prop.nlogo

breed [peeps peep]
breed [govprops govprop]
peeps-own [internal_pref external_pref buddies rebelling]
globals [external_pref_init_mean external_pref_init_max]

to setup
  clear-all
  create-peeps (population_density / 100) * (max-pycor - min-pycor) * (max-pxcor - min-pxcor)
  create-govprops propagandists
  randomize-init-turtles
  ask patches [
    set pcolor 9
  ]
  reset-ticks
end

to randomize-init-turtles
  ask peeps [
    set shape "circle"
    set internal_pref min(list max (list 0 random-normal internal_pref_mean internal_pref_sd) 100)
    let deviated random-normal internal_pref external_pref_sd
    set external_pref min(list
      ifelse-value deviated < internal_pref [internal_pref + ( internal_pref - deviated )] [ deviated ]
      100
    )
    set xcor (random 41) - 20
    set ycor (random 41) - 20
    set color 99.9 - (external_pref - internal_pref) / 10
    rebel-check
  ]
  set external_pref_init_mean mean [external_pref] of peeps
  set external_pref_init_max max [external_pref] of peeps
end

to go
  ask peeps [
    fd 0.5            ;; forward 1 step
    rt random 10    ;; turn right
    lt random 10    ;; turn left
    set buddies (other peeps) in-radius buddy-radius
    check-social-influence
    ;; show patch-here
    rebel-check
  ]
  color-check
  propaganda-spread
  tick
end

to check-social-influence
  drop-in-pref-social
  ;; let vicinity_pref min(list
  ;;  (ifelse-value (any? buddies)
  ;;    [external_pref + (mean([external_pref] of buddies) - external_pref) * transmission / 100]
  ;;    [external_pref])
  ;;  external_pref
  ;;)
  ;;set external_pref max(list internal_pref vicinity_pref)
end

to drop-in-pref-social
  let casual_drop 0
  let rebel_drop 0
  let divisor 200
  if (rebelling = true) [
    set divisor divisor * rebel_hardiness
  ]

  if (any? buddies with [rebelling = false]) [
    set casual_drop (external_pref - mean([external_pref] of buddies with [rebelling = false])) * transmission / divisor
  ]
  let near-rebels (other peeps with [rebelling = true]) in-radius propaganda-radius
  if (any? near-rebels) [
    set rebel_drop (external_pref - mean([external_pref] of near-rebels)) * transmission / divisor
  ]
  ;; show casual_drop
  ;; show rebel_drop
  ;; let social_pref min(list external_pref (external_pref - casual_drop))
  let social_pref min(list external_pref (external_pref - rebel_drop - casual_drop))
  if (social_pref > internal_pref)[
    ;; show external_pref - social_pref
    ;; show (list ticks external_pref internal_pref social_pref (external_pref - social_pref))
  ]
  set external_pref max(list social_pref internal_pref)
end

to propaganda-spread
  ask patches [set pcolor 9]
  if propagandists != count govprops [
    ask govprops [die]
    create-govprops propagandists
  ]
  ask govprops [
    fd 1
    rt random 10
    lt random 10
    let around-me-patches patches in-radius propaganda-radius
    ask around-me-patches [set pcolor yellow + 3]

    let around-me peeps in-radius propaganda-radius
    set around-me around-me with [rebelling = false]
    ask around-me [
      set external_pref min(list
        (external_pref * (1.0 + (random-normal (prop-power / 1000) 0.001)))
        100
      )
    ]

    set around-me peeps in-radius propaganda-radius
    set around-me around-me with [rebelling = true]
    ask around-me [
      set external_pref min(list
        (external_pref * (1.0 + (random-normal (prop-power / (1000 * rebel_hardiness)) 0.001)))
        100
      )
    ]
  ]
end


to color-check
  ifelse color_scheme = "difference" [
    ask peeps [set color 99.9 - (external_pref - internal_pref) / 10]
  ] [
    let scale external_pref_init_max - rebel_threshold
    ask peeps [
      let mypath external_pref - rebel_threshold
      set color 15 + 5 * (mypath / scale)
    ]
  ]
end

