diff --git a/becoming_stronger.tex b/becoming_stronger.tex
index f1d3f99..59d085d 100644
--- a/becoming_stronger.tex
+++ b/becoming_stronger.tex
@@ -17,34 +17,45 @@ \part{Becoming Stronger}
 terms of Bayesian probability theory and decision theory is standard in
 cognitive science. For an introduction to the heuristics and biases
 approach, see Baron's \textit{Thinking and
-Deciding}.\textsuperscript{1} For a general introduction to the field,
+Deciding}.\footnote{Jonathan Baron, \textit{Thinking and Deciding} (Cambridge
+University Press, 2007).\comment{1}} For a general introduction to the field,
 see the \textit{Oxford Handbook of Thinking and
-Reasoning}.\textsuperscript{2}}
+Reasoning}.\footnote{Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison, \textit{The Oxford
+Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning} (Oxford University Press, 2013).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  The arguments made in these pages about the \textit{philosophy} of
 rationality are more controversial. Yudkowsky argues, for example, that
 a rational agent should one-box in Newcomb's
 Problem---a minority position among working decision
-theorists.\textsuperscript{3} (See Holt for a nontechnical description
-of Newcomb's Problem.\textsuperscript{4}) Gary
+theorists.\footnote{Bourget and Chalmers, ``What Do Philosophers
+Believe?''\comment{3}} (See Holt for a nontechnical description
+of Newcomb's Problem.\footnote{Holt, ``Thinking Inside the
+Boxes.''\comment{4}}) Gary
 Drescher's \textit{Good and Real} independently comes
 to many of the same conclusions as Yudkowsky on philosophy of science
-and decision theory.\textsuperscript{5} As such, it serves as an
+and decision theory.\footnote{Gary L. Drescher, \textit{Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes
+from Physics to Ethics} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).\comment{5}} As such, it serves as an
 excellent book-length treatment of the core philosophical content of
 \textit{Rationality: From AI to Zombies}.}
 
 {
  Talbott distinguishes several views in Bayesian epistemology,
 including E.T. Jaynes' position that not all possible
-priors are equally reasonable.\textsuperscript{6,7} Like Jaynes,
+priors are equally reasonable.\footnote{William Talbott, ``Bayesian
+Epistemology,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia
+of Philosophy}, Fall 2013, ed. Edward N. Zalta.\comment{6}}\supercomma\footnote{Jaynes, \textit{Probability Theory}.\comment{7}} Like Jaynes,
 Yudkowsky is interested in supplementing the Bayesian optimality
 criterion for belief revision with an optimality criterion for priors.
 This aligns Yudkowsky with researchers who hope to better understand
 general-purpose AI via an improved theory of ideal reasoning, such as
-Marcus Hutter.\textsuperscript{8} For a broader discussion of
+Marcus Hutter.\footnote{Marcus Hutter, \textit{Universal Artificial Intelligence:
+Sequential Decisions Based On Algorithmic Probability} (Berlin:
+Springer, 2005), doi:10.1007/b138233.\comment{8}} For a broader discussion of
 philosophical efforts to naturalize theories of knowledge, see
-Feldman.\textsuperscript{9}}
+Feldman.\footnote{Richard Feldman, ``Naturalized
+Epistemology,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia
+of Philosophy}, Summer 2012, ed. Edward N. Zalta.\comment{9}}}
 
 {
  ``Bayesianism'' is often
@@ -55,7 +66,9 @@ \part{Becoming Stronger}
 more ``subjective'' than
 Bayesianism, because frequentism's probability
 assignments depend on the intentions of the
-experimenter.\textsuperscript{10}}
+experimenter.\footnote{John K. Kruschke, ``What to Believe: Bayesian
+Methods for Data Analysis,'' \textit{Trends in
+Cognitive Sciences} 14, no. 7 (2010): 293--300.\comment{10}}}
 
 {
  Importantly, this philosophical disagreement
@@ -69,14 +82,22 @@ \part{Becoming Stronger}
 frequentist methods remain more popular, and in some contexts they are
 still clearly superior to Bayesian approaches.
 Kruschke's \textit{Doing Bayesian Data Analysis} is a
-fun and accessible introduction to the topic.\textsuperscript{11}}
+fun and accessible introduction to the topic.\footnote{John K. Kruschke, \textit{Doing Bayesian Data Analysis, Second
+Edition: A Tutorial with R, JAGS, and Stan} (Academic Press, 2014).\comment{11}}}
 
 {
  In light of evidence that training in statistics---and some other
 fields, such as psychology---improves reasoning skills outside the
 classroom, statistical literacy is directly relevant to the project of
 overcoming bias. (Classes in formal logic and informal fallacies have
-not proven similarly useful.)\textsuperscript{12,13}}
+not proven similarly useful.)\footnote{Geoffrey T. Fong, David H. Krantz, and Richard E. Nisbett,
+``The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking
+about Everyday Problems,'' \textit{Cognitive
+Psychology} 18, no. 3 (1986): 253--292,
+doi:10.1016/0010-0285(86)90001-0.\comment{12}}\supercomma\footnote{Paul J. H. Schoemaker, ``The Role of
+Statistical Knowledge in Gambling Decisions: Moment vs. Risk Dimension
+Approaches,'' \textit{Organizational Behavior and
+Human Performance} 24, no. 1 (1979): 1--17.\comment{13}}}
 
 {
  ~}
@@ -154,66 +175,6 @@ \subsection{An Art in its Infancy}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Jonathan Baron, \textit{Thinking and Deciding} (Cambridge
-University Press, 2007).}
-
-{
- 2. Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison, \textit{The Oxford
-Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning} (Oxford University Press, 2013).}
-
-{
- 3. Bourget and Chalmers, ``What Do Philosophers
-Believe?''}
-
-{
- 4. Holt, ``Thinking Inside the
-Boxes.''}
-
-{
- 5. Gary L. Drescher, \textit{Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes
-from Physics to Ethics} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).}
-
-{
- 6. William Talbott, ``Bayesian
-Epistemology,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia
-of Philosophy}, Fall 2013, ed. Edward N. Zalta.}
-
-{
- 7. Jaynes, \textit{Probability Theory}.}
-
-{
- 8. Marcus Hutter, \textit{Universal Artificial Intelligence:
-Sequential Decisions Based On Algorithmic Probability} (Berlin:
-Springer, 2005), doi:10.1007/b138233.}
-
-{
- 9. Richard Feldman, ``Naturalized
-Epistemology,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia
-of Philosophy}, Summer 2012, ed. Edward N. Zalta.}
-
-{
- 10. John K. Kruschke, ``What to Believe: Bayesian
-Methods for Data Analysis,'' \textit{Trends in
-Cognitive Sciences} 14, no. 7 (2010): 293--300.}
-
-{
- 11. John K. Kruschke, \textit{Doing Bayesian Data Analysis, Second
-Edition: A Tutorial with R, JAGS, and Stan} (Academic Press, 2014).}
-
-{
- 12. Geoffrey T. Fong, David H. Krantz, and Richard E. Nisbett,
-``The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking
-about Everyday Problems,'' \textit{Cognitive
-Psychology} 18, no. 3 (1986): 253--292,
-doi:10.1016/0010-0285(86)90001-0.}
-
-{
- 13. Paul J. H. Schoemaker, ``The Role of
-Statistical Knowledge in Gambling Decisions: Moment vs. Risk Dimension
-Approaches,'' \textit{Organizational Behavior and
-Human Performance} 24, no. 1 (1979): 1--17.}
-
 \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 
 \mysection{My Childhood Death Spiral}
@@ -1028,7 +989,8 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 race \ldots}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Gharlane of Eddore\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Gharlane of Eddore\footnote{Edward Elmer Smith, \textit{Second Stage Lensmen} (Old Earth
+Books, 1998).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -1391,10 +1353,6 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Edward Elmer Smith, \textit{Second Stage Lensmen} (Old Earth
-Books, 1998).}
-
 \mysection{That Tiny Note of Discord}
 
 {
@@ -1769,7 +1727,7 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 approaches simultaneously in a Manhattan Project.
 (``All parents did the things they tell their children
 not to do. That's how they know to tell them not to do
-it.''\textsuperscript{1}) It's not as
+it.''\footnote{John Moore, \textit{Slay and Rescue} (Xlibris Corp, 2000).\comment{1}}) It's not as
 if adding one more approach could \textit{hurt.}}
 
 {
@@ -1888,9 +1846,6 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. John Moore, \textit{Slay and Rescue} (Xlibris Corp, 2000).}
-
 \mysection{My Naturalistic Awakening}
 
 {
@@ -1933,7 +1888,9 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 the human brain for inspiration. (The paper in question is
 ``Levels of Organization in General
 Intelligence,'' a requested chapter for the volume
-\textit{Artificial General Intelligence},\textsuperscript{1} which
+\textit{Artificial General Intelligence},\footnote{Ben Goertzel and Cassio Pennachin, eds., \textit{Artificial
+General Intelligence}, Cognitive Technologies (Berlin: Springer, 2007),
+doi:10.1007/978-3-540-68677-4.\comment{1}} which
 finally came out in print in 2007.)}
 
 {
@@ -2129,11 +2086,6 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Ben Goertzel and Cassio Pennachin, eds., \textit{Artificial
-General Intelligence}, Cognitive Technologies (Berlin: Springer, 2007),
-doi:10.1007/978-3-540-68677-4.}
-
 \mysection{The Level Above Mine}
 
 {
@@ -3273,7 +3225,7 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
  \textit{Do nothing because it is righteous, or praiseworthy, or
 noble, to do so; do nothing because it seems good to do so; do only
 that which you must do, and which you cannot do in any other
-way.}\textsuperscript{1}}
+way.}\footnote{Le Guin, \textit{The Farthest Shore}.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Doing what it seemed good to do had only led me astray.}
@@ -3323,7 +3275,8 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 my ``searching for neat tools and
 algorithms'' mode. Reading \textit{Probabilistic
 Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible
-Inference},\textsuperscript{2} I could imagine how much time I would
+Inference},\footnote{Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
+Systems}.\comment{2}} I could imagine how much time I would
 have wasted on ad-hoc systems and special cases, if I
 hadn't known that key. ``Do only that
 which you must do, and which you cannot do in any other
@@ -3403,13 +3356,6 @@ \chapter{Yudkowsky's Coming of Age}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Le Guin, \textit{The Farthest Shore}.}
-
-{
- 2. Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
-Systems}.}
-
 \chapter{Challenging the Difficult}
 
 \mysection{Tsuyoku Naritai! (I Want to Become Stronger)}
@@ -3762,7 +3708,8 @@ \chapter{Challenging the Difficult}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Steven Brust, \textit{The Paths of the
-Dead}\textsuperscript{1}
+Dead}\footnote{Steven Brust, \textit{The Paths of the Dead}, Vol. 1 of The
+Viscount of Adrilankha (Tor Books, 2002).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -3826,10 +3773,6 @@ \chapter{Challenging the Difficult}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Steven Brust, \textit{The Paths of the Dead}, Vol. 1 of The
-Viscount of Adrilankha (Tor Books, 2002).}
-
 \mysection{Use the Try Harder, Luke}
 
 {
@@ -4370,7 +4313,9 @@ \chapter{Challenging the Difficult}
 not have the intention of surpassing others in whatever he does.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---\textit{Budo Shoshinshu}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---\textit{Budo Shoshinshu}\footnote{Daidoji Yuzan et al., \textit{Budoshoshinshu: The
+Warrior's Primer of Daidoji Yuzan} (Black Belt
+Communications Inc., 1984).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -4391,7 +4336,8 @@ \chapter{Challenging the Difficult}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---\textit{Flashing Steel: Mastering Eishin-Ryu
-Swordsmanship}\textsuperscript{2}
+Swordsmanship}\footnote{Masayuki Shimabukuro, \textit{Flashing Steel: Mastering
+Eishin-Ryu Swordsmanship} (Frog Books, 1995).\comment{2}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -4602,15 +4548,6 @@ \chapter{Challenging the Difficult}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daidoji Yuzan et al., \textit{Budoshoshinshu: The
-Warrior's Primer of Daidoji Yuzan} (Black Belt
-Communications Inc., 1984).}
-
-{
- 2. Masayuki Shimabukuro, \textit{Flashing Steel: Mastering
-Eishin-Ryu Swordsmanship} (Frog Books, 1995).}
-
 \mysection{Shut Up and Do the Impossible!}
 
 {
@@ -6119,7 +6056,10 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 having trouble remembering who; my records don't seem
 to show any email or \textit{Overcoming Bias} comment which told me of
 this 12-page essay, ``Epistemic Viciousness in the
-Martial Arts'' by Gillian Russell.\textsuperscript{1}
+Martial Arts'' by Gillian Russell.\footnote{Gillian Russell, ``Epistemic Viciousness in
+the Martial Arts,'' in \textit{Martial Arts and
+Philosophy: Beating and Nothingness}, ed. Graham Priest and Damon A.
+Young (Open Court, 2010).\comment{1}}
 Maybe Anna Salamon?}
 
 {
@@ -6236,12 +6176,6 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Gillian Russell, ``Epistemic Viciousness in
-the Martial Arts,'' in \textit{Martial Arts and
-Philosophy: Beating and Nothingness}, ed. Graham Priest and Damon A.
-Young (Open Court, 2010).}
-
 \mysection{Schools Proliferating Without Evidence}
 
 {
@@ -6252,7 +6186,8 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 \textit{House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth.} }
 
 {
- From \textit{House of Cards}, chapter 1:\textsuperscript{1}}
+ From \textit{House of Cards}, chapter 1:\footnote{Robyn M. Dawes, \textit{House of Cards: Psychology and
+Psychotherapy Built on Myth} (Free Press, 1996).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  The ability of these professionals has been subjected to empirical
@@ -6376,10 +6311,6 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robyn M. Dawes, \textit{House of Cards: Psychology and
-Psychotherapy Built on Myth} (Free Press, 1996).}
-
 \mysection{Three Levels of Rationality Verification}
 
 {
@@ -8373,7 +8304,10 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 \textit{anyone} report the smoke. Put the subject with two confederates
 who ignore the smoke, and they'll only report it 10\%
 on the time---even staying in the room until it becomes
-hazy.\textsuperscript{1} }
+hazy.\footnote{Bibb Latané and John M. Darley, ``Bystander
+`Apathy,'''
+\textit{American Scientist} 57, no. 2 (1969): 244--268,
+http://www.jstor.org/stable/27828530.\comment{1}} }
 
 {
  On the standard model, the two primary drivers of bystander apathy
@@ -8392,7 +8326,7 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 calm.}
 
 {
- Cialdini:\textsuperscript{2}}
+ Cialdini:\footnote{Cialdini, \textit{Influence}.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Very often an emergency is not obviously an emergency. Is the man
@@ -8492,15 +8426,6 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Bibb Latané and John M. Darley, ``Bystander
-`Apathy,'''
-\textit{American Scientist} 57, no. 2 (1969): 244--268,
-http://www.jstor.org/stable/27828530.}
-
-{
- 2. Cialdini, \textit{Influence}.}
-
 \mysection{Collective Apathy and the Internet}
 
 {
@@ -9896,7 +9821,8 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 you do begin to sense that more is possible---then you may just
 \textit{instantaneously} go wrong. As David Stove observes, most
 ``great thinkers'' in philosophy,
-e.g., Hegel, are properly objects of pity.\textsuperscript{1}
+e.g., Hegel, are properly objects of pity.\footnote{David Charles Stove, \textit{The Plato Cult and Other
+Philosophical Follies} (Cambridge University Press, 1991).\comment{1}}
 That's what happens by default to anyone who sets out
 to develop the art of thinking; they develop fake answers.}
 
@@ -10043,8 +9969,5 @@ \chapter{The Craft and the Community}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. David Charles Stove, \textit{The Plato Cult and Other
-Philosophical Follies} (Cambridge University Press, 1991).}
 
 
diff --git a/change_mind.tex b/change_mind.tex
index 6b827ff..42064e4 100644
--- a/change_mind.tex
+++ b/change_mind.tex
@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ \part{How to Actually Change Your Mind}
 math existed on a different and higher plane than beliefs that are
 merely ``private'' or
 ``subjective.'' But, writes Robin
-Hanson:\textsuperscript{1}}
+Hanson:\footnote{Robin Hanson, ``You Are Never Entitled to Your
+Opinion,'' \textit{Overcoming Bias (blog)} (2006),
+http://www.overcomingbias.com/2006/12/you\_are\_never\_e.html.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  You are never entitled to your opinion. Ever! You are not even
@@ -71,7 +73,12 @@ \part{How to Actually Change Your Mind}
 fifty-fifty.'' Even if you'd rather
 say ``I don't know''
 or ``Maybe'' and stop there, the
-answer is still 1:5.\textsuperscript{2}}
+answer is still 1:5.\footnote{This follows from the assumption that there are six
+possibilities and you have no reason to favor one of them over any of
+the others. We're also assuming, unrealistically, that
+you can really be certain the admirer is one of those six people, and
+that you aren't neglecting other possibilities. (What
+if more than one of the six people has a crush on you?)\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Suppose also that you've noticed you get winked at
@@ -186,15 +193,27 @@ \subsection{How to Not Actually Change Your Mind}
  Never mind getting rival factions to agree about complicated
 propositions in national politics or moral philosophy; students with
 different group loyalties couldn't even agree on what
-they were \textit{seeing}.\textsuperscript{3}}
+they were \textit{seeing}.\footnote{Albert Hastorf and Hadley Cantril, ``They Saw
+a Game: A Case Study,'' \textit{Journal of Abnormal
+and Social Psychology} 49 (1954): 129--134,
+http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/\~{}schaller/Psyc590Readings/Hastorf1954.pdf.\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  When something we care about is threatened---our world-view, our
 in-group, our social standing, or anything else---our thoughts and
-perceptions rally to their defense.\textsuperscript{4,5} Some
+perceptions rally to their defense.\footnote{Pronin, ``How We See Ourselves and How We See
+Others.''\comment{4}}\supercomma\footnote{Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper,
+``The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and
+Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut
+Massacre,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and Social
+Psychology} 49 (1985): 577--585,
+http://ssc.wisc.edu/\~{}jpiliavi/965/hwang.pdf.\comment{5}} Some
 psychologists these days go so far as to hypothesize that our ability
 to come up with explicit justifications for our conclusions evolved
-\textit{specifically} to help us win arguments.\textsuperscript{6}}
+\textit{specifically} to help us win arguments.\footnote{Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, ``Why Do Humans
+Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,''
+\textit{Behavioral and Brain Sciences} 34 (2011): 57--74,
+https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/904097/filename/MercierSperberWhydohumansreason.pdf.\comment{6}}}
 
