#13 0x561cc3796c1c in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14
#14 0x561cc3796c67 in main system/main.c:48:12
#15 0x7f89d163bd8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#16 0x7f89d163be3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
#17 0x561cc0a79fa4 in _start (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x210bfa4) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 96 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s).
Free the params[i].data too.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d117ed0 ("migration/multifd: Allow receiving pages without packets")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>
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Hi there, I'm trying to set host data on
snp-v3branch. I included the following in my QEMU command-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,host-data=b2l3bmNvd3FuY21wbXA. Both guest and host kernels were from here, and I could get a guest report using sev-guest. While I can setReport Datawithsev-guest-get-report,Host datais still blank no matter what I passed to QEMU.The following is the guest report I got with the Makefile in sev-guest used in hashing
Please advise
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