to rebel-check
  ifelse external_pref < rebel_threshold [
    set shape "x"
    set rebelling true
  ] [
    set shape "circle"
    set rebelling false
  ]
  if internal_pref < rebel_threshold [
    if (
      ((external_pref - internal_pref) > 2 * internal_pref_sd) and
      (random 100 < freedom_fighter_chance)
      ) [
      set rebelling true
      set external_pref rebel_threshold
      show "freedom fighter created"
    ]
  ]
end
;;histogram [ ( external_pref - internal_pref ) ] of turtles


to draw-polygon [num-sides len]  ;; turtle procedure
  pen-down
  repeat num-sides [
    fd len
    rt 360 / num-sides
  ]
end
;; invoke as ask turtles [ draw-polygon 8 who ]


to-report absolute-value [number]
  ifelse number >= 0
    [ report number ]
    [ report (- number) ]
end

to swap-colors [turtle1 turtle2]
  let temp [color] of turtle1
  ask turtle1 [ set color [color] of turtle2 ]
  ask turtle2 [ set color temp ]
end


;to test
;  ;; all other turtles:
;  other turtles
;  ;; all other turtles on this patch:
;  other turtles-here
;  ;; all red turtles:
;  turtles with [color = red]
;  ;; all red turtles on my patch
;  turtles-here with [color = red]
;  ;; patches on right side of view
;  patches with [pxcor > 0]
;  ;; all turtles less than 3 patches away
;  turtles in-radius 3
;  ;; the four patches to the east, north, west, and south
;  patches at-points [[1 0] [0 1] [-1 0] [0 -1]]
;  ;; shorthand for those four patches
;  neighbors4
;  ;; turtles in the first quadrant that are on a green patch
;  turtles with [(xcor > 0) and (ycor > 0)
;    and (pcolor = green)]
;  ;; turtles standing on my neighboring four patches
;  turtles-on neighbors4
;  ;; all the links connected to turtle 0
;  [my-links] of turtle 0
;
;
;  ;Or tell a randomly chosen patch to sprout a new turtle:
;  ask one-of patches [ sprout 1 ]
;
;  ; Create set of turtles :g: from global, with input (here, turtles)
;  set g turtle-set turtles
;end
@#$#@#$#@
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Setup
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OBSERVER
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BUTTON
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Run
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Preferences Plot
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"" ""
PENS
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"External" 5.0 0 -14439633 true "" "histogram [external_pref] of peeps"
"Initial External" 5.0 0 -8990512 true "histogram [external_pref] of peeps" ""
"Initial External Mean" 0.0 1 -8990512 false "" "plot-pen-reset\nplotxy external_pref_init_mean plot-y-max"
"External Mean" 0.0 1 -14439633 false "" "plot-pen-reset\nplotxy mean [external_pref] of peeps plot-y-max\n"
"Internal Pref Mean" 0.0 1 -16777216 false "plotxy mean [internal_pref] of peeps plot-y-max * 1.4" ""
"Rebel Threshold" 0.0 1 -2674135 true "" "plot-pen-reset\nplotxy rebel_threshold plot-y-max"

SLIDER
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SLIDER
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rebel_threshold
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HORIZONTAL

MONITOR
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SLIDER
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MONITOR
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External Pref Avg.
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Rebellion Over Time
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"Mean External Pref" 1.0 0 -13840069 true "" "plot mean [external_pref] of peeps"
"Mean Internal Pref" 1.0 0 -16777216 true "" "plot mean [internal_pref] of peeps"
"Rebellion Threshold" 1.0 0 -1604481 true "" "plot rebel_threshold"

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SLIDER
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SLIDER
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SLIDER
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freedom_fighter_chance
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TEXTBOX
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Click me first!
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SLIDER
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rebel_hardiness
rebel_hardiness
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NIL
HORIZONTAL

@#$#@#$#@
## WHAT IS IT?