 {
  One of the defining insights of 20th-century psychology, animating
@@ -209,9 +228,17 @@ \subsection{How to Not Actually Change Your Mind}
 doing any story-telling. When we seem to ``directly
 perceive'' things about ourselves in introspection,
 it often turns out to rest on tenuous implicit causal
-models.\textsuperscript{7,8} When we try to argue for our beliefs, we
+models.\footnote{Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy D. Wilson,
+``Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on
+Mental Processes,'' \textit{Psychological Review} 84
+(1977): 231--259,
+http://people.virginia.edu/\~{}tdw/nisbett\&wilson.pdf.\comment{7}}\supercomma\footnote{Eric Schwitzgebel, \textit{Perplexities of Consciousness} (MIT
+Press, 2011).\comment{8}} When we try to argue for our beliefs, we
 can come up with shaky reasoning bearing no relation to how we first
-arrived at the belief.\textsuperscript{9} Rather than judging our
+arrived at the belief.\footnote{Jonathan Haidt, ``The Emotional Dog and Its
+Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
+Judgment,'' \textit{Psychological Review} 108, no. 4
+(2001): 814--834, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814.\comment{9}} Rather than judging our
 explanations by their predictive power, we tell stories to make sense
 of what we think we know.}
 
@@ -310,7 +337,9 @@ \subsection{Rationality Applied}
  In a blog post discussing how rationality-enthusiast
 ``rationalists'' differ from
 anti-empiricist ``rationalists,''
-Scott Alexander observed:\textsuperscript{10}}
+Scott Alexander observed:\footnote{Scott Alexander, ``Why I Am Not Rene
+Descartes,'' \textit{Slate Star Codex (blog)} (2014),
+http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/11/27/why-i-am-not-rene-descartes/.\comment{10}}}
 
 {
  [O]bviously it's useful to have as much evidence
@@ -383,7 +412,9 @@ \subsection{Rationality Applied}
 students to \textit{notice what they're really seeing}
 won't be as easy as reciting the axioms of probability
 theory to them. As Luke Muehlhauser writes, in The Power of
-Agency:\textsuperscript{11}}
+Agency:\footnote{Luke Muehlhauser, ``The Power of
+Agency,'' \textit{Less Wrong (blog)} (2011),
+http://lesswrong.com/lw/5i8/the\_power\_of\_agency/.\comment{11}}}
 
 {
  You are not a Bayesian homunculus whose reasoning is
@@ -422,70 +453,6 @@ \subsection{Rationality Applied}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robin Hanson, ``You Are Never Entitled to Your
-Opinion,'' \textit{Overcoming Bias (blog)} (2006),
-http://www.overcomingbias.com/2006/12/you\_are\_never\_e.html.}
-
-{
- 2. This follows from the assumption that there are six
-possibilities and you have no reason to favor one of them over any of
-the others. We're also assuming, unrealistically, that
-you can really be certain the admirer is one of those six people, and
-that you aren't neglecting other possibilities. (What
-if more than one of the six people has a crush on you?)}
-
-{
- 3. Albert Hastorf and Hadley Cantril, ``They Saw
-a Game: A Case Study,'' \textit{Journal of Abnormal
-and Social Psychology} 49 (1954): 129--134,
-http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/\~{}schaller/Psyc590Readings/Hastorf1954.pdf.}
-
-{
- 4. Pronin, ``How We See Ourselves and How We See
-Others.''}
-
-{
- 5. Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper,
-``The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and
-Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut
-Massacre,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and Social
-Psychology} 49 (1985): 577--585,
-http://ssc.wisc.edu/\~{}jpiliavi/965/hwang.pdf.}
-
-{
- 6. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, ``Why Do Humans
-Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,''
-\textit{Behavioral and Brain Sciences} 34 (2011): 57--74,
-https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/904097/filename/MercierSperberWhydohumansreason.pdf.}
-
-{
- 7. Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy D. Wilson,
-``Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on
-Mental Processes,'' \textit{Psychological Review} 84
-(1977): 231--259,
-http://people.virginia.edu/\~{}tdw/nisbett\&wilson.pdf.}
-
-{
- 8. Eric Schwitzgebel, \textit{Perplexities of Consciousness} (MIT
-Press, 2011).}
-
-{
- 9. Jonathan Haidt, ``The Emotional Dog and Its
-Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
-Judgment,'' \textit{Psychological Review} 108, no. 4
-(2001): 814--834, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814.}
-
-{
- 10. Scott Alexander, ``Why I Am Not Rene
-Descartes,'' \textit{Slate Star Codex (blog)} (2014),
-http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/11/27/why-i-am-not-rene-descartes/.}
-
-{
- 11. Luke Muehlhauser, ``The Power of
-Agency,'' \textit{Less Wrong (blog)} (2011),
-http://lesswrong.com/lw/5i8/the\_power\_of\_agency/.}
-
 \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
 
 \mysection{The Proper Use of Humility}
@@ -657,7 +624,8 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
 ``Faced with the choice of changing
 one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so,
 almost everyone gets busy on the
-proof.''\textsuperscript{1} And the greater the
+proof.''\footnote{John Kenneth Galbraith, \textit{Economics, Peace and Laughter}
+(Plume, 1981), 50.\comment{1}} And the greater the
 \textit{inconvenience} of changing one's mind, the more
 effort people will expend on the proof.}
 
@@ -685,10 +653,6 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. John Kenneth Galbraith, \textit{Economics, Peace and Laughter}
-(Plume, 1981), 50.}
-
 \mysection{The Third Alternative}
 
 
@@ -1004,13 +968,13 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
  Now, there's a number of reasons my past self
 cannot claim a strict moral victory in this conversation. One reason is
 that I have no memory of whence I pulled that
-2\textsuperscript{750,000,000} figure, though it's
+$2^{750,000,000}$ figure, though it's
 probably the right meta-order of magnitude. The other reason is that my
 past self didn't apply the concept of a calibrated
 confidence. Of all the times over the history of humanity that a human
-being has calculated odds of 2\textsuperscript{750,000,000}:1 against
+being has calculated odds of $2^{750,000,000}$:1 against
 something, they have undoubtedly been wrong more often than once in
-2\textsuperscript{750,000,000} times. E.g. the shared genes estimate
+$2^{750,000,000}$ times. E.g. the shared genes estimate
 was revised to 95\%, not 98\%---and that may even apply only to the
 30,000 known genes and not the entire genome, in which case
 it's the wrong meta-order of magnitude.}
@@ -1103,7 +1067,8 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Marc Stiegler, \textit{David's
-Sling}\textsuperscript{1}
+Sling}\footnote{Marc Stiegler, \textit{David's Sling} (Baen,
+1988).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -1139,7 +1104,7 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
  Years ago, one of the strange little formative moments in my
 career as a rationalist was reading this paragraph from \textit{Player
 of Games} by Iain M. Banks, especially the sentence in
-bold:\textsuperscript{2}}
+bold:\footnote{Iain Banks, \textit{The Player of Games} (Orbit, 1989).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  A guilty system recognizes no innocents. As with any power
@@ -1303,7 +1268,8 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
 
 {
  G2 points us to Asimov's ``The
-Relativity of Wrong'':\textsuperscript{3}}
+Relativity of Wrong'':\footnote{Isaac Asimov, \textit{The Relativity of Wrong} (Oxford
+University Press, 1989).\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  When people thought the earth was flat, they were wrong. When
@@ -1317,17 +1283,6 @@ \chapter{Overly Convenient Excuses}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Marc Stiegler, \textit{David's Sling} (Baen,
-1988).}
-
-{
- 2. Iain Banks, \textit{The Player of Games} (Orbit, 1989).}
-
-{
- 3. Isaac Asimov, \textit{The Relativity of Wrong} (Oxford
-University Press, 1989).}
-
 \mysection{Absolute Authority}
 
 {
@@ -2487,7 +2442,10 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 Benefits'' studied whether subjects mixed up their
 judgments of the possible benefits of a technology (e.g., nuclear
 power), and the possible risks of that technology, into a single
-overall good or bad feeling about the technology.\textsuperscript{1}
+overall good or bad feeling about the technology.\footnote{Melissa L. Finucane et al., ``The Affect
+Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits,''
+\textit{Journal of Behavioral Decision Making} 13, no. 1 (2000):
+1--17.\comment{1}}
 Suppose that I first tell you that a particular kind of nuclear reactor
 generates less nuclear waste than competing reactor designs. But then I
 tell you that the reactor is more unstable than competing designs, with
@@ -2556,12 +2514,6 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Melissa L. Finucane et al., ``The Affect
-Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits,''
-\textit{Journal of Behavioral Decision Making} 13, no. 1 (2000):
-1--17.}
-
 \mysection{Correspondence Bias}
 
 {
@@ -2571,7 +2523,10 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 they occur.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Gilbert and Malone\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Gilbert and Malone\footnote{Daniel T. Gilbert and Patrick S. Malone, ``The
+Correspondence Bias,'' \textit{Psychological
+Bulletin} 117, no. 1 (1995): 21--38,
+http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/\~{}dtg/Gilbert\%20\&\%20Malone\%20(CORRESPONDENCE\%20BIAS).pdf.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -2617,7 +2572,10 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 behavior. When subjects are told that a pro-abortion or anti-abortion
 speaker was \textit{randomly assigned} to give a speech on that
 position, subjects still think the speakers harbor leanings in the
-direction randomly assigned.\textsuperscript{2}}
+direction randomly assigned.\footnote{Edward E. Jones and Victor A. Harris, ``The
+Attribution of Attitudes,'' \textit{Journal of
+Experimental Social Psychology} 3 (1967): 1--24,
+http://www.radford.edu/\~{}jaspelme/443/spring-2007/Articles/Jones\_n\_Harris\_1967.pdf.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  It seems quite intuitive to explain rain by water spirits; explain
@@ -2689,18 +2647,6 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel T. Gilbert and Patrick S. Malone, ``The
-Correspondence Bias,'' \textit{Psychological
-Bulletin} 117, no. 1 (1995): 21--38,
-http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/\~{}dtg/Gilbert\%20\&\%20Malone\%20(CORRESPONDENCE\%20BIAS).pdf.}
-
-{
- 2. Edward E. Jones and Victor A. Harris, ``The
-Attribution of Attitudes,'' \textit{Journal of
-Experimental Social Psychology} 3 (1967): 1--24,
-http://www.radford.edu/\~{}jaspelme/443/spring-2007/Articles/Jones\_n\_Harris\_1967.pdf.}
-
 \mysection{Are Your Enemies Innately Evil?}
 
 {
@@ -2847,7 +2793,9 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 it.''}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---H. Beam Piper, \textit{Police Operation}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---H. Beam Piper, \textit{Police Operation}\footnote{Henry Beam Piper, ``Police
+Operation,'' \textit{Astounding Science Fiction}
+(July 1948).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -2883,7 +2831,9 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
  This is an application of the general principle that, as Robert
 Pirsig puts it, ``The world's greatest
 fool may say the Sun is shining, but that doesn't make
-it dark out.''\textsuperscript{2}}
+it dark out.''\footnote{Robert M. Pirsig, \textit{Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
+Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values}, 1st ed. (New York: Morrow,
+1974).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  If you knew someone who was wrong 99.99\% of the time on yes-or-no
@@ -2980,16 +2930,6 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Henry Beam Piper, ``Police
-Operation,'' \textit{Astounding Science Fiction}
-(July 1948).}
-
-{
- 2. Robert M. Pirsig, \textit{Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
-Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values}, 1st ed. (New York: Morrow,
-1974).}
-
 \mysection{Argument Screens Off Authority}
 
 {
@@ -3154,9 +3094,11 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 independent of each other, given various background knowledge, actually
 turns into a quite technical topic. The books to read are Judea
 Pearl's \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
-Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference}\textsuperscript{1} and
+Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference}\footnote{Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
+Systems}.\comment{1}} and
 \textit{Causality: Models, Reasoning, and
-Inference}.\textsuperscript{2} (If you only have time to read one book,
+Inference}.\footnote{Judea Pearl, \textit{Causality: Models, Reasoning, and
+Inference}, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).\comment{2}} (If you only have time to read one book,
 read the first one.)}
 
 {
@@ -3298,14 +3240,6 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
-Systems}.}
-
-{
- 2. Judea Pearl, \textit{Causality: Models, Reasoning, and
-Inference}, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).}
-
 \mysection{Hug the Query}
 
 {
@@ -3345,7 +3279,8 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
  Jerry Cleaver said: ``What does you in is not
 failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique.
 It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on
-the ball.''\textsuperscript{1}}
+the ball.''\footnote{Jerry Cleaver, \textit{Immediate Fiction: A Complete Writing
+Course} (Macmillan, 2004).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Just as it is superior to argue physics than credentials, it is
@@ -3384,16 +3319,13 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Jerry Cleaver, \textit{Immediate Fiction: A Complete Writing
-Course} (Macmillan, 2004).}
-
 \mysection{Rationality and the English Language}
 
 {
  Responding to my discussion of applause lights, someone said that
 my writing reminded them of George Orwell's Politics
-and the English Language.\textsuperscript{1} I was honored. Especially
+and the English Language.\footnote{George Orwell, ``Politics and the English
+Language,'' \textit{Horizon} (April 1946).\comment{1}} I was honored. Especially
 since I'd already thought of today's
 topic. }
 
@@ -3551,10 +3483,6 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. George Orwell, ``Politics and the English
-Language,'' \textit{Horizon} (April 1946).}
-
 \mysection{Human Evil and Muddled Thinking}
 
 {
@@ -3575,7 +3503,7 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 convulsive effort to wrench it off its path. Orwell's
 weapon was clear writing. Orwell knew that muddled language is muddled
 thinking; he knew that human evil and muddled thinking intertwine like
-conjugate strands of DNA:\textsuperscript{1}}
+conjugate strands of DNA:\footnote{Ibid.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence
@@ -3620,7 +3548,7 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 ultimate villains are cutters and airbrushers of photographs (based on
 historical cutting and airbrushing in the Soviet Union). At the peak of
 all darkness in the Ministry of Love, O'Brien tortures
-Winston to admit that two plus two equals five:\textsuperscript{2}}
+Winston to admit that two plus two equals five:\footnote{George Orwell, \textit{1984} (Signet Classic, 1950).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  ``Do you remember,'' he went
@@ -3714,12 +3642,6 @@ \chapter{Politics and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Ibid.}
-
-{
- 2. George Orwell, \textit{1984} (Signet Classic, 1950).}
-
 
 \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 
@@ -3744,7 +3666,10 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 {
  Taber and Lodge's ``Motivated
 skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs''
-describes the confirmation of six predictions:\textsuperscript{1}}
+describes the confirmation of six predictions:\footnote{Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge, ``Motivated
+Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,''
+\textit{American Journal of Political Science} 50, no. 3 (2006):
+755--769, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Prior attitude effect. Subjects who feel strongly about an
@@ -3856,12 +3781,6 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge, ``Motivated
-Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,''
-\textit{American Journal of Political Science} 50, no. 3 (2006):
-755--769, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x.}
-
 \mysection{Update Yourself Incrementally}
 
 {
@@ -4797,7 +4716,7 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
  for they are already enduring it.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Eugene Gendlin\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Eugene Gendlin\footnote{Eugene T. Gendlin, \textit{Focusing} (Bantam Books, 1982).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -4811,9 +4730,6 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Eugene T. Gendlin, \textit{Focusing} (Bantam Books, 1982).}
-
 \mysection{Motivated Stopping and Motivated Continuation}
 
 {
@@ -5242,7 +5158,8 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 the instant of its creation to its ultimate end \ldots}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---\textit{First Lensman}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---\textit{First Lensman}\footnote{Edward Elmer Smith and A. J. Donnell, \textit{First Lensman}
+(Old Earth Books, 1997).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -5258,7 +5175,8 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 to perceive its truth.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---\textit{Gray Lensman}\textsuperscript{2}
+ {}---\textit{Gray Lensman}\footnote{Edward Elmer Smith and Ric Binkley, \textit{Gray Lensman} (Old
+Earth Books, 1998).\comment{2}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -5315,8 +5233,8 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 
 {
  A penny on Earth exerts a gravitational acceleration on the Moon
-of around 4.5 {\texttimes} 10\textsuperscript{{}-31}
-m/s\textsuperscript{2}, so in one sense it's not too
+of around $4.5 \times 10^{-31}\,
+\mathrm{m/s}^{2}$, so in one sense it's not too
 far wrong to say that every event is entangled with its whole past
 light cone. And since inferences can propagate backward and forward
 through causal networks, \textit{epistemic} entanglements can easily
@@ -5426,14 +5344,6 @@ \chapter{Against Rationalization}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Edward Elmer Smith and A. J. Donnell, \textit{First Lensman}
-(Old Earth Books, 1997).}
-
-{
- 2. Edward Elmer Smith and Ric Binkley, \textit{Gray Lensman} (Old
-Earth Books, 1998).}
-
 \mysection{Of Lies and Black Swan Blowups}
 
 {
@@ -5858,7 +5768,7 @@ \chapter{Against Doublethink}
 thought that defeated him.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---George Orwell, \textit{1984}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---George Orwell, \textit{1984}\footnote{Orwell, \textit{1984}.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -6000,9 +5910,6 @@ \chapter{Against Doublethink}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Orwell, \textit{1984}.}
-
 \mysection{No, Really, I've Deceived Myself}
 
 {
@@ -6164,7 +6071,8 @@ \chapter{Against Doublethink}
 person, present indicative.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Ludwig Wittgenstein\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Ludwig Wittgenstein\footnote{Ludwig Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations},
+trans. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -6182,7 +6090,8 @@ \chapter{Against Doublethink}
 what's been dropped.''}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Terry Pratchett, \textit{Maskerade}\textsuperscript{2}
+ {}---Terry Pratchett, \textit{Maskerade}\footnote{Terry Pratchett, \textit{Maskerade}, Discworld Series (ISIS,
+1997).\comment{2}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -6327,14 +6236,6 @@ \chapter{Against Doublethink}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations},
-trans. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).}
-
-{
- 2. Terry Pratchett, \textit{Maskerade}, Discworld Series (ISIS,
-1997).}
-
 \mysection{Moore's Paradox}
 
 {
@@ -6612,7 +6513,10 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 {
  Tversky and Kahneman recorded the estimates of subjects who saw
-the Wheel of Fortune showing various numbers.\textsuperscript{1} The
+the Wheel of Fortune showing various numbers.\footnote{Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ``Judgment
+Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,''
+\textit{Science} 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124--1131,
+doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124.\comment{1}} The
 median estimate of subjects who saw the wheel show 65 was 45\%; the
 median estimate of subjects who saw 10 was 25\%. }
 
@@ -6647,7 +6551,11 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 {
  Strack and Mussweiler asked for the year Einstein first visited
-the United States.\textsuperscript{2} Completely implausible anchors,
+the United States.\footnote{Fritz Strack and Thomas Mussweiler,
+``Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:
+Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility,''
+\textit{Journal of Personality and Social Psychology} 73, no. 3 (1997):
+437--446.\comment{2}} Completely implausible anchors,
 such as 1215 or 1992, produced anchoring effects just as large as more
 plausible anchors such as 1905 or 1939.}
 
@@ -6666,7 +6574,10 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 sounds implausible, try to throw it away entirely and come up with a
 new estimate, rather than sliding from the anchor. But this in itself
 may not be sufficient---subjects instructed to avoid anchoring still
-seem to do so.\textsuperscript{3} So, second, even if you are trying
+seem to do so.\footnote{George A. Quattrone et al., ``Explorations in
+Anchoring: The Effects of Prior Range, Anchor Extremity, and Suggestive
+Hints'' (Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University,
+1981).\comment{3}} So, second, even if you are trying
 the first method, try also to think of an anchor in the opposite
 direction---an anchor that is clearly too small or too large, instead
 of too large or too small---and dwell on it briefly.}
@@ -6676,25 +6587,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ``Judgment
-Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,''
-\textit{Science} 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124--1131,
-doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124.}
-
-{
- 2. Fritz Strack and Thomas Mussweiler,
-``Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:
-Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility,''
-\textit{Journal of Personality and Social Psychology} 73, no. 3 (1997):
-437--446.}
-
-{
- 3. George A. Quattrone et al., ``Explorations in
-Anchoring: The Effects of Prior Range, Anchor Extremity, and Suggestive
-Hints'' (Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University,
-1981).}
-
 \mysection{Priming and Contamination}
 
 {
@@ -6745,7 +6637,11 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
  In Mussweiler and Strack's experiment, subjects
 were asked an anchoring question: ``Is the annual mean
 temperature in Germany higher or lower than 5 C / 20
-C?''\textsuperscript{1} Afterward, on a
+C?''\footnote{Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack,
+``Comparing Is Believing: A Selective Accessibility
+Model of Judgmental Anchoring,'' \textit{European
+Review of Social Psychology} 10 (1 1999): 135--167,
+doi:10.1080/14792779943000044.\comment{1}} Afterward, on a
 word-identification task, subjects presented with the 5 C anchor were
 faster on identifying words like
 ``cold'' and
@@ -6761,7 +6657,10 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 ``information'' can influence
 estimates and decisions. In the field of heuristics and biases, this
 more general phenomenon is known as
-\textit{contamination}.\textsuperscript{2}}
+\textit{contamination}.\footnote{Gretchen B. Chapman and Eric J. Johnson,
+``Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments
+of Belief and Value,'' in Gilovich, Griffin, and
+Kahneman, \textit{Heuristics and Biases}, 120--138.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Early research in heuristics and biases discovered anchoring
@@ -6771,13 +6670,18 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 This effect was originally attributed to subjects adjusting from the
 anchor as a starting point, stopping as soon as they reached a
 plausible value, and under-adjusting because they were stopping at one
-end of a confidence interval.\textsuperscript{3}}
+end of a confidence interval.\footnote{Tversky and Kahneman, ``Judgment Under
+Uncertainty.''\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  Tversky and Kahneman's early hypothesis still
 appears to be the correct explanation in some circumstances, notably
 when subjects generate the initial estimate
-themselves.\textsuperscript{4} But modern research seems to show that
+themselves.\footnote{Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, ``Putting
+Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic: Differential
+Processing of Self-Generated and Experimentor-Provided
+Anchors,'' \textit{Psychological Science} 12 (5
+2001): 391--396, doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00372.\comment{4}} But modern research seems to show that
 most anchoring is actually due to contamination, not sliding
 adjustment. (Hat tip to Unnamed for reminding me of
 this---I'd read the Epley and Gilovich paper years ago,
@@ -6790,7 +6694,11 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 effective at getting customers to buy in larger quantities? You
 probably think you're not influenced. But
 \textit{someone} must be, because these signs have been shown to work,
-which is why stores keep putting them up.\textsuperscript{5}}
+which is why stores keep putting them up.\footnote{Brian Wansink, Robert J. Kent, and Stephen J. Hoch,
+``An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase
+Quantity Decisions,'' \textit{Journal of Marketing
+Research} 35, no. 1 (1998): 71--81,
+http://www.jstor.org/stable/3151931.\comment{5}}}
 
 {
  Yet the most fearsome aspect of contamination is that it serves as
@@ -6814,37 +6722,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack,
-``Comparing Is Believing: A Selective Accessibility
-Model of Judgmental Anchoring,'' \textit{European
-Review of Social Psychology} 10 (1 1999): 135--167,
-doi:10.1080/14792779943000044.}
-
-{
- 2. Gretchen B. Chapman and Eric J. Johnson,
-``Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments
-of Belief and Value,'' in Gilovich, Griffin, and
-Kahneman, \textit{Heuristics and Biases}, 120--138.}
-
-{
- 3. Tversky and Kahneman, ``Judgment Under
-Uncertainty.''}
-
-{
- 4. Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, ``Putting
-Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic: Differential
-Processing of Self-Generated and Experimentor-Provided
-Anchors,'' \textit{Psychological Science} 12 (5
-2001): 391--396, doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00372.}
-
-{
- 5. Brian Wansink, Robert J. Kent, and Stephen J. Hoch,
-``An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase
-Quantity Decisions,'' \textit{Journal of Marketing
-Research} 35, no. 1 (1998): 71--81,
-http://www.jstor.org/stable/3151931.}
-
 \mysection{Do We Believe Everything We're Told?}
 
 {
@@ -6894,11 +6771,17 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 distraction had no effect on identifying true propositions (55\%
 success for uninterrupted presentations, vs. 58\% when interrupted);
 but did affect identifying false propositions (55\% success when
-uninterrupted, vs. 35\% when interrupted).\textsuperscript{1}}
+uninterrupted, vs. 35\% when interrupted).\footnote{Daniel T. Gilbert, Douglas S. Krull, and Patrick S. Malone,
+``Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the
+Rejection of False Information,'' \textit{Journal of
+Personality and Social Psychology} 59 (4 1990): 601--613,
+doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.601.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  A much more dramatic illustration was produced in followup
-experiments by Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone.\textsuperscript{2}
+experiments by Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone.\footnote{Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone, ``You
+Can't Not Believe Everything You
+Read.''\comment{2}}
 Subjects read aloud crime reports crawling across a video monitor, in
 which the color of the text indicated whether a particular statement
 was true or false. Some reports contained false statements that
@@ -6951,18 +6834,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel T. Gilbert, Douglas S. Krull, and Patrick S. Malone,
-``Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the
-Rejection of False Information,'' \textit{Journal of
-Personality and Social Psychology} 59 (4 1990): 601--613,
-doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.601.}
-
-{
- 2. Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone, ``You
-Can't Not Believe Everything You
-Read.''}
-
 \mysection{Cached Thoughts}
 
 {
@@ -7220,7 +7091,8 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 {
  The eminent philosophers of Monty Python said it best of all in
-\textit{Life of Brian}:\textsuperscript{1}}
+\textit{Life of Brian}:\footnote{Graham Chapman et al., \textit{Monty Python's
+The Life of Brian (of Nazareth)} (Eyre Methuen, 1979).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  ``You've got to think for
@@ -7252,17 +7124,13 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Graham Chapman et al., \textit{Monty Python's
-The Life of Brian (of Nazareth)} (Eyre Methuen, 1979).}
-
 \mysection{Original Seeing}
 
 {
  Since Robert Pirsig put this very well, I'll just
 copy down what he said. I don't know if this story is
 based on reality or not, but either way, it's
-true.\textsuperscript{1}}
+true.\footnote{Pirsig, \textit{Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance}.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  He'd been having trouble with students who had
@@ -7354,9 +7222,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Pirsig, \textit{Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance}.}
-
 \mysection{Stranger than History}
 
 {
@@ -7457,7 +7322,10 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 the most diligent science fiction writers are, first and foremost,
 storytellers; the requirements of storytelling are not the same as the
 requirements of forecasting. As Nick Bostrom points
-out:\textsuperscript{1}}
+out:\footnote{Nick Bostrom, ``Existential Risks: Analyzing
+Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,''
+\textit{Journal of Evolution and Technology} 9 (2002),
+http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  When was the last time you saw a movie about humankind suddenly
@@ -7672,7 +7540,8 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 based on \textit{literally} zero evidence.''}
 
 {
- As George Orwell said of cliches:\textsuperscript{2}}
+ As George Orwell said of cliches:\footnote{Orwell, ``Politics and the English
+Language.''\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  What is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the word,
@@ -7685,7 +7554,7 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 {
  Yet in my estimation, the \textit{most} damaging aspect of using
 other authors' imaginations is that it stops people
-from using their own. As Robert Pirsig said:\textsuperscript{3}}
+from using their own. As Robert Pirsig said:\footnote{Pirsig, \textit{Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance}.\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  She was blocked because she was trying to repeat, in her writing,
@@ -7706,19 +7575,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Nick Bostrom, ``Existential Risks: Analyzing
-Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,''
-\textit{Journal of Evolution and Technology} 9 (2002),
-http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html.}
-
-{
- 2. Orwell, ``Politics and the English
-Language.''}
-
-{
- 3. Pirsig, \textit{Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance}.}
-
 \mysection{The Virtue of Narrowness}
 
 {
@@ -7851,7 +7707,8 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 {
  As Plato put it in \textit{The Republic, Book
-VII}:\textsuperscript{1}}
+VII}:\footnote{Plato, \textit{Great Dialogues of Plato}, ed. Eric H.
+Warmington and Philip G. Rouse (Signet Classic, 1999).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  If anyone should throw back his head and learn something by
@@ -7891,10 +7748,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Plato, \textit{Great Dialogues of Plato}, ed. Eric H.
-Warmington and Philip G. Rouse (Signet Classic, 1999).}
-
 \mysection{How to Seem (and Be) Deep}
 
 {
@@ -8070,7 +7923,10 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 lower probability, yielding an overall accuracy rate of 96\%.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky\footnote{Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, ``The Weighing
+of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence,''
+\textit{Cognitive Psychology} 24, no. 3 (1992): 411--435,
+doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-R.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -8129,17 +7985,11 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, ``The Weighing
-of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence,''
-\textit{Cognitive Psychology} 24, no. 3 (1992): 411--435,
-doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-R.}
-
 \mysection{Hold Off On Proposing Solutions}
 
 {
  From Robyn Dawes's \textit{Rational Choice in an
-Uncertain World}.\textsuperscript{1} Bolding added.}
+Uncertain World}.\footnote{Dawes, \textit{Rational Choice in An Uncertain World}, 55--56.\comment{1}} Bolding added.}
 
 {
  Norman R. F. Maier noted that when a group faces a problem, the
@@ -8248,9 +8098,6 @@ \chapter{Seeing with Fresh Eyes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Dawes, \textit{Rational Choice in An Uncertain World}, 55--56.}
-
 \mysection{The Genetic Fallacy}
 
 {
@@ -8409,7 +8256,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 pay for an insurance policy that paid out \$100 if the clock were lost
 in shipping? According to Hsee and Kunreuther, subjects stated
 willingness to pay more than twice as much in the first
-condition.\textsuperscript{1} This may sound rational---why not pay
+condition.\footnote{Christopher K. Hsee and Howard C. Kunreuther,
+``The Affection Effect in Insurance
+Decisions,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}
+20 (2 2000): 141--159, doi:10.1023/A:1007876907268.\comment{1}} This may sound rational---why not pay
 more to protect the more valuable object?---until you realize that the
 insurance doesn't \textit{protect} the clock, it just
 pays if the clock is lost, and pays exactly the same amount for either
@@ -8426,7 +8276,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
  Then how about this? Yamagishi showed that subjects judged a
 disease as more dangerous when it was described as killing 1,286 people
 out of every 10,000, versus a disease that was 24.14\% likely to be
-fatal.\textsuperscript{2} Apparently the mental image of a thousand
+fatal.\footnote{Kimihiko Yamagishi, ``When a 12.86\% Mortality
+Is More Dangerous than 24.14\%: Implications for Risk
+Communication,'' \textit{Applied Cognitive
+Psychology} 11 (6 1997): 461--554.\comment{2}} Apparently the mental image of a thousand
 dead bodies is much more alarming, compared to a single person
 who's more likely to survive than not.}
 
@@ -8439,7 +8292,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 on other aspects of airport safety. Slovic et al. presented two groups
 of subjects with the arguments for and against purchasing the
 equipment, with a response scale ranging from 0 (would not support at
-all) to 20 (very strong support).\textsuperscript{3} One group saw the
+all) to 20 (very strong support).\footnote{Paul Slovic et al., ``Rational Actors or
+Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral
+Economics,'' \textit{Journal of Socio-Economics} 31,
+no. 4 (2002): 329--342, doi:10.1016/S1053-5357(02)00174-9.\comment{3}} One group saw the
 measure described as saving 150 lives. The other group saw the measure
 described as saving 98\% of 150 lives. The hypothesis motivating the
 experiment was that saving 150 lives sounds vaguely good---is that a
@@ -8450,7 +8306,11 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 {
  Or consider the report of Denes-Raj and
-Epstein:\textsuperscript{4} Subjects offered an opportunity to win \$1
+Epstein:\footnote{Veronika Denes-Raj and Seymour Epstein,
+``Conflict between Intuitive and Rational Processing:
+When People Behave against Their Better Judgment,''
+\textit{Journal of Personality and Social Psychology} 66 (5 1994):
+819--829, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.819.\comment{4}} Subjects offered an opportunity to win \$1
 each time they randomly drew a red jelly bean from a bowl, often
 preferred to draw from a bowl with more red beans and a smaller
 proportion of red beans. E.g., 7 in 100 was preferred to 1 in 10.}
@@ -8474,7 +8334,8 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 food preservatives, presenting information about high benefits made
 people perceive lower risks; presenting information about higher risks
 made people perceive lower benefits; and so on across the
-quadrants.\textsuperscript{5} People conflate their judgments about
+quadrants.\footnote{Finucane et al., ``The Affect Heuristic in
+Judgments of Risks and Benefits.''\comment{5}} People conflate their judgments about
 particular good/bad aspects of something into an overall good or bad
 feeling about that thing.}
 
@@ -8487,7 +8348,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 {
  Ganzach found the same effect in the realm of
-finance.\textsuperscript{6} According to ordinary economic theory,
+finance.\footnote{Yoav Ganzach, ``Judging Risk and Return of
+Financial Assets,'' \textit{Organizational Behavior
+and Human Decision Processes} 83, no. 2 (2000): 353--370,
+doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2914.\comment{6}} According to ordinary economic theory,
 return and risk should correlate \textit{positively}{}---or to put it
 another way, people pay a premium price for safe investments, which
 lowers the return; stocks deliver higher returns than bonds, but have
@@ -8502,52 +8366,14 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
  For further reading I recommend Slovic's fine
 summary article, ``Rational Actors or Rational Fools:
 Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral
-Economics.''\textsuperscript{7}}
+Economics.''\footnote{Slovic et al., ``Rational Actors or Rational
+Fools.''\comment{7}}}
 
 \myendsectiontext
 
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Christopher K. Hsee and Howard C. Kunreuther,
-``The Affection Effect in Insurance
-Decisions,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}
-20 (2 2000): 141--159, doi:10.1023/A:1007876907268.}
-
-{
- 2. Kimihiko Yamagishi, ``When a 12.86\% Mortality
-Is More Dangerous than 24.14\%: Implications for Risk
-Communication,'' \textit{Applied Cognitive
-Psychology} 11 (6 1997): 461--554.}
-
-{
- 3. Paul Slovic et al., ``Rational Actors or
-Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral
-Economics,'' \textit{Journal of Socio-Economics} 31,
-no. 4 (2002): 329--342, doi:10.1016/S1053-5357(02)00174-9.}
-
-{
- 4. Veronika Denes-Raj and Seymour Epstein,
-``Conflict between Intuitive and Rational Processing:
-When People Behave against Their Better Judgment,''
-\textit{Journal of Personality and Social Psychology} 66 (5 1994):
-819--829, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.819.}
-
-{
- 5. Finucane et al., ``The Affect Heuristic in
-Judgments of Risks and Benefits.''}
-
-{
- 6. Yoav Ganzach, ``Judging Risk and Return of
-Financial Assets,'' \textit{Organizational Behavior
-and Human Decision Processes} 83, no. 2 (2000): 353--370,
-doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2914.}
-
-{
- 7. Slovic et al., ``Rational Actors or Rational
-Fools.''}
-
 \mysection{Evaluability (and Cheap Holiday Shopping)}
 