This is a model showcasing Kuran's Cascade Theory (1991), developed by Aditya Gupta (School of Public Policy, London School of Economics - 2021).

Please enjoy the model under [this link](https://www.netlogoweb.org/launch#https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ca9/politics_simulations/master/prop.nlogo).

## HOW IT WORKS

We observe a map full of people or "peeps" (after hitting "Setup"), each with their own private and public preference for their current government. Upon hitting "Run" a simulation begins where the agents move, interact, and thus influence each other's public preferences on the bases of chosen parameters.

The logic is this: If the "external preference" of peeps falls below the rebellion threshold, they are actively "rebelling" - and marked as "X" check marks. 

The charts show distributions of these attributes and key statistics of the population.

There are two color schemes: 
1. "difference" showcases the quantified difference of their preferences with increasingly darker shades of blue. 

2. The "likely_rebel" scheme shows the difference between their rebellion threshold, and their actual external preference. 


## HOW TO USE IT

* Please start by pressing "Setup" to set (or reset) the map. 
You observe people (called "peeps" in the code) spread out over a region - the map.

* The "Run" button begins and pauses the simulation.

* The first 3 sliders help choose a population density, an approximate a normal distribution by choosing a mean and standard distribution for an internal preferences.
**Internal Preferences are constant over each run**.


* The **external preference for every agent is higher than their own internal preference** in this simulation. The distance from internal preference is also normally distributed, with standard deviation **external_pref_sd**. Increase this slider to create a wider gap between internal and external preferences at setup time.

* The distance at which peeps remain influenced by external opinions of their neighbours is controlled by **"buddy-radius"**. The external preferences of "buddies" can have a bidirectional effect on peeps.

* **transmission** determines the level to which peeps and rebels are influenced by their neighbours (buddies) and rebels around them.

* The **propaganda-radius** on the right shows the radius of influence of **rebels as well as propagandists**. They typically are "noisier" elements in the and send their message "farther" than "buddies", or people near a peep. 

* The **rebel_threshold** determines the point of external preference which an agent starts to "rebel". External preference must exceed internal preference here, so agents with internal preference over the rebel_threshold will not rebel. You can move this in simulation-time.

* **propagandists** introduces agents spreading propaganda and forcing an increase in "external preference" of people around. Rebels are resistent to this effect and respond to public around them. Even so, they remain hardy. Their resistence to these influences is a multiplicative factor of **"rebel_hardiness"**.

* **prop-power** determines the power of the propaganda and can be moved in realtime.

* Finally, we have the *freedom-fighter-chance*. If an agent's external_preference is forced to exceed her internal preference by twice its standard deviation (a level that their internal preference had only <5% chance of reaching), and their internal preference is below the rebellion threshold, then they experience a **freedom-fighter-chance** % probability of immediately rebelling (and external preference reaching rebellion threshold). 


## THINGS TO NOTICE

* The first observation should be that under most conditions, without propaganda (or penalty), the external preference approaches the internal preference over time. The rate of transmission directly influences this.

* Introduction of propagandists (or proxy for government/policing agents) directly starts increasing external preference. A key finding is that with enough propagandists and power (and low freedom-fighter chance), the external preference may **irrepairably** reach very high values, such that it may never be restored. This is a shout to **Pluralistic Ignorance**, or _“The lie”_ (Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1970).

* The starting conditions and the history of the simulation matter a lot in terms of determining the outcomes and responses. Mean and standard deviation of preferences do not completely represent underlying distributions which could be deeply fractured. The same "rebellion percentage" could be representative of vastly different scenarios.


## EXTENDING THE MODEL / KNOWN CAVEATS

The model obviously makes a lot of oversimplifying assumptions, not the least of which is the idea that there is a consistent rebellion threshold across the population (this in fact is in direct conflict with Kuran's theories).

Furthermore, the values and their effects are synthetic at best.

Viewers are welcome to copy, modify, and extend and refine the code to suit their needs. The code is open-sourced as per MIT license attached below.