 {
@@ -8566,12 +8392,19 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 low-value options are valued more highly than high-value
 options''---if you buy someone a \$45 scarf, you are
 more likely to be seen as generous than if you buy them a \$55
-coat.\textsuperscript{1}}
+coat.\footnote{Christopher K. Hsee, ``Less Is Better: When
+Low-Value Options Are Valued More Highly than High-Value
+Options,'' \textit{Behavioral Decision Making} 11 (2
+1998): 107--121.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  This is a special case of a more general phenomenon. In an earlier
 experiment, Hsee asked subjects how much they would be willing to pay
-for a second-hand music dictionary:\textsuperscript{2}}
+for a second-hand music dictionary:\footnote{Christopher K. Hsee, ``The Evaluability
+Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and
+Separate Evaluations of Alternatives,''
+\textit{Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes} 67 (3
+1996): 247--257, doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0077.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Dictionary A, from 1993, with 10,000 entries, in like-new
@@ -8609,7 +8442,8 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 becomes evaluable, that facet swamps the importance of the torn cover.}
 
 {
- From Slovic et al.: Which would you prefer?\textsuperscript{3}}
+ From Slovic et al.: Which would you prefer?\footnote{Slovic et al., ``Rational Actors or Rational
+Fools.''\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  A 29/36 chance to win \$2.}
@@ -8739,23 +8573,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Christopher K. Hsee, ``Less Is Better: When
-Low-Value Options Are Valued More Highly than High-Value
-Options,'' \textit{Behavioral Decision Making} 11 (2
-1998): 107--121.}
-
-{
- 2. Christopher K. Hsee, ``The Evaluability
-Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and
-Separate Evaluations of Alternatives,''
-\textit{Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes} 67 (3
-1996): 247--257, doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0077.}
-
-{
- 3. Slovic et al., ``Rational Actors or Rational
-Fools.''}
-
 \mysection{Unbounded Scales, Huge Jury Awards, and Futurism}
 
 {
@@ -8827,7 +8644,15 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 bounded scale, or}
 
 {
- Assign a dollar value to punitive damages.\textsuperscript{1}}
+ Assign a dollar value to punitive damages.\footnote{Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein,
+``Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
+Punitive Damages,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and
+Uncertainty} 16 (1 1998): 48--86, doi:10.1023/A:1007710408413; Daniel
+Kahneman, Ilana Ritov, and David Schkade, ``Economic
+Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses
+to Public Issues,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and
+Uncertainty} 19, nos. 1--3 (1999): 203--235,
+doi:10.1023/A:1007835629236.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  And, lo and behold, while subjects correlated very well with each
@@ -8912,17 +8737,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein,
-``Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
-Punitive Damages,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and
-Uncertainty} 16 (1 1998): 48--86, doi:10.1023/A:1007710408413; Daniel
-Kahneman, Ilana Ritov, and David Schkade, ``Economic
-Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses
-to Public Issues,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and
-Uncertainty} 19, nos. 1--3 (1999): 203--235,
-doi:10.1023/A:1007835629236.}
-
 \mysection{The Halo Effect}
 
 {
@@ -8939,29 +8753,40 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 {
  The halo effect is the manifestation of the affect heuristic in
 social psychology. Robert Cialdini, in \textit{Influence: Science and
-Practice},\textsuperscript{1} summarizes:}
+Practice},\footnote{Robert B. Cialdini, \textit{Influence: Science and Practice}
+(Boston: Allyn \& Bacon, 2001).\comment{1}} summarizes:}
 
 {
  Research has shown that we automatically assign to good-looking
 individuals such favorable traits as talent, kindness, honesty, and
 intelligence (for a review of this evidence, see Eagly, Ashmore,
-Makhijani, and Longo, 1991).\textsuperscript{2} Furthermore, we make
+Makhijani, and Longo, 1991).\footnote{Alice H. Eagly et al., ``What Is Beautiful Is
+Good, But \ldots A Meta-analytic Review of Research on the Physical
+Attractiveness Stereotype,'' \textit{Psychological
+Bulletin} 110 (1 1991): 109--128, doi:10.1037/0033-2909.110.1.109.\comment{2}} Furthermore, we make
 these judgments without being aware that physical attractiveness plays
 a role in the process. Some consequences of this unconscious assumption
 that ``good-looking equals good''
 scare me. For example, a study of the 1974 Canadian federal elections
 found that attractive candidates received more than two and a half
 times as many votes as unattractive candidates (Efran and Patterson,
-1976).\textsuperscript{3} Despite such evidence of favoritism toward
+1976).\footnote{M. G. Efran and E. W. J. Patterson, ``The
+Politics of Appearance'' (Unpublished PhD thesis,
+1976).\comment{3}} Despite such evidence of favoritism toward
 handsome politicians, follow-up research demonstrated that voters did
 not realize their bias. In fact, 73 percent of Canadian voters surveyed
 denied in the strongest possible terms that their votes had been
 influenced by physical appearance; only 14 percent even allowed for the
 possibility of such influence (Efran and Patterson,
-1976).\textsuperscript{4} Voters can deny the impact of attractiveness
+1976).\footnote{Ibid.\comment{4}} Voters can deny the impact of attractiveness
 on electability all they want, but evidence has continued to confirm
 its troubling presence (Budesheim and DePaola,
-1994).\textsuperscript{5}}
+1994).\footnote{Thomas Lee Budesheim and Stephen DePaola,
+``Beauty or the Beast?: The Effects of Appearance,
+Personality, and Issue Information on Evaluations of Political
+Candidates,'' \textit{Personality and Social
+Psychology Bulletin} 20 (4 1994): 339--348,
+doi:10.1177/0146167294204001.\comment{5}}}
 
 {
  A similar effect has been found in hiring situations. In one
@@ -8969,11 +8794,16 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 accounted for more favorable hiring decisions than did job
 qualifications---this, even though the interviewers claimed that
 appearance played a small role in their choices (Mack and Rainey,
-1990).\textsuperscript{6} The advantage given to attractive workers
+1990).\footnote{Denise Mack and David Rainey, ``Female
+Applicants' Grooming and Personnel
+Selection,'' \textit{Journal of Social Behavior and
+Personality} 5 (5 1990): 399--407.\comment{6}} The advantage given to attractive workers
 extends past hiring day to payday. Economists examining US and Canadian
 samples have found that attractive individuals get paid an average of
 12--14 percent more than their unattractive coworkers (Hamermesh and
-Biddle, 1994).\textsuperscript{7}}
+Biddle, 1994).\footnote{Daniel S. Hamermesh and Jeff E. Biddle,
+``Beauty and the Labor Market,''
+\textit{The American Economic Review} 84 (5 1994): 1174--1194.\comment{7}}}
 
 {
  Equally unsettling research indicates that our judicial process is
@@ -8981,8 +8811,20 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 structure. It now appears that good-looking people are likely to
 receive highly favorable treatment in the legal system (see Castellow,
 Wuensch, and Moore, 1991; and Downs and Lyons, 1990, for
-reviews).\textsuperscript{8} For example, in a Pennsylvania study
-(Stewart, 1980),\textsuperscript{9} researchers rated the physical
+reviews).\footnote{Wilbur A. Castellow, Karl L. Wuensch, and Charles H. Moore,
+``Effects of Physical Attractiveness of the Plaintiff
+and Defendant in Sexual Harassment Judgments,''
+\textit{Journal of Social Behavior and Personality} 5 (6 1990):
+547--562; A. Chris Downs and Phillip M. Lyons,
+``Natural Observations of the Links Between
+Attractiveness and Initial Legal Judgments,''
+\textit{Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin} 17 (5 1991):
+541--547, doi:10.1177/0146167291175009.\comment{8}} For example, in a Pennsylvania study
+(Stewart, 1980),\footnote{John E. Stewart, ``Defendants'
+Attractiveness as a Factor in the Outcome of Trials: An Observational
+Study,'' \textit{Journal of Applied Social
+Psychology} 10 (4 1980): 348--361,
+doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1980.tb00715.x.\comment{9}} researchers rated the physical
 attractiveness of 74 separate male defendants at the start of their
 criminal trials. When, much later, the researchers checked court
 records for the results of these cases, they found that the handsome
@@ -8994,13 +8836,24 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 was the more attractive of the two, the average compensation was
 \$10,051. What's more, both male and female jurors
 exhibited the attractiveness-based favoritism (Kulka and Kessler,
-1978).\textsuperscript{10}}
+1978).\footnote{Richard A. Kulka and Joan B. Kessler, ``Is
+Justice Really Blind?: The Effect of Litigant Physical Attractiveness
+on Judicial Judgment,'' \textit{Journal of Applied
+Social Psychology} 8 (4 1978): 366--381,
+doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1978.tb00790.x.\comment{10}}}
 
 {
  Other experiments have demonstrated that attractive people are
 more likely to obtain help when in need (Benson, Karabenic, and Lerner,
-1976)\textsuperscript{11} and are more persuasive in changing the
-opinions of an audience (Chaiken, 1979) \ldots\textsuperscript{12}}
+1976)\footnote{Peter L. Benson, Stuart A. Karabenick, and Richard M. Lerner,
+``Pretty Pleases: The Effects of Physical
+Attractiveness, Race, and Sex on Receiving Help,''
+\textit{Journal of Experimental Social Psychology} 12 (5 1976):
+409--415, doi:10.1016/0022-1031(76)90073-1.\comment{11}} and are more persuasive in changing the
+opinions of an audience (Chaiken, 1979) \ldots\footnote{Shelly Chaiken, ``Communicator Physical
+Attractiveness and Persuasion,'' \textit{Journal of
+Personality and Social Psychology} 37 (8 1979): 1387--1397,
+doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.8.1387.\comment{12}}}
 
 {
  The influence of attractiveness on ratings of intelligence,
@@ -9034,81 +8887,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robert B. Cialdini, \textit{Influence: Science and Practice}
-(Boston: Allyn \& Bacon, 2001).}
-
-{
- 2. Alice H. Eagly et al., ``What Is Beautiful Is
-Good, But \ldots A Meta-analytic Review of Research on the Physical
-Attractiveness Stereotype,'' \textit{Psychological
-Bulletin} 110 (1 1991): 109--128, doi:10.1037/0033-2909.110.1.109.}
-
-{
- 3. M. G. Efran and E. W. J. Patterson, ``The
-Politics of Appearance'' (Unpublished PhD thesis,
-1976).}
-
-{
- 4. Ibid.}
-
-{
- 5. Thomas Lee Budesheim and Stephen DePaola,
-``Beauty or the Beast?: The Effects of Appearance,
-Personality, and Issue Information on Evaluations of Political
-Candidates,'' \textit{Personality and Social
-Psychology Bulletin} 20 (4 1994): 339--348,
-doi:10.1177/0146167294204001.}
-
-{
- 6. Denise Mack and David Rainey, ``Female
-Applicants' Grooming and Personnel
-Selection,'' \textit{Journal of Social Behavior and
-Personality} 5 (5 1990): 399--407.}
-
-{
- 7. Daniel S. Hamermesh and Jeff E. Biddle,
-``Beauty and the Labor Market,''
-\textit{The American Economic Review} 84 (5 1994): 1174--1194.}
-
-{
- 8. Wilbur A. Castellow, Karl L. Wuensch, and Charles H. Moore,
-``Effects of Physical Attractiveness of the Plaintiff
-and Defendant in Sexual Harassment Judgments,''
-\textit{Journal of Social Behavior and Personality} 5 (6 1990):
-547--562; A. Chris Downs and Phillip M. Lyons,
-``Natural Observations of the Links Between
-Attractiveness and Initial Legal Judgments,''
-\textit{Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin} 17 (5 1991):
-541--547, doi:10.1177/0146167291175009.}
-
-{
- 9. John E. Stewart, ``Defendants'
-Attractiveness as a Factor in the Outcome of Trials: An Observational
-Study,'' \textit{Journal of Applied Social
-Psychology} 10 (4 1980): 348--361,
-doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1980.tb00715.x.}
-
-{
- 10. Richard A. Kulka and Joan B. Kessler, ``Is
-Justice Really Blind?: The Effect of Litigant Physical Attractiveness
-on Judicial Judgment,'' \textit{Journal of Applied
-Social Psychology} 8 (4 1978): 366--381,
-doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1978.tb00790.x.}
-
-{
- 11. Peter L. Benson, Stuart A. Karabenick, and Richard M. Lerner,
-``Pretty Pleases: The Effects of Physical
-Attractiveness, Race, and Sex on Receiving Help,''
-\textit{Journal of Experimental Social Psychology} 12 (5 1976):
-409--415, doi:10.1016/0022-1031(76)90073-1.}
-
-{
- 12. Shelly Chaiken, ``Communicator Physical
-Attractiveness and Persuasion,'' \textit{Journal of
-Personality and Social Psychology} 37 (8 1979): 1387--1397,
-doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.8.1387.}
-
 \mysection{Superhero Bias}
 
 {
@@ -9155,7 +8933,8 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 you're pretty much invulnerable?}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Adam Warren, \textit{Empowered}, Vol. 1\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Adam Warren, \textit{Empowered}, Vol. 1\footnote{Adam Warren, \textit{Empowered}, vol. 1 (Dark Horse Books,
+2007).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -9270,10 +9049,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Adam Warren, \textit{Empowered}, vol. 1 (Dark Horse Books,
-2007).}
-
 \mysection{Mere Messiahs}
 
 {
@@ -9374,7 +9149,8 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 before science, religious honesty was not an oxymoron.}
 
 {
- As Sam Harris said:\textsuperscript{1}}
+ As Sam Harris said:\footnote{Sam Harris, \textit{The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the
+Future of Reason} (WW Norton \& Company, 2005).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  It is not enough that Jesus was a man who transformed himself to
@@ -9403,10 +9179,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Sam Harris, \textit{The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the
-Future of Reason} (WW Norton \& Company, 2005).}
-
 \mysection{Affective Death Spirals}
 
 {
@@ -10009,7 +9781,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
  In Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter's classic
 \textit{When Prophecy Fails}, one of the cult members walked out the
 door immediately after the flying saucer failed to
-land.\textsuperscript{1} Who gets fed up and leaves \textit{first}? An
+land.\footnote{Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter,
+\textit{When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a
+Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World}
+(Harper-Torchbooks, 1956).\comment{1}} Who gets fed up and leaves \textit{first}? An
 \textit{average} cult member? Or a relatively more skeptical member,
 who previously might have been acting as a voice of moderation, a brake
 on the more fanatic members?}
@@ -10102,12 +9877,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter,
-\textit{When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a
-Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World}
-(Harper-Torchbooks, 1956).}
-
 \mysection{When None Dare Urge Restraint}
 
 {
@@ -10238,7 +10007,9 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
  But we'd have been more paranoid if
 we'd read ``Intergroup Conflict and
 Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment'' by Sherif,
-Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif.\textsuperscript{1} In this study, the
+Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif.\footnote{Muzafer Sherif et al., ``Study of Positive and
+Negative Intergroup Attitudes Between Experimentally Produced Groups:
+Robbers Cave Study,'' Unpublished manuscript (1954).\comment{1}} In this study, the
 experimental subjects---excuse me,
 ``campers''---were 22 boys between
 fifth and sixth grade, selected from 22 different schools in Oklahoma
@@ -10380,11 +10151,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Muzafer Sherif et al., ``Study of Positive and
-Negative Intergroup Attitudes Between Experimentally Produced Groups:
-Robbers Cave Study,'' Unpublished manuscript (1954).}
-
 \mysection{Every Cause Wants to Be a Cult}
 
 {
@@ -10575,7 +10341,8 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---\textit{The Way of Chuang Tzu}, trans. Thomas
-Merton\textsuperscript{1}
+Merton\footnote{Zhuangzi and Thomas Merton, \textit{The Way of Chuang Tzu} (New
+Directions Publishing, 1965).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -10729,10 +10496,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Zhuangzi and Thomas Merton, \textit{The Way of Chuang Tzu} (New
-Directions Publishing, 1965).}
-
 \mysection{Guardians of the Gene Pool}
 
 {
@@ -10791,7 +10554,9 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Michael Shermer, ``The Unlikeliest Cult in
-History''\textsuperscript{1}
+History''\footnote{Michael Shermer, ``The Unlikeliest Cult in
+History,'' \textit{Skeptic} 2, no. 2 (1993): 74--81,
+http://www.2think.org/02\_2\_she.shtml.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -11058,11 +10823,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Michael Shermer, ``The Unlikeliest Cult in
-History,'' \textit{Skeptic} 2, no. 2 (1993): 74--81,
-http://www.2think.org/02\_2\_she.shtml.}
-
 \mysection{Two Cult Koans}
 
 {
@@ -11244,7 +11004,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
  That we have found the tendency to conformity in our society so
 strong \ldots is a matter of concern. It raises questions about our ways
 of education and about the values that guide our
-conduct.\textsuperscript{1}}
+conduct.\footnote{Solomon E. Asch, ``Studies of Independence and
+Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous
+Majority,'' \textit{Psychological Monographs} 70
+(1956).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  It is not a trivial question whether the subjects of
@@ -11287,7 +11050,10 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 I've described so far. But as you might expect, the
 devil is in the details of the experimental results. According to a
 meta-analysis of over a hundred replications by Smith and
-Bond:\textsuperscript{2}}
+Bond:\footnote{Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith, ``Culture and
+Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch's
+(1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task,''
+\textit{Psychological Bulletin} 119 (1996): 111--137.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Conformity increases strongly up to 3 confederates, but
@@ -11363,18 +11129,6 @@ \chapter{Death Spirals}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Solomon E. Asch, ``Studies of Independence and
-Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous
-Majority,'' \textit{Psychological Monographs} 70
-(1956).}
-
-{
- 2. Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith, ``Culture and
-Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch's
-(1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task,''
-\textit{Psychological Bulletin} 119 (1996): 111--137.}
-
 \mysection{On Expressing Your Concerns}
 
 {
@@ -12629,7 +12383,8 @@ \chapter{Letting Go}
 {
  Ursula K. LeGuin wrote: ``In innocence there is
 no strength against evil. But there is strength in it for
-good.''\textsuperscript{1} Innocent curiosity may
+good.''\footnote{Ursula K. Le Guin, \textit{The Farthest Shore} (Saga Press,
+2001).\comment{1}} Innocent curiosity may
 turn innocently awry; and so the training of a rationalist, and its
 accompanying sophistication, must be dared as a danger if we want to
 become stronger. Nonetheless we can try to keep the lightness and the
@@ -12725,10 +12480,6 @@ \chapter{Letting Go}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Ursula K. Le Guin, \textit{The Farthest Shore} (Saga Press,
-2001).}
-
 \mysection{No One Can Exempt You From Rationality's Laws}
 
 {
@@ -12863,7 +12614,7 @@ \chapter{Letting Go}
  An alternative to death.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War}\footnote{Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War} (Cloud Hands, Inc., 2004).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -12876,7 +12627,8 @@ \chapter{Letting Go}
  Don't raise the pressure, lower the wall.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Lois McMaster Bujold, \textit{Komarr}\textsuperscript{2}
+ {}---Lois McMaster Bujold, \textit{Komarr}\footnote{Lois McMaster Bujold, \textit{Komarr}, Miles Vorkosigan
+Adventures (Baen, 1999).\comment{2}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -13030,13 +12782,6 @@ \chapter{Letting Go}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War} (Cloud Hands, Inc., 2004).}
-
-{
- 2. Lois McMaster Bujold, \textit{Komarr}, Miles Vorkosigan
-Adventures (Baen, 1999).}
-
 \mysection{Crisis of Faith}
 
 {
@@ -13689,3 +13434,4 @@ \chapter{Letting Go}
 \myendsectiontext
 
 
+
diff --git a/machine_in_ghost.tex b/machine_in_ghost.tex
index 29fa910..de3bfdb 100644
--- a/machine_in_ghost.tex
+++ b/machine_in_ghost.tex
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ \subsection{Ghosts and Machines}
 arguing that minds and brains are fundamentally distinct and separate
 phenomena. This is the view the philosopher Gilbert Ryle called
 ``the dogma of the Ghost in the
-Machine.''\textsuperscript{1} But modern scientists
+Machine.''\footnote{Gilbert Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind} (University of
+Chicago Press, 1949).\comment{1}} But modern scientists
 and philosophers who have rejected dualism haven't
 necessarily replaced it with a better predictive model of how the mind
 works. \textit{Practically} speaking, our purposes and desires still
@@ -187,7 +188,11 @@ \subsection{Rebuilding Intelligence}
 Good's older term, ``intelligence
 explosion,'' to help distinguish his views from other
 futurist predictions, such as Ray Kurzweil's
-exponential technological progress thesis.\textsuperscript{2}}
+exponential technological progress thesis.\footnote{Irving John Good, ``Speculations Concerning
+the First Ultraintelligent Machine,'' in
+\textit{Advances in Computers}, ed. Franz L. Alt and Morris Rubinoff,
+vol. 6 (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 31--88,
+doi:10.1016/S0065-2458(08)60418-0.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Technologies like smarter-than-human AI seem likely to result in
@@ -211,12 +216,15 @@ \subsection{Rebuilding Intelligence}
 position. Nick Bostrom's book
 \textit{Superintelligence} provides a big-picture summary of the many
 moral and strategic questions raised by smarter-than-human
-AI.\textsuperscript{3}}
+AI.\footnote{Nick Bostrom, \textit{Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers,
+Strategies} (Oxford University Press, 2014).\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  For a general introduction to the field of AI, the most widely
 used textbook is Russell and Norvig's
-\textit{Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach}.\textsuperscript{4}
+\textit{Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach}.\footnote{Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, \textit{Artificial
+Intelligence: A Modern Approach}, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
+Prentice-Hall, 2010).\comment{4}}
 In a chapter discussing the moral and philosophical questions raised by
 AI, Russell and Norvig note the technical difficulty of specifying good
 behavior in strongly adaptive AI:}
@@ -238,9 +246,13 @@ \subsection{Rebuilding Intelligence}
 nanotechnology, biotechnology, and other fields could endanger human
 civilization, Bostrom and \'Cirkovi\'c compiled the first academic
 anthology on the topic, \textit{Global Catastrophic
-Risks}.\textsuperscript{5} The most extreme of these are the
+Risks}.\footnote{Bostrom and \'Cirkovi\'c, \textit{Global Catastrophic Risks}.\comment{5}} The most extreme of these are the
 \textit{existential risks}, risks that could result in the permanent
-stagnation or extinction of humanity.\textsuperscript{6}}
+stagnation or extinction of humanity.\footnote{An example of a possible existential risk is the
+``grey goo'' scenario, in which
+molecular robots designed to efficiently self-replicate do their job
+too well, rapidly outcompeting living organisms as they consume the
+Earth's available matter.\comment{6}}}
 
 {
  People (experts included) tend to be \textit{extraordinarily bad}
@@ -256,7 +268,10 @@ \subsection{Rebuilding Intelligence}
 science and AI. Yudkowsky and Bostrom summarize near-term concerns
 along with long-term ones in a chapter of the \textit{Cambridge
 Handbook of Artificial Intelligence}, ``The ethics of
-artificial intelligence.''\textsuperscript{7}}
+artificial intelligence.''\footnote{Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky, ``The
+Ethics of Artificial Intelligence,'' in \textit{The
+Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence}, ed. Keith Frankish and
+William Ramsey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).\comment{7}}}
 
 {
  Though this is a book about \textit{human} rationality, the topic
@@ -284,42 +299,6 @@ \subsection{Rebuilding Intelligence}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Gilbert Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind} (University of
-Chicago Press, 1949).}
-
-{
- 2. Irving John Good, ``Speculations Concerning
-the First Ultraintelligent Machine,'' in
-\textit{Advances in Computers}, ed. Franz L. Alt and Morris Rubinoff,
-vol. 6 (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 31--88,
-doi:10.1016/S0065-2458(08)60418-0.}
-
-{
- 3. Nick Bostrom, \textit{Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers,
-Strategies} (Oxford University Press, 2014).}
-
-{
- 4. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, \textit{Artificial
-Intelligence: A Modern Approach}, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
-Prentice-Hall, 2010).}
-
-{
- 5. Bostrom and \'Cirkovi\'c, \textit{Global Catastrophic Risks}.}
-
-{
- 6. An example of a possible existential risk is the
-``grey goo'' scenario, in which
-molecular robots designed to efficiently self-replicate do their job
-too well, rapidly outcompeting living organisms as they consume the
-Earth's available matter.}
-
-{
- 7. Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky, ``The
-Ethics of Artificial Intelligence,'' in \textit{The
-Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence}, ed. Keith Frankish and
-William Ramsey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).}
-
 \mysectionnn{Interlude The Power of Intelligence}
 
 {
@@ -554,7 +533,8 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 Darwin, ``that a beneficent and omnipotent God would
 have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of
 their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars, or that a cat
-should play with mice.''\textsuperscript{1} I wonder
+should play with mice.''\footnote{Francis Darwin, ed., \textit{The Life and Letters of Charles
+Darwin}, vol. 2 (John Murray, 1887).\comment{1}} I wonder
 if any earlier thinker remarked on the excellent evidence thus provided
 for Manichaean religions over monotheistic ones.}
 
@@ -593,7 +573,9 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
  ``Many non-biologists,''
 observed George Williams, ``think that it is for their
 benefit that rattles grow on rattlesnake
-tails.''\textsuperscript{2} Bzzzt! \textit{This} kind
+tails.''\footnote{George C. Williams, \textit{Adaptation and Natural Selection: A
+Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought}, Princeton Science
+Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).\comment{2}} Bzzzt! \textit{This} kind
 of purposefulness is not allowed. Evolution doesn't
 work by letting flashes of purposefulness creep in at
 random---reshaping one species for the benefit of a random recipient.}
@@ -882,15 +864,6 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Francis Darwin, ed., \textit{The Life and Letters of Charles
-Darwin}, vol. 2 (John Murray, 1887).}
-
-{
- 2. George C. Williams, \textit{Adaptation and Natural Selection: A
-Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought}, Princeton Science
-Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).}
-
 \mysection{The Wonder of Evolution}
 
 {
@@ -1064,7 +1037,8 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 a designer, would be like a sophisticated modern bacterium trying to
 imitate the first replicator as a biochemist. As T. H. Huxley,
 ``Darwin's
-Bulldog,'' put it:\textsuperscript{1}}
+Bulldog,'' put it:\footnote{Thomas Henry Huxley, \textit{Evolution and Ethics and Other
+Essays} (Macmillan, 1894).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Let us understand, once and for all, that the ethical progress of
@@ -1080,10 +1054,6 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Thomas Henry Huxley, \textit{Evolution and Ethics and Other
-Essays} (Macmillan, 1894).}
-
 \mysection{Evolutions Are Stupid (But Work Anyway)}
 
 {
@@ -1148,7 +1118,8 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
  Thus, if the population size were 1,000,000---the estimated
 population in hunter-gatherer times---then it would require 2,763
 generations for a gene conveying a 1\% advantage to spread through the
-gene pool.\textsuperscript{1}}
+gene pool.\footnote{Dan Graur and Wen-Hsiung Li, \textit{Fundamentals of Molecular
+Evolution}, 2nd ed. (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 2000).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  This should not be surprising; genes have to do all their own work
@@ -1179,9 +1150,12 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 {
  A mutation conveying a 3\% advantage (which is pretty darned
 large, as mutations go) has a 6\% chance of spreading, at least on that
-occasion.\textsuperscript{2} Mutations can happen more than once, but
+occasion.\footnote{John B. S. Haldane, ``A Mathematical Theory of
+Natural and Artificial Selection,''
+\textit{Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical
+Society} 23 (5 1927): 607--615, doi:10.1017/S0305004100011750.\comment{2}} Mutations can happen more than once, but
 in a population of a million with a copying fidelity of
-10\textsuperscript{{}-8} errors per base per generation, you may have
+$10^{-8}$ errors per base per generation, you may have
 to wait a hundred generations for another chance, and then it still has
 only a 6\% chance of fixating. }
 
@@ -1285,16 +1259,6 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Dan Graur and Wen-Hsiung Li, \textit{Fundamentals of Molecular
-Evolution}, 2nd ed. (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 2000).}
-
-{
- 2. John B. S. Haldane, ``A Mathematical Theory of
-Natural and Artificial Selection,''
-\textit{Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical
-Society} 23 (5 1927): 607--615, doi:10.1017/S0305004100011750.}
-
 \mysection{No Evolutions for Corporations or Nanodevices}
 
 {
@@ -1428,7 +1392,7 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 ago will blur itself out. Yes, the personality of a corporation can
 influence its spinoff---but that's nothing like the
 heritability of DNA, which is digital rather than analog, and can
-transmit itself with 10\textsuperscript{{}-8} errors per base per
+transmit itself with $10^{-8}$ errors per base per
 generation.}
 
 {
@@ -1922,7 +1886,10 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 randomly selected neighbor, where a
 ``neighbor'' is any other fox who
 benefits from an altruistic fox's
-restraint.\textsuperscript{1}}
+restraint.\footnote{David Sloan Wilson, ``A Theory of Group
+Selection,'' \textit{Proceedings of the National
+Academy of Sciences of the United States of America} 72, no. 1 (1975):
+143--146.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  So is the cost of restrained breeding sufficiently small, and the
@@ -1967,7 +1934,11 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 individual selection were too extreme to be found in Nature. Why not
 create them artificially, in the laboratory? Michael J. Wade proceeded
 to do just that, repeatedly selecting populations of insects for low
-numbers of adults per subpopulation.\textsuperscript{2} And what was
+numbers of adults per subpopulation.\footnote{Michael J. Wade, ``Group selections among
+laboratory populations of Tribolium,''
+\textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
+States of America} 73, no. 12 (1976): 4604--4607,
+doi:10.1073/pnas.73.12.4604.\comment{2}} And what was
 the result? Did the insects restrain their breeding and live in quiet
 peace with enough food for all?}
 
@@ -2068,19 +2039,6 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. David Sloan Wilson, ``A Theory of Group
-Selection,'' \textit{Proceedings of the National
-Academy of Sciences of the United States of America} 72, no. 1 (1975):
-143--146.}
-
-{
- 2. Michael J. Wade, ``Group selections among
-laboratory populations of Tribolium,''
-\textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
-States of America} 73, no. 12 (1976): 4604--4607,
-doi:10.1073/pnas.73.12.4604.}
-
 \mysection{Fake Optimization Criteria}
 
 {
@@ -2204,7 +2162,11 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 {\raggedleft
  {}---John Tooby and Leda Cosmides,\newline
  ``The Psychological Foundations of
-Culture''\textsuperscript{1}
+Culture''\footnote{John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, ``The
+Psychological Foundations of Culture,'' in
+\textit{The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of
+Culture}, ed. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby (New
+York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19--136.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -2348,13 +2310,6 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, ``The
-Psychological Foundations of Culture,'' in
-\textit{The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of
-Culture}, ed. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby (New
-York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19--136.}
-
 \mysection{Evolutionary Psychology}
 
 {
@@ -2581,7 +2536,12 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Robert Wright, \textit{The Moral Animal},\newline
- summarizing Crawford et al.\textsuperscript{1}
+ summarizing Crawford et al.\footnote{Robert Wright, \textit{The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We
+Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology} (Pantheon Books,
+1994); Charles B. Crawford, Brenda E. Salter, and Kerry L. Jang,
+``Human Grief: Is Its Intensity Related to the
+Reproductive Value of the Deceased?,''
+\textit{Ethology and Sociobiology} 10, no. 4 (1989): 297--307.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -2740,14 +2700,6 @@ \chapter{The Simple Math of Evolution}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robert Wright, \textit{The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We
-Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology} (Pantheon Books,
-1994); Charles B. Crawford, Brenda E. Salter, and Kerry L. Jang,
-``Human Grief: Is Its Intensity Related to the
-Reproductive Value of the Deceased?,''
-\textit{Ethology and Sociobiology} 10, no. 4 (1989): 297--307.}
-
 \mysection{Superstimuli and the Collapse of Western Civilization}
 
 {
@@ -4332,7 +4284,8 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 {
  If you read Judea Pearl's \textit{Probabilistic
 Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible
-Inference},\textsuperscript{1} then you will see that the basic insight
+Inference},\footnote{Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
+Systems}.\comment{1}} then you will see that the basic insight
 behind graphical models is \textit{indispensable} to problems that
 require it. (It's not something that fits on a T-shirt,
 I'm afraid, so you'll have to go and
@@ -4391,10 +4344,6 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
-Systems}.}
-
 \mysection{Terminal Values and Instrumental Values}
 
 {
@@ -5331,7 +5280,8 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 population. Later on, when Michael J. Wade actually went out and
 created in the laboratory the nigh-impossible conditions for group
 selection, the adults adapted to cannibalize eggs and larvae,
-especially female larvae.\textsuperscript{1}}
+especially female larvae.\footnote{Wade, ``Group selections among laboratory
+populations of Tribolium.''\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Now, why might the group selectionists have \textit{not} thought
@@ -5517,10 +5467,6 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Wade, ``Group selections among laboratory
-populations of Tribolium.''}
-
 \mysection{Lost Purposes}
 
 {
@@ -5682,7 +5628,8 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 of the wisher.}
 
 {
- Miyamoto Musashi said:\textsuperscript{1}}
+ Miyamoto Musashi said:\footnote{Miyamoto Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings} (New Line
+Publishing, 2003).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  The primary thing when you take a sword in your hands is your
@@ -5717,7 +5664,7 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 thoroughly research this.}
 
 {
- C. J. Cherryh said:\textsuperscript{2}}
+ C. J. Cherryh said:\footnote{Carolyn J. Cherryh, \textit{The Paladin} (Baen, 2002).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Your sword has no blade. It has only your intention. When that
@@ -5790,20 +5737,15 @@ \chapter{Fragile Purposes}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Miyamoto Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings} (New Line
-Publishing, 2003).}
-
-{
- 2. Carolyn J. Cherryh, \textit{The Paladin} (Baen, 2002).}
-
 \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \mysection{The Parable of the Dagger}
 
 {
  \textit{(Adapted from Raymond
-Smullyan.}\textit{\textsuperscript{1}}\textit{)} }
+Smullyan.}\textit{\footnote{Raymond M. Smullyan, \textit{What Is the Name of This Book?:
+The Riddle of Dracula and Other Logical Puzzles} (Penguin Books,
+1990).\comment{1}}}\textit{)} }
 
 {
  Once upon a time, there was a court jester who dabbled in logic.}
@@ -5896,11 +5838,6 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Raymond M. Smullyan, \textit{What Is the Name of This Book?:
-The Riddle of Dracula and Other Logical Puzzles} (Penguin Books,
-1990).}
-
 \mysection{The Parable of Hemlock}
 
 {
@@ -6326,7 +6263,8 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 on gasolene; and the material of that is a specimen of lithium.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Charles Sanders Peirce\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Charles Sanders Peirce\footnote{Charles Sanders Peirce, \textit{Collected Papers} (Harvard
+University Press, 1931).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -6463,10 +6401,6 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Charles Sanders Peirce, \textit{Collected Papers} (Harvard
-University Press, 1931).}
-
 \mysection{Similarity Clusters}
 