## NETLOGO FEATURES

A key caveat of netlogo is that the world-state is evaluated synchronously per tick. This means that the agents/peeps are updated in some given sequence, rather than "asynchronously" or concurrently, in a true "continuous" sense as would happen in reality. Nevertheless, this does not deter from the insights available from this.

## CREDITS AND REFERENCES

Please enjoy the model under [this link](https://www.netlogoweb.org/launch#https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ca9/politics_simulations/master/prop.nlogo).

This work has been inspired by:

### Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989

#### Metadata

* Item Type: Article
* Authors: Timur Kuran
* Date: 1991
* URL: [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010422](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010422)
* DOI: [10.2307/2010422](https://doi.org/10.2307/2010422)

#### Abstract

Like many major revolutions in history, the East European Revolution of 1989 caught its leaders, participants, victims, and observers by surprise. This paper offers and explanation whose crucial feature is a distinction between private and public preferences. By suppressing their antipathies to the political status quo, the East Europeans misled everyone, including themselves, as to the possibility of a successful uprising. In effect, they conferred on their privately despised governments an aura of invincibility. Under the circumstances, public opposition was poised to grow explosively if ever enough people lost their fear of exposing their private preferences. The currently popular theories of revolution do not make clear why uprisings easily explained in retrospect may not have been anticipated. The theory developed here fills this void. Among its predictions is that political revolutions will inevitably continue to catch the world by surprise.

## MIT License

Copyright (c) [2021] [Aditya Gupta, agupta42@lse.ac.uk]

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:

The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
@#$#@#$#@
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Circle -16777216 true false 144 174 42
Circle -16777216 true false 24 174 42
Circle -7500403 false true 24 174 42
Circle -7500403 false true 144 174 42
Circle -7500403 false true 234 174 42

turtle
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0
Polygon -10899396 true false 215 204 240 233 246 254 228 266 215 252 193 210
Polygon -10899396 true false 195 90 225 75 245 75 260 89 269 108 261 124 240 105 225 105 210 105
Polygon -10899396 true false 105 90 75 75 55 75 40 89 31 108 39 124 60 105 75 105 90 105
Polygon -10899396 true false 132 85 134 64 107 51 108 17 150 2 192 18 192 52 169 65 172 87
Polygon -10899396 true false 85 204 60 233 54 254 72 266 85 252 107 210
Polygon -7500403 true true 119 75 179 75 209 101 224 135 220 225 175 261 128 261 81 224 74 135 88 99

wheel
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0
Circle -7500403 true true 3 3 294
Circle -16777216 true false 30 30 240
Line -7500403 true 150 285 150 15
Line -7500403 true 15 150 285 150
Circle -7500403 true true 120 120 60
Line -7500403 true 216 40 79 269
Line -7500403 true 40 84 269 221
Line -7500403 true 40 216 269 79
Line -7500403 true 84 40 221 269

wolf
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0
Polygon -16777216 true false 253 133 245 131 245 133
Polygon -7500403 true true 2 194 13 197 30 191 38 193 38 205 20 226 20 257 27 265 38 266 40 260 31 253 31 230 60 206 68 198 75 209 66 228 65 243 82 261 84 268 100 267 103 261 77 239 79 231 100 207 98 196 119 201 143 202 160 195 166 210 172 213 173 238 167 251 160 248 154 265 169 264 178 247 186 240 198 260 200 271 217 271 219 262 207 258 195 230 192 198 210 184 227 164 242 144 259 145 284 151 277 141 293 140 299 134 297 127 273 119 270 105
Polygon -7500403 true true -1 195 14 180 36 166 40 153 53 140 82 131 134 133 159 126 188 115 227 108 236 102 238 98 268 86 269 92 281 87 269 103 269 113

x
false
0
Polygon -7500403 true true 270 75 225 30 30 225 75 270
Polygon -7500403 true true 30 75 75 30 270 225 225 270
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NetLogo 6.2.0
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default
0.0
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0.0 1 1.0 0.0
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link direction
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Line -7500403 true 150 150 90 180
Line -7500403 true 150 150 210 180
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0
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