 {
@@ -6567,13 +6501,18 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 study this sort of thing experimentally, do so under the heading of
 ``typicality effects'' or
 ``prototype
-effects.''\textsuperscript{1} For example, if you ask
+effects.''\footnote{Eleanor Rosch, ``Principles of
+Categorization,'' in \textit{Cognition and
+Categorization}, ed. Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ:
+Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978).\comment{1}} For example, if you ask
 subjects to press a button to indicate
 ``true'' or
 ``false'' in response to statements
 like ``A robin is a bird'' or
 ``A penguin is a bird,'' reaction
-times are faster for more central examples.\textsuperscript{2}
+times are faster for more central examples.\footnote{George Lakoff, \textit{Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What
+Categories Reveal about the Mind} (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
+1987).\comment{2}}
 Typicality measures correlate well using different investigative
 methods---reaction times are one example; you can also ask people to
 directly rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, how well an example (like a
@@ -6590,15 +6529,22 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 ``98 is approximately 100,'' or
 ``100 is approximately 98''? If
 you're like most people, the first statement seems to
-make more sense.\textsuperscript{3} For similar reasons, people asked
+make more sense.\footnote{Jerrold Sadock, ``Truth and
+Approximations,'' \textit{Papers from the Third
+Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society} (1977): 430--439.\comment{3}} For similar reasons, people asked
 to rate how similar Mexico is to the United States, gave consistently
 higher ratings than people asked to rate how similar the United States
-is to Mexico.\textsuperscript{4}}
+is to Mexico.\footnote{Amos Tversky and Itamar Gati, ``Studies of
+Similarity,'' in \textit{Cognition and
+Categorization}, ed. Eleanor Rosch and Barbara Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ:
+Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1978), 79--98.\comment{4}}}
 
 {
  And if that still seems harmless, a study by Rips showed that
 people were more likely to expect a disease would spread from robins to
-ducks on an island, than from ducks to robins.\textsuperscript{5} Now
+ducks on an island, than from ducks to robins.\footnote{Lance J. Rips, ``Inductive Judgments about
+Natural Categories,'' \textit{Journal of Verbal
+Learning and Verbal Behavior} 14 (1975): 665--681.\comment{5}} Now
 this is not a \textit{logical} impossibility, but in a pragmatic sense,
 whatever difference separates a duck from a robin and would make a
 disease less likely to spread from a duck to a robin, must also be a
@@ -6650,33 +6596,6 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Eleanor Rosch, ``Principles of
-Categorization,'' in \textit{Cognition and
-Categorization}, ed. Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ:
-Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978).}
-
-{
- 2. George Lakoff, \textit{Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What
-Categories Reveal about the Mind} (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
-1987).}
-
-{
- 3. Jerrold Sadock, ``Truth and
-Approximations,'' \textit{Papers from the Third
-Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society} (1977): 430--439.}
-
-{
- 4. Amos Tversky and Itamar Gati, ``Studies of
-Similarity,'' in \textit{Cognition and
-Categorization}, ed. Eleanor Rosch and Barbara Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ:
-Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1978), 79--98.}
-
-{
- 5. Lance J. Rips, ``Inductive Judgments about
-Natural Categories,'' \textit{Journal of Verbal
-Learning and Verbal Behavior} 14 (1975): 665--681.}
-
 \mysection{The Cluster Structure of Thingspace}
 
 {
@@ -7253,7 +7172,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 {
  Plus if you try to scale up the Network 1 design, it requires
-O(N\textsuperscript{2}) connections, where N is the total number of
+$O(N^{2})$ connections, where N is the total number of
 observables.}
 
 {
@@ -7281,7 +7200,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 compute the answer in one step, rather than waiting for the network to
 settle---an important requirement in biology when the neurons only run
 at 20Hz. And the network architecture scales as O(N), rather than
-O(N\textsuperscript{2}).}
+$O(N^{2})$.}
 
 {
  Admittedly, there are some things you can notice more easily with
@@ -7301,7 +7220,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 network.}
 
 {
- So yes, those O(N\textsuperscript{2}) connections were buying us
+ So yes, those $O(N^{2})$ connections were buying us
 something. But not very much. Network 1 is not \textit{more} useful on
 most real-world problems, where you rarely find an animal stuck halfway
 between being a cat and a dog.}
@@ -7491,7 +7410,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 networks that might be used to answer questions about bleggs and rubes.
 Network 1 (Figure 162.1) has a number of disadvantages---such as
 potentially oscillating/chaotic behavior, or requiring
-O(N\textsuperscript{2}) connections---but Network 1's
+$O(N^{2})$ connections---but Network 1's
 structure does have one major advantage over Network 2: every unit in
 the network corresponds to a testable query. If you observe every
 observable, clamping every value, there are no units in the network
@@ -10016,8 +9935,8 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 we'll need to ask 3 yes-or-no questions to find out
 X's exact state. The entropy of Y is 2 bits; we have to
 ask 2 yes-or-no questions to find out Y's exact state.
-This may seem obvious since 2\textsuperscript{3} = 8 and
-2\textsuperscript{2} = 4, so 3 questions can distinguish 8
+This may seem obvious since $2^3 = 8$ and
+$2^2 = 4$, so 3 questions can distinguish 8
 possibilities and 2 questions can distinguish 4 possibilities; but
 remember that if the possibilities were not all equally likely, we
 could use a more clever code to discover Y's state
@@ -10614,7 +10533,8 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 {
  (For more on this, I recommend Tom Mitchell's
 \textit{Machine Learning}, from which this example was
-adapted.\textsuperscript{1})}
+adapted.\footnote{Tom M. Mitchell, \textit{Machine Learning} (McGraw-Hill
+Science/Engineering/Math, 1997).\comment{1}})}
 
 {
  Now you may notice that the format above \textit{cannot} represent
@@ -10655,7 +10575,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 {
  So the space of \textit{all possible} concepts that classify Days
 is the set of all possible sets of Days, whose size is
-2\textsuperscript{24} = 16,777,216.}
+$2^{24} = 16,777,216$.}
 
 {
  This complete space includes all the concepts we have discussed so
@@ -10695,7 +10615,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 classified negative by the other half. Then when we learn the actual
 classification of the example, it will cut the space of compatible
 concepts in half. So it might only take 9 examples
-(2\textsuperscript{9} = 512) to narrow 325 possible concepts down to
+$(2^9 = 512)$ to narrow 325 possible concepts down to
 one.}
 
 {
@@ -10725,7 +10645,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 Forty bits, or 5 bytes, to be classified simply
 ``Yes'' or
 ``No.'' Forty bits implies
-2\textsuperscript{40} possible examples, and 2\textsuperscript{240}
+$2^{40}$ possible examples, and $2^{240}$
 possible concepts that classify those examples as positive or
 negative.}
 
@@ -10833,10 +10753,6 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Tom M. Mitchell, \textit{Machine Learning} (McGraw-Hill
-Science/Engineering/Math, 1997).}
-
 \mysection{Conditional Independence, and Naive Bayes}
 
 {
@@ -11389,7 +11305,8 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 cortex. So, yes, your brain really does represent a detailed image of
 what it sees or imagines. See Stephen Kosslyn's
 \textit{Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery
-Debate.}\textsuperscript{1}}
+Debate.}\footnote{Stephen M. Kosslyn, \textit{Image and Brain: The Resolution of
+the Imagery Debate} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Part of the reason people get in trouble with words, is that they
@@ -11455,10 +11372,6 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Stephen M. Kosslyn, \textit{Image and Brain: The Resolution of
-the Imagery Debate} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).}
-
 \mysection{Variable Question Fallacies}
 
 {
@@ -12161,8 +12074,18 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 right. (``Really? 15\%? Is that a real number, or an
 urban legend based on an Internet poll?''
 It's a real number. See Casscells, Schoenberger, and
-Graboys 1978;\textsuperscript{1} Eddy 1982;\textsuperscript{2}
-Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995;\textsuperscript{3} and many other
+Graboys 1978;\footnote{Ward Casscells, Arno Schoenberger, and Thomas Graboys,
+``Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory
+Results,'' \textit{New England Journal of Medicine}
+299 (1978): 999--1001.\comment{1}} Eddy 1982;\footnote{David M. Eddy, ``Probabilistic Reasoning in
+Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportunities,'' in
+\textit{Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, ed. Daniel
+Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge University Press,
+1982).\comment{2}}
+Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995;\footnote{Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage, ``How to
+Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction: Frequency
+Formats,'' \textit{Psychological Review} 102 (1995):
+684--704.\comment{3}} and many other
 studies. It's a surprising result which is easy to
 replicate, so it's been extensively replicated.)}
 
@@ -12430,7 +12353,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 {
  A study by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage in 1995 showed that some ways
 of phrasing story problems are much more evocative of correct Bayesian
-reasoning.\textsuperscript{4} The \textit{least} evocative phrasing
+reasoning.\footnote{Ibid.\comment{4}} The \textit{least} evocative phrasing
 used probabilities. A slightly more evocative phrasing used frequencies
 instead of probabilities; the problem remained the same, but instead of
 saying that 1\% of women had breast cancer, one would say that 1 out of
@@ -12796,7 +12719,9 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 {
  E. T. Jaynes, in \textit{Probability Theory With Applications in
 Science and Engineering}, suggests that credibility and evidence should
-be measured in decibels.\textsuperscript{5}}
+be measured in decibels.\footnote{Edwin T. Jaynes, ``Probability Theory, with
+Applications in Science and Engineering,''
+Unpublished manuscript (1974).\comment{5}}}
 
 {
  Decibels?}
@@ -12821,7 +12746,7 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
  or}
 
 {\centering
- intensity = 10\textsuperscript{decibels/10}.
+ intensity = $10^{decibels/10}$.
 \par}
 
 
@@ -13302,32 +13227,6 @@ \chapter{A Human's Guide to Words}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Ward Casscells, Arno Schoenberger, and Thomas Graboys,
-``Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory
-Results,'' \textit{New England Journal of Medicine}
-299 (1978): 999--1001.}
-
-{
- 2. David M. Eddy, ``Probabilistic Reasoning in
-Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportunities,'' in
-\textit{Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, ed. Daniel
-Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge University Press,
-1982).}
-
-{
- 3. Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage, ``How to
-Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction: Frequency
-Formats,'' \textit{Psychological Review} 102 (1995):
-684--704.}
-
-{
- 4. Ibid.}
-
-{
- 5. Edwin T. Jaynes, ``Probability Theory, with
-Applications in Science and Engineering,''
-Unpublished manuscript (1974).}
 
 
 
diff --git a/map_and_territory.tex b/map_and_territory.tex
index af1e997..12d76f5 100644
--- a/map_and_territory.tex
+++ b/map_and_territory.tex
@@ -189,7 +189,13 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 question by, e.g., anthropic problems in which the number of observers
 is uncertain. The exact rules of decision theory are called into
 question by, e.g., Newcomblike problems in which other agents may
-predict your decision before it happens.\textsuperscript{1}}
+predict your decision before it happens.\footnote{\textbf{Editor's Note:} For a good introduction
+to Newcomb's Problem, see Holt.\footnotemark More
+generally, you can find definitions and explanations for many of the
+terms in this book at the website
+wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/RAZ\_Glossary.\comment{1}}\footnotetext{Jim Holt, ``Thinking Inside the
+Boxes,'' \textit{Slate} (2002),
+http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/egghead/2002/02/thinkinginside\%5C\_the\%5C\_boxes.single.html.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  In cases like these, it is futile to try to settle the problem by
@@ -296,18 +302,6 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. \textbf{Editor's Note:} For a good introduction
-to Newcomb's Problem, see Holt.\textsuperscript{2} More
-generally, you can find definitions and explanations for many of the
-terms in this book at the website
-wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/RAZ\_Glossary.}
-
-{
- 2. Jim Holt, ``Thinking Inside the
-Boxes,'' \textit{Slate} (2002),
-http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/egghead/2002/02/thinkinginside\%5C\_the\%5C\_boxes.single.html.}
-
 \mysection{Feeling Rational} 
 
 {
@@ -567,7 +561,7 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 but only one kind of common sense.'' The truth is a
 narrow target, a small region of configuration space to hit.
 ``She loves me, she loves me not''
-may be a binary question, but E = mc\textsuperscript{2} is a tiny dot
+may be a binary question, but $E = mc^2$ is a tiny dot
 in the space of all equations, like a winning lottery ticket in the
 space of all lottery tickets. Error is not an exceptional condition; it
 is success that is a priori so improbable that it requires an
@@ -707,7 +701,10 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 and Combs, ``Judged Frequency of Lethal
 Events,'' studied errors in quantifying the severity
 of risks, or judging which of two dangers occurred more
-frequently.\textsuperscript{1} Subjects thought that accidents caused
+frequently.\footnote{Sarah Lichtenstein et al., ``Judged Frequency
+of Lethal Events,'' \textit{Journal of Experimental
+Psychology: Human Learning and Memory} 4, no. 6 (1978): 551--578,
+doi:10.1037/0278-7393.4.6.551.\comment{1}} Subjects thought that accidents caused
 about as many deaths as disease; thought that homicide was a more
 frequent cause of death than suicide. Actually, diseases cause about
 sixteen times as many deaths as accidents, and suicide is twice as
@@ -721,7 +718,10 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 this makes people more likely to remember, or more likely to recall, an
 accident. In 1979, a followup study by Combs and Slovic showed that the
 skewed probability judgments correlated strongly (0.85 and 0.89) with
-skewed reporting frequencies in two newspapers.\textsuperscript{2} This
+skewed reporting frequencies in two newspapers.\footnote{Barbara Combs and Paul Slovic, ``Newspaper
+Coverage of Causes of Death,'' \textit{Journalism \&
+Mass Communication Quarterly} 56, no. 4 (1979): 837--849,
+doi:10.1177/107769907905600420.\comment{2}} This
 doesn't disentangle whether murders are more available
 to memory because they are more reported-on, or whether newspapers
 report more on murders because murders are more vivid (hence also more
@@ -758,12 +758,17 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 on flood plains appear to be very much prisoners of their experience
 \ldots Recently experienced floods appear to set an upward bound to the
 size of loss with which managers believe they ought to be
-concerned.''\textsuperscript{3}}
+concerned.''\footnote{Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth, and Jacqueline Meszaros,
+``Insurer Ambiguity and Market
+Failure,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and Uncertainty} 7
+(1 1993): 71--87, doi:10.1007/BF01065315.\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  Burton et al. report that when dams and levees are built, they
 reduce the frequency of floods, and thus apparently create a false
-sense of security, leading to reduced precautions.\textsuperscript{4}
+sense of security, leading to reduced precautions.\footnote{Ian Burton, Robert W. Kates, and Gilbert F. White, \textit{The
+Environment as Hazard}, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
+1978).\comment{4}}
 While building dams decreases the \textit{frequency} of floods, damage
 \textit{per flood} is afterward so much greater that average yearly
 damage \textit{increases.} The wise would extrapolate from a memory of
@@ -784,29 +789,6 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Sarah Lichtenstein et al., ``Judged Frequency
-of Lethal Events,'' \textit{Journal of Experimental
-Psychology: Human Learning and Memory} 4, no. 6 (1978): 551--578,
-doi:10.1037/0278-7393.4.6.551.}
-
-{
- 2. Barbara Combs and Paul Slovic, ``Newspaper
-Coverage of Causes of Death,'' \textit{Journalism \&
-Mass Communication Quarterly} 56, no. 4 (1979): 837--849,
-doi:10.1177/107769907905600420.}
-
-{
- 3. Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth, and Jacqueline Meszaros,
-``Insurer Ambiguity and Market
-Failure,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and Uncertainty} 7
-(1 1993): 71--87, doi:10.1007/BF01065315.}
-
-{
- 4. Ian Burton, Robert W. Kates, and Gilbert F. White, \textit{The
-Environment as Hazard}, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
-1978).}
-
 \mysection{Burdensome Details}
 
 {
@@ -815,7 +797,8 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Pooh-Bah, in Gilbert and Sullivan's
-\textit{The Mikado}\textsuperscript{1}
+\textit{The Mikado}\footnote{William S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan, \textit{The Mikado},
+Opera, 1885.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -868,7 +851,8 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 the USA and the USSR'' than to
 ``Suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA
 and the USSR,'' each experimental group was only
-presented with one proposition.\textsuperscript{2} What strategy could
+presented with one proposition.\footnote{Tversky and Kahneman, ``Extensional Versus
+Intuitive Reasoning.''\comment{2}} What strategy could
 these forecasters have followed, as a group, that would have eliminated
 the conjunction fallacy, when no individual knew directly about the
 comparison? When no individual even knew that the experiment was
@@ -921,7 +905,11 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
  Similarly, consider the six-sided die with four green faces and
 two red faces. The subjects had to bet on the sequence (1) RGRRR, (2)
 GRGRRR, or (3) GRRRRR appearing anywhere in twenty rolls of the
-dice.\textsuperscript{3} Sixty-five percent of the subjects chose
+dice.\footnote{Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ``Judgments
+of and by Representativeness,'' in \textit{Judgment
+Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul
+Slovic, and Amos Tversky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
+84--98.\comment{3}} Sixty-five percent of the subjects chose
 GRGRRR, which is strictly dominated by RGRRR, since any sequence
 containing GRGRRR also pays off for RGRRR. How could the subjects have
 done better? By noticing the inclusion? Perhaps; but that is only a
@@ -992,21 +980,6 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. William S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan, \textit{The Mikado},
-Opera, 1885.}
-
-{
- 2. Tversky and Kahneman, ``Extensional Versus
-Intuitive Reasoning.''}
-
-{
- 3. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ``Judgments
-of and by Representativeness,'' in \textit{Judgment
-Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul
-Slovic, and Amos Tversky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
-84--98.}
-
 \mysection{Planning Fallacy}
 
 {
@@ -1017,7 +990,11 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 billion instead of \$7 billion. The Sydney Opera House may be the most
 legendary construction overrun of all time, originally estimated to be
 completed in 1963 for \$7 million, and finally completed in 1973 for
-\$102 million.\textsuperscript{1} }
+\$102 million.\footnote{Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Michael Ross,
+``Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and
+Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions,'' in
+Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, \textit{Heuristics and Biases},
+250--270.\comment{1}} }
 
 {
  Are these isolated disasters brought to our attention by selective
@@ -1029,7 +1006,16 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 {
  Buehler et al. asked their students for estimates of when they
 (the students) thought they would complete their personal academic
-projects.\textsuperscript{2} Specifically, the researchers asked for
+projects.\footnote{Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Michael Ross,
+``Exploring the `Planning
+Fallacy': Why People Underestimate Their Task
+Completion Times,'' \textit{Journal of Personality
+and Social Psychology} 67, no. 3 (1994): 366--381,
+doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.366; Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and
+Michael Ross, ``It's About Time:
+Optimistic Predictions in Work and Love,''
+\textit{European Review of Social Psychology} 6, no. 1 (1995): 1--32,
+doi:10.1080/14792779343000112.\comment{2}} Specifically, the researchers asked for
 estimated times by which the students thought it was 50\%, 75\%, and
 99\% probable their personal projects would be done. Would you care to
 guess how many students finished on or before their estimated 50\%,
@@ -1052,7 +1038,8 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 a highly conservative forecast, a prediction that they felt virtually
 certain that they would fulfill, students' confidence
 in their time estimates far exceeded their
-accomplishments.''\textsuperscript{3}}
+accomplishments.''\footnote{Buehler, Griffin, and Ross, ``Inside the
+Planning Fallacy.''\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  More generally, this phenomenon is known as the
@@ -1073,7 +1060,11 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 {
  \ldots produced \textit{indistinguishable}
-results.\textsuperscript{4}}
+results.\footnote{Ian R. Newby-Clark et al., ``People Focus on
+Optimistic Scenarios and Disregard Pessimistic Scenarios While
+Predicting Task Completion Times,'' \textit{Journal
+of Experimental Psychology: Applied} 6, no. 3 (2000): 171--182,
+doi:10.1037/1076-898X.6.3.171.\comment{4}}}
 
 {
  When people are asked for a
@@ -1124,7 +1115,8 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 subjects' visualization, the more optimistic (and less
 accurate) they become. Buehler et al. asked an experimental group of
 subjects to describe highly specific plans for their Christmas
-shopping---where, when, and how.\textsuperscript{5} On average, this
+shopping---where, when, and how.\footnote{Buehler, Griffin, and Ross, ``Inside the
+Planning Fallacy.''\comment{5}} On average, this
 group expected to finish shopping more than a week before Christmas.
 Another group was simply asked when they expected to finish their
 Christmas shopping, with an average response of four days. Both groups
@@ -1136,7 +1128,7 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 before deadline. They actually finished one day before deadline. Asked
 when they had previously completed similar tasks, they responded,
 ``one day before
-deadline.''\textsuperscript{6} This is the power of
+deadline.''\footnote{Ibid.\comment{6}} This is the power of
 the outside view over the inside view.}
 
 {
@@ -1164,43 +1156,6 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Michael Ross,
-``Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and
-Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions,'' in
-Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, \textit{Heuristics and Biases},
-250--270.}
-
-{
- 2. Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Michael Ross,
-``Exploring the `Planning
-Fallacy': Why People Underestimate Their Task
-Completion Times,'' \textit{Journal of Personality
-and Social Psychology} 67, no. 3 (1994): 366--381,
-doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.366; Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and
-Michael Ross, ``It's About Time:
-Optimistic Predictions in Work and Love,''
-\textit{European Review of Social Psychology} 6, no. 1 (1995): 1--32,
-doi:10.1080/14792779343000112.}
-
-{
- 3. Buehler, Griffin, and Ross, ``Inside the
-Planning Fallacy.''}
-
-{
- 4. Ian R. Newby-Clark et al., ``People Focus on
-Optimistic Scenarios and Disregard Pessimistic Scenarios While
-Predicting Task Completion Times,'' \textit{Journal
-of Experimental Psychology: Applied} 6, no. 3 (2000): 171--182,
-doi:10.1037/1076-898X.6.3.171.}
-
-{
- 5. Buehler, Griffin, and Ross, ``Inside the
-Planning Fallacy.''}
-
-{
- 6. Ibid.}
-
 \mysection{Illusion of Transparency: Why No One Understands You}
 
 {
@@ -1227,14 +1182,22 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 it was marvelous, just marvelous.'' Keysar presented
 a group of subjects with scenario (a), and 59\% thought that
 Mark's message was sarcastic \textit{and that Jane
-would perceive the sarcasm}.\textsuperscript{1} Among other subjects,
+would perceive the sarcasm}.\footnote{Boaz Keysar, ``The Illusory Transparency of
+Intention: Linguistic Perspective Taking in Text,''
+\textit{Cognitive Psychology} 26 (2 1994): 165--208,
+doi:10.1006/cogp.1994.1006.\comment{1}} Among other subjects,
 told scenario (b), only 3\% thought that Jane would perceive
 Mark's message as sarcastic. Keysar and Barr seem to
 indicate that an actual voice message was played back to the
-subjects.\textsuperscript{2} Keysar showed that if subjects were told
+subjects.\footnote{Keysar and Barr, ``Self-Anchoring in
+Conversation.''\comment{2}} Keysar showed that if subjects were told
 that the restaurant was horrible \textit{but that Mark wanted to
 conceal his response}, they believed June would not perceive sarcasm in
-the (same) message:\textsuperscript{3}}
+the (same) message:\footnote{Boaz Keysar, ``Language Users as Problem
+Solvers: Just What Ambiguity Problem Do They
+Solve?,'' in \textit{Social and Cognitive Approaches
+to Interpersonal Communication}, ed. Susan R. Fussell and Roger J.
+Kreuz (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 175--200.\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  They were just as likely to predict that she would perceive
@@ -1242,7 +1205,8 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 had a positive experience and was truly sincere. So participants took
 Mark's \textit{communicative intention} as transparent.
 It was as if they assumed that June would perceive whatever intention
-Mark wanted her to perceive.\textsuperscript{4}}
+Mark wanted her to perceive.\footnote{Keysar and Barr, ``Self-Anchoring in
+Conversation.''\comment{4}}}
 
 {
  ``The goose hangs high'' is an
@@ -1251,7 +1215,10 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 goose hangs high'' meant that the future looks good;
 another group of subjects learned that ``the goose
 hangs high'' meant the future looks
-gloomy.\textsuperscript{5} Subjects were then asked which of these two
+gloomy.\footnote{Boaz Keysar and Bridget Bly, ``Intuitions of
+the Transparency of Idioms: Can One Keep a Secret by Spilling the
+Beans?,'' \textit{Journal of Memory and Language} 34
+(1 1995): 89--109, doi:10.1006/jmla.1995.1005.\comment{5}} Subjects were then asked which of these two
 meanings an \textit{uninformed} listener would be more likely to
 attribute to the idiom. Each group thought that listeners would
 perceive the meaning presented as
@@ -1266,7 +1233,10 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 {
  Keysar and Henly tested the calibration of speakers: Would
 speakers underestimate, overestimate, or correctly estimate how often
-listeners understood them?\textsuperscript{6} Speakers were given
+listeners understood them?\footnote{Boaz Keysar and Anne S. Henly,
+``Speakers' Overestimation of Their
+Effectiveness,'' \textit{Psychological Science} 13 (3
+2002): 207--212, doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00439.\comment{6}} Speakers were given
 ambiguous sentences (``The man is chasing a woman on a
 bicycle.'') and disambiguating pictures (a man
 running after a cycling woman), then asked the speakers to utter the
@@ -1284,7 +1254,8 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 {
  As Keysar and Barr note, two days before Germany's
 attack on Poland, Chamberlain sent a letter intended to make it clear
-that Britain would fight if any invasion occurred.\textsuperscript{7}
+that Britain would fight if any invasion occurred.\footnote{Keysar and Barr, ``Self-Anchoring in
+Conversation.''\comment{7}}
 The letter, phrased in polite diplomatese, was heard by Hitler as
 conciliatory---and the tanks rolled.}
 
@@ -1298,43 +1269,6 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Boaz Keysar, ``The Illusory Transparency of
-Intention: Linguistic Perspective Taking in Text,''
-\textit{Cognitive Psychology} 26 (2 1994): 165--208,
-doi:10.1006/cogp.1994.1006.}
-
-{
- 2. Keysar and Barr, ``Self-Anchoring in
-Conversation.''}
-
-{
- 3. Boaz Keysar, ``Language Users as Problem
-Solvers: Just What Ambiguity Problem Do They
-Solve?,'' in \textit{Social and Cognitive Approaches
-to Interpersonal Communication}, ed. Susan R. Fussell and Roger J.
-Kreuz (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 175--200.}
-
-{
- 4. Keysar and Barr, ``Self-Anchoring in
-Conversation.''}
-
-{
- 5. Boaz Keysar and Bridget Bly, ``Intuitions of
-the Transparency of Idioms: Can One Keep a Secret by Spilling the
-Beans?,'' \textit{Journal of Memory and Language} 34
-(1 1995): 89--109, doi:10.1006/jmla.1995.1005.}
-
-{
- 6. Boaz Keysar and Anne S. Henly,
-``Speakers' Overestimation of Their
-Effectiveness,'' \textit{Psychological Science} 13 (3
-2002): 207--212, doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00439.}
-
-{
- 7. Keysar and Barr, ``Self-Anchoring in
-Conversation.''}
-
 \mysection{Expecting Short Inferential Distances}
 
 {
@@ -1540,7 +1474,11 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 thought of nuclear war makes the person unhappy, and we can see how his
 brain therefore rejects the belief. But if you imagine a billion
 worlds---Everett branches, or Tegmark
-duplicates\textsuperscript{1}{}---this thought process will not
+duplicates\footnote{Max Tegmark, ``Parallel
+Universes,'' in \textit{Science and Ultimate Reality:
+Quantum Theory, Cosmology, and Complexity}, ed. John D. Barrow, Paul C.
+W. Davies, and Charles L. Harper Jr. (New York: Cambridge University
+Press, 2004), 459--491.\comment{1}}{}---this thought process will not
 systematically correlate optimists to branches in which no nuclear war
 occurs. (Some clever fellow is bound to say, ``Ah, but
 since I have hope, I'll work a little harder at my job,
@@ -1579,13 +1517,6 @@ \chapter{Predictably Wrong}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Max Tegmark, ``Parallel
-Universes,'' in \textit{Science and Ultimate Reality:
-Quantum Theory, Cosmology, and Complexity}, ed. John D. Barrow, Paul C.
-W. Davies, and Charles L. Harper Jr. (New York: Cambridge University
-Press, 2004), 459--491.}
-
 
 \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
 
@@ -1739,10 +1670,12 @@ \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
 neither to the ties of marriage nor of relationship nor of friendship,
 and the case is the same even though those who differ with respect to
 these colors be brothers or any other
-kin.''\textsuperscript{1} Edward Gibbon wrote:
+kin.''\footnote{Procopius, \textit{History of the Wars}, ed. Henry B. Dewing,
+vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1914).\comment{1}} Edward Gibbon wrote:
 ``The support of a faction became necessary to every
 candidate for civil or ecclesiastical
-honors.''\textsuperscript{2} }
+honors.''\footnote{Edward Gibbon, \textit{The History of the Decline and Fall of
+the Roman Empire}, vol. 4 (J. \& J. Harper, 1829).\comment{2}} }
 
 {
  Who were the Blues and the Greens? They were sports fans---the
@@ -1917,14 +1850,6 @@ \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Procopius, \textit{History of the Wars}, ed. Henry B. Dewing,
-vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1914).}
-
-{
- 2. Edward Gibbon, \textit{The History of the Decline and Fall of
-the Roman Empire}, vol. 4 (J. \& J. Harper, 1829).}
-
 \mysection{Belief in Belief}
 
 {
@@ -2013,7 +1938,8 @@ \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
 \textit{virtuous} and \textit{beneficial}, to believe that the Ultimate
 Cosmic Sky is both perfectly blue and perfectly green. Dennett calls
 this ``belief in
-belief.''\textsuperscript{1}}
+belief.''\footnote{Daniel C. Dennett, \textit{Breaking the Spell: Religion as a
+Natural Phenomenon} (Penguin, 2006).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  And here things become complicated, as human minds are wont to
@@ -2116,10 +2042,6 @@ \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel C. Dennett, \textit{Breaking the Spell: Religion as a
-Natural Phenomenon} (Penguin, 2006).}
-
 \mysection{Bayesian Judo}
 
 {
@@ -2270,7 +2192,8 @@ \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
  Paolo Freire said, ``Washing
 one's hands of the conflict between the powerful and
 the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be
-neutral.''\textsuperscript{1} A playground is a great
+neutral.''\footnote{Paulo Freire, \textit{The Politics of Education: Culture,
+Power, and Liberation} (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1985), 122.\comment{1}} A playground is a great
 place to be a bully, and a terrible place to be a victim, if the
 teachers don't care \textit{who started it.} And
 likewise in international politics: A world where the Great Powers
@@ -2392,10 +2315,6 @@ \chapter{Fake Beliefs}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Paulo Freire, \textit{The Politics of Education: Culture,
-Power, and Liberation} (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1985), 122.}
-
 \mysection{Religion's Claim to be Non{}-Disprovable}
 
 {
@@ -3668,7 +3587,7 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 induction, the computer program does not produce a deterministic
 prediction, but assigns probabilities to strings. For example, we could
 write a program to explain a fair coin by writing a program that
-assigns equal probabilities to all 2\textsuperscript{N} strings of
+assigns equal probabilities to all $2^N$ strings of
 length N. This is Solomonoff induction's approach to
 \textit{fitting} the observed data. The higher the probability a
 program assigns to the observed data, the better that program
@@ -3825,7 +3744,10 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 an acquaintance in an IRC channel might be less reliable than a
 published journal article. Alas, belief is easier than disbelief; we
 believe instinctively, but disbelief requires a conscious
-effort.\textsuperscript{1}}
+effort.\footnote{Daniel T. Gilbert, Romin W. Tafarodi, and Patrick S. Malone,
+``You Can't Not Believe Everything You
+Read,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and Social
+Psychology} 65 (2 1993): 221--233, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.221.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  So instead, by dint of mighty straining, I forced my model of
@@ -3863,17 +3785,13 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel T. Gilbert, Romin W. Tafarodi, and Patrick S. Malone,
-``You Can't Not Believe Everything You
-Read,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and Social
-Psychology} 65 (2 1993): 221--233, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.221.}
-
 \mysection{Absence of Evidence Is Evidence of Absence}
 
 {
  From Robyn Dawes's \textit{Rational Choice in an
-Uncertain World}:\textsuperscript{1}}
+Uncertain World}:\footnote{Robyn M. Dawes, \textit{Rational Choice in An Uncertain World},
+1st ed., ed. Jerome Kagan (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
+1988), 250-251.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  In fact, this post-hoc fitting of evidence to hypothesis was
@@ -3976,11 +3894,6 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robyn M. Dawes, \textit{Rational Choice in An Uncertain World},
-1st ed., ed. Jerome Kagan (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
-1988), 250-251.}
-
 \mysection{Conservation of Expected Evidence}
 
 {
@@ -4104,7 +4017,8 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 {
  This essay is closely based on an excerpt from
 Meyers's \textit{Exploring Social
-Psychology};\textsuperscript{1} the excerpt is worth reading in its
+Psychology};\footnote{David G. Meyers, \textit{Exploring Social Psychology} (New
+York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 15--19.\comment{1}} the excerpt is worth reading in its
 entirety. }
 
 {
@@ -4172,7 +4086,9 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 {
  In this demonstration (from Paul Lazarsfeld by way of Meyers), all
 of the findings above are the \textit{opposite} of what was actually
-found.\textsuperscript{2} How many times did you think your model took
+found.\footnote{Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ``The American
+Solidier---An Expository Review,'' \textit{Public
+Opinion Quarterly} 13, no. 3 (1949): 377--404.\comment{2}} How many times did you think your model took
 a hit? How many times did you admit you would have been wrong?
 That's how good your model really was. The measure of
 your strength as a rationalist is your ability to be more confused by
@@ -4193,7 +4109,9 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 findings, one true (``In prosperous times people spend
 a larger portion of their income than during a
 recession'') and one the truth's
-opposite.\textsuperscript{3} In both sides of the pair, students rated
+opposite.\footnote{Daphna Baratz, \textit{How Justified Is the
+``Obvious'' Reaction?} (Stanford
+University, 1983).\comment{3}} In both sides of the pair, students rated
 the supposed finding as what they ``would have
 predicted.'' Perfectly standard hindsight bias.}
 
@@ -4224,20 +4142,6 @@ \chapter{Noticing Confusion}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. David G. Meyers, \textit{Exploring Social Psychology} (New
-York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 15--19.}
-
-{
- 2. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ``The American
-Solidier---An Expository Review,'' \textit{Public
-Opinion Quarterly} 13, no. 3 (1949): 377--404.}
-
-{
- 3. Daphna Baratz, \textit{How Justified Is the
-``Obvious'' Reaction?} (Stanford
-University, 1983).}
-
 \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \mysection{Fake Explanations}
@@ -4257,7 +4161,12 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 {
  And the answer was that before the students entered the room, the
-instructor turned the plate around.\textsuperscript{1}}
+instructor turned the plate around.\footnote{Search for ``heat
+conduction.'' Taken from Joachim Verhagen,
+http://web.archive.org/web/20060424082937/\-http://www.nvon.nl/scheik/best/diversen/scijokes/scijokes.txt,
+archived version, October 27, 2001.
+\comment{1}}
+}
 
 {
  Consider the student who frantically stammers,
@@ -4343,11 +4252,6 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
- 1. Search for ``heat
-conduction.'' Taken from Joachim Verhagen,
-http://web.archive.org/web/20060424082937/\-http://www.nvon.nl/scheik/best/diversen/scijokes/scijokes.txt,
-archived version, October 27, 2001.
-
 \mysection{Guessing the Teacher's Password}
 
 {
@@ -4709,7 +4613,9 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 {
  Judea Pearl uses the metaphor of an algorithm for counting
-soldiers in a line.\textsuperscript{1} Suppose you're
+soldiers in a line.\footnote{Judea Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
+Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference} (San Mateo, CA: Morgan
+Kaufmann, 1988).\comment{1}} Suppose you're
 in the line, and you see two soldiers next to you, one in front and one
 in back. That's three soldiers, including you. So you
 ask the soldier behind you, ``How many soldiers do
@@ -4822,11 +4728,6 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Judea Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
-Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference} (San Mateo, CA: Morgan
-Kaufmann, 1988).}
-
 \mysection{Semantic Stopsigns}
 
 {
@@ -5021,7 +4922,8 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 the acceptance of something and that was a vital principle.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Lord Kelvin\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Lord Kelvin\footnote{Silvanus Phillips Thompson, \textit{The Life of Lord Kelvin}
+(American Mathematical Society, 2005).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -5162,10 +5064,6 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Silvanus Phillips Thompson, \textit{The Life of Lord Kelvin}
-(American Mathematical Society, 2005).}
-
 \mysection{The Futility of Emergence}
 
 {
@@ -5530,7 +5428,10 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 expressed high confidence in their guesses, only 21\% of the subjects
 successfully guessed the experimenter's real rule, and
 replications since then have continued to show success rates of around
-20\%.\textsuperscript{1}}
+20\%.\footnote{Peter Cathcart Wason, ``On the Failure to
+Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task,''
+\textit{Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology} 12, no. 3 (1960):
+129--140, doi:10.1080/17470216008416717.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  The study was called ``On the failure to
@@ -5640,17 +5541,19 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Peter Cathcart Wason, ``On the Failure to
-Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task,''
-\textit{Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology} 12, no. 3 (1960):
-129--140, doi:10.1080/17470216008416717.}
-
 \mysection{Lawful Uncertainty}
 
 {
  In \textit{Rational Choice in an Uncertain World}, Robyn Dawes
-describes an experiment by Tversky:\textsuperscript{1,2}}
+describes an experiment by Tversky:\footnote{Dawes, \textit{Rational Choice in An Uncertain World}; Yaacov
+Schul and Ruth Mayo, ``Searching for Certainty in an
+Uncertain World: The Difficulty of Giving Up the Experiential for the
+Rational Mode of Thinking,'' \textit{Journal of
+Behavioral Decision Making} 16, no. 2 (2003): 93--106,
+doi:10.1002/bdm.434.\comment{1}}\supercomma\footnote{Amos Tversky and Ward Edwards, ``Information
+versus Reward in Binary Choices,'' \textit{Journal of
+Experimental Psychology} 71, no. 5 (1966): 680--683,
+doi:10.1037/h0023123.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Many psychological experiments were conducted in the late 1950s
@@ -5814,20 +5717,6 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Dawes, \textit{Rational Choice in An Uncertain World}; Yaacov
-Schul and Ruth Mayo, ``Searching for Certainty in an
-Uncertain World: The Difficulty of Giving Up the Experiential for the
-Rational Mode of Thinking,'' \textit{Journal of
-Behavioral Decision Making} 16, no. 2 (2003): 93--106,
-doi:10.1002/bdm.434.}
-
-{
- 2. Amos Tversky and Ward Edwards, ``Information
-versus Reward in Binary Choices,'' \textit{Journal of
-Experimental Psychology} 71, no. 5 (1966): 680--683,
-doi:10.1037/h0023123.}
-
 \mysection{My Wild and Reckless Youth}
 
 {
@@ -6045,7 +5934,10 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 on some other planet, so that it might well happen here. More on this
 in Section 7 of ''Cognitive biases potentially
 affecting judgment of global
-risks.''\textsuperscript{1} }
+risks.''\footnote{Eliezer Yudkowsky, ``Cognitive Biases
+Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks,'' in
+\textit{Global Catastrophic Risks}, ed. Nick Bostrom and Milan M.
+\'Cirkovi\'c (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 91--119.\comment{1}} }
 
 {
  There is an inverse error to generalizing from fictional evidence:
@@ -6171,12 +6063,6 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Eliezer Yudkowsky, ``Cognitive Biases
-Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks,'' in
-\textit{Global Catastrophic Risks}, ed. Nick Bostrom and Milan M.
-\'Cirkovi\'c (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 91--119.}
-
 \mysection{Explain/Worship/Ignore?}
 
 {
@@ -6419,7 +6305,9 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
  A classic paper by Drew McDermott, ``Artificial
 Intelligence Meets Natural Stupidity,'' criticized AI
 programs that would try to represent notions like \textit{happiness is
-a state of mind} using a semantic network:\textsuperscript{1}}
+a state of mind} using a semantic network:\footnote{Drew McDermott, ``Artificial Intelligence
+Meets Natural Stupidity,'' \textit{SIGART
+Newsletter}, no. 57 (1976): 4--9, doi:10.1145/1045339.1045340.\comment{1}}}
 
 {\centering
  HAPPINESS -{}-{}-IS-A-{}-{}-{\textgreater} STATE-OF-MIND
@@ -6532,7 +6420,10 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 pure white in color, and weigh 300 pounds when adult, then you do not
 have any beliefs \textit{about} beavers, true or false. Your belief
 about ``beavers'' is not right
-enough to be wrong.\textsuperscript{2} If you don't
+enough to be wrong.\footnote{Richard Rorty, ``Out of the Matrix: How the
+Late Philosopher Donald Davidson Showed That Reality
+Can't Be an Illusion,'' \textit{The
+Boston Globe} (October 2003).\comment{2}} If you don't
 have enough experience to regenerate beliefs when they are deleted,
 then do you have enough experience to connect that belief to anything
 at all? Wittgenstein: ``A wheel that can be turned
@@ -6613,17 +6504,6 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Drew McDermott, ``Artificial Intelligence
-Meets Natural Stupidity,'' \textit{SIGART
-Newsletter}, no. 57 (1976): 4--9, doi:10.1145/1045339.1045340.}
-
-{
- 2. Richard Rorty, ``Out of the Matrix: How the
-Late Philosopher Donald Davidson Showed That Reality
-Can't Be an Illusion,'' \textit{The
-Boston Globe} (October 2003).}
-
 \mysectionnn{Interlude The Simple Truth}
 
 {
@@ -7949,3 +7829,4 @@ \chapter{Mysterious Answers}
 \myendsectiontext
 
 
+
diff --git a/mere_goodness.tex b/mere_goodness.tex
index 638026f..0e17ae6 100644
--- a/mere_goodness.tex
+++ b/mere_goodness.tex
@@ -122,7 +122,34 @@ \subsection{Journey and Destination}
  Stretched into the future, questions of fun theory intersect with
 questions of \textit{transhumanism}, the view that we can radically
 improve the human condition if we make enough scientific and social
-progress.\textsuperscript{1} Transhumanism occasions a number of
+progress.\footnote{One example of a transhumanist argument is:
+``We could feasibly abolish aging and disease within a
+few decades or centuries. This would effectively end death by natural
+causes, putting us in the same position as organisms with negligible
+senescence---lobsters, Aldabra giant tortoises, etc. Therefore we
+should invest in disease prevention and anti-aging
+technologies.'' This idea qualifies as transhumanist
+because eliminating the leading causes of injury and death would
+drastically change human life.
+
+ Bostrom and Savulescu survey arguments for and against radical
+human enhancement, e.g., Sandel's objection that
+tampering with our biology too much would make life feel like less of a
+``gift.''\footnotemark\supercomma\footnotemark
+Bostrom's ``History of Transhumanist
+Thought'' provides context for the
+debate.\footnotemark\comment{1}}\footback{3}
+\footnext\footnotetext{Nick Bostrom, ``A History of Transhumanist
+Thought,'' \textit{Journal of Evolution and
+Technology} 14, no. 1 (2005): 1--25,
+http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf.\comment{2}}
+\footnext\footnotetext{Michael Sandel, ``What's Wrong
+With Enhancement,'' Background material for the
+President's Council on Bioethics. (2002).\comment{3}}
+\footnext\footnotetext{Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu, ``Human
+Enhancement Ethics: The State of the Debate,'' in
+\textit{Human Enhancement}, ed. Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu
+(2009).\comment{4}} Transhumanism occasions a number of
 debates in moral philosophy, such as whether the best long-term
 outcomes for sentient life would be based on \textit{hedonism} (the
 pursuit of pleasure) or on more complex notions of \textit{eudaimonia}
@@ -197,43 +224,6 @@ \subsection{Journey and Destination}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. One example of a transhumanist argument is:
-``We could feasibly abolish aging and disease within a
-few decades or centuries. This would effectively end death by natural
-causes, putting us in the same position as organisms with negligible
-senescence---lobsters, Aldabra giant tortoises, etc. Therefore we
-should invest in disease prevention and anti-aging
-technologies.'' This idea qualifies as transhumanist
-because eliminating the leading causes of injury and death would
-drastically change human life.}
-
-{
- Bostrom and Savulescu survey arguments for and against radical
-human enhancement, e.g., Sandel's objection that
-tampering with our biology too much would make life feel like less of a
-``gift.''\textsuperscript{2,3}
-Bostrom's ``History of Transhumanist
-Thought'' provides context for the
-debate.\textsuperscript{4}}
-
-{
- 2. Nick Bostrom, ``A History of Transhumanist
-Thought,'' \textit{Journal of Evolution and
-Technology} 14, no. 1 (2005): 1--25,
-http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf.}
-
-{
- 3. Michael Sandel, ``What's Wrong
-With Enhancement,'' Background material for the
-President's Council on Bioethics. (2002).}
-
-{
- 4. Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu, ``Human
-Enhancement Ethics: The State of the Debate,'' in
-\textit{Human Enhancement}, ed. Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu
-(2009).}
-
 \chapter{Fake Preferences}
 
 \mysection{Not for the Sake of Happiness (Alone)}
@@ -264,7 +254,8 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
 others to be happy. (In particular, Sam Harris does this in \textit{The
 End of Faith}, which I just finished perusing---though
 Harris's reduction is more of a drive-by shooting than
-a major topic of discussion.)\textsuperscript{1}}
+a major topic of discussion.)\footnote{Harris, \textit{The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the
+Future of Reason}.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  This isn't the same as arguing whether all
@@ -390,16 +381,27 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Harris, \textit{The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the
-Future of Reason}.}
-
 \mysection{Fake Selfishness}
 
 {
  Once upon a time, I met someone who proclaimed himself to be
 purely selfish, and told me that I should be purely selfish as well. I
-was feeling mischievous\textsuperscript{1} that day, so I said,
+was feeling mischievous\footnote{Other mischievous questions to ask self-proclaimed Selfishes:
+``Would you sacrifice your own life to save the entire
+human species?'' (If they notice that their own life
+is strictly included within the human species, you can specify that
+they can choose between dying immediately to save the Earth, or living
+in comfort for one more year and then dying along with Earth.) Or,
+taking into account that scope insensitivity leads many people to be
+more concerned over one life than the Earth, ``If you
+had to choose one event or the other, would you rather that you stubbed
+your toe, or that the stranger standing near the wall there gets
+horribly tortured for fifty years?'' (If they say
+that they'd be emotionally disturbed by knowing,
+specify that they won't know about the torture.)
+``Would you steal a thousand dollars from Bill Gates
+if you could be guaranteed that neither he nor anyone else would ever
+find out about it?'' (Selfish libertarians only.)\comment{1}} that day, so I said,
 ``I've observed that with most
 religious people, at least the ones I meet, it doesn't
 matter much what their religion says, because whatever they want to do,
@@ -451,24 +453,6 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Other mischievous questions to ask self-proclaimed Selfishes:
-``Would you sacrifice your own life to save the entire
-human species?'' (If they notice that their own life
-is strictly included within the human species, you can specify that
-they can choose between dying immediately to save the Earth, or living
-in comfort for one more year and then dying along with Earth.) Or,
-taking into account that scope insensitivity leads many people to be
-more concerned over one life than the Earth, ``If you
-had to choose one event or the other, would you rather that you stubbed
-your toe, or that the stranger standing near the wall there gets
-horribly tortured for fifty years?'' (If they say
-that they'd be emotionally disturbed by knowing,
-specify that they won't know about the torture.)
-``Would you steal a thousand dollars from Bill Gates
-if you could be guaranteed that neither he nor anyone else would ever
-find out about it?'' (Selfish libertarians only.)}
-
 \mysection{Fake Morality}
 
 {
@@ -816,7 +800,8 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
  (See also: Truly Part Of You, Words as Mental Paintbrush Handles,
 Drew McDermott's ``Artificial
 Intelligence Meets Natural
-Stupidity.''\textsuperscript{1})}
+Stupidity.''\footnote{McDermott, ``Artificial Intelligence Meets
+Natural Stupidity.''\comment{1}})}
 
 {
  The essential driver of the Detached Lever Fallacy is that the
@@ -916,8 +901,10 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
  Culture is not nearly so powerful as a good many Marxist academics
 once liked to think. For more on this I refer you to Tooby and
 Cosmides's ``The Psychological
-Foundations of Culture''\textsuperscript{2} or Steven
-Pinker's \textit{The Blank Slate.}\textsuperscript{3}}
+Foundations of Culture''\footnote{Tooby and Cosmides, ``The Psychological
+Foundations of Culture.''\comment{2}} or Steven
+Pinker's \textit{The Blank Slate.}\footnote{Steven Pinker, \textit{The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of
+Human Nature} (New York: Viking, 2002).\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  But the upshot is that if you have a little baby AI that is raised
@@ -1020,18 +1007,6 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. McDermott, ``Artificial Intelligence Meets
-Natural Stupidity.''}
-
-{
- 2. Tooby and Cosmides, ``The Psychological
-Foundations of Culture.''}
-
-{
- 3. Steven Pinker, \textit{The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of
-Human Nature} (New York: Viking, 2002).}
-
 \mysection{Dreams of AI Design}
 
 {
@@ -1171,7 +1146,8 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
  Another excellent example of genuine reduction can be found in
 Judea Pearl's \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in
 Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible
-Inference.}\textsuperscript{1} You could go around all day in circles
+Inference.}\footnote{Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
+Systems}.\comment{1}} You could go around all day in circles
 talk about how a \textit{cause} is something that \textit{makes}
 something else happen, and until you understood the nature of
 conditional independence, you would be helpless to make an AI that
@@ -1252,10 +1228,6 @@ \chapter{Fake Preferences}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Pearl, \textit{Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
-Systems}.}
-
 \mysection{The Design Space of Minds{}-in{}-General}
 
 {
@@ -2198,7 +2170,7 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 {
  Oh, there might be argument sequences that would compel any
 neurologically intact \textit{human}{}---like the argument I use to
-make people let the AI out of the box\textsuperscript{1}{}---but that
+make people let the AI out of the box\footnote{Just kidding.\comment{1}}{}---but that
 is hardly the same thing from a philosophical perspective.}
 
 {
@@ -2244,9 +2216,6 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Just kidding.}
-
 \mysection{Created Already in Motion}
 
 {
@@ -3142,7 +3111,9 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 pure white in color, and weigh 300 pounds when adult, then you do not
 have any beliefs \textit{about} beavers, true or false. You must get at
 least some of your beliefs right, before the remaining ones can be
-wrong \textit{about} anything.\textsuperscript{1}}
+wrong \textit{about} anything.\footnote{Rorty, ``Out of the Matrix: How the Late
+Philosopher Donald Davidson Showed That Reality Can't
+Be an Illusion.''\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  My belief that I had \textit{no} information \textit{about}
@@ -3386,11 +3357,6 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Rorty, ``Out of the Matrix: How the Late
-Philosopher Donald Davidson Showed That Reality Can't
-Be an Illusion.''}
-
 \mysection{Morality as Fixed Computation}
 
 {
@@ -3623,7 +3589,10 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Bill Hibbard (2001), Super-Intelligent
-Machines\textsuperscript{1}
+Machines\footnote{Bill Hibbard, ``Super-Intelligent
+Machines,'' \textit{ACM SIGGRAPH Computer Graphics}
+35, no. 1 (2001): 13--15,
+http://www.siggraph.org/publications/newsletter/issues/v35/v35n1.pdf.\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -3641,7 +3610,10 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
  So \ldots um \ldots what could possibly go wrong \ldots}
 
 {
- When I mentioned (sec. 7.2)\textsuperscript{2} that
+ When I mentioned (sec. 7.2)\footnote{Eliezer Yudkowsky, ``Artificial Intelligence
+as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk,''
+in Bostrom and \'Cirkovi\'c, \textit{Global Catastrophic Risks},
+308--345.\comment{2}} that
 Hibbard's AI ends up tiling the galaxy with tiny
 molecular smiley-faces, Hibbard wrote an indignant reply saying:}
 
@@ -3738,13 +3710,13 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 number of possible objects is exponential in the number of attributes.
 If a black-and-white image is 256 pixels on a side, then the total
 image is 65,536 pixels. The number of possible images is
-2\textsuperscript{65,536}. And the number of possible \textit{concepts}
+$2^{65,536}$. And the number of possible \textit{concepts}
 that classify images into positive and negative instances---the number
 of possible \textit{boundaries} you could draw in the space of
-images---is 2\textsuperscript{265,536}. From this, we see that even
+images---is $2^{265,536}$. From this, we see that even
 supervised learning is almost entirely a matter of inductive bias,
-without which it would take a minimum of 2\textsuperscript{65,536}
-classified examples to discriminate among 2\textsuperscript{265,536}
+without which it would take a minimum of $2^{65,536}$
+classified examples to discriminate among $2^{265,536}$
 possible concepts---even if classifications are constant over time.}
 
 {
@@ -4039,18 +4011,6 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Bill Hibbard, ``Super-Intelligent
-Machines,'' \textit{ACM SIGGRAPH Computer Graphics}
-35, no. 1 (2001): 13--15,
-http://www.siggraph.org/publications/newsletter/issues/v35/v35n1.pdf.}
-
-{
- 2. Eliezer Yudkowsky, ``Artificial Intelligence
-as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk,''
-in Bostrom and \'Cirkovi\'c, \textit{Global Catastrophic Risks},
-308--345.}
-
 \mysection{The True Prisoner's Dilemma}
 
 {
@@ -4268,7 +4228,9 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 Dilemmas, when the other player will cooperate if it expects you to do
 the same. I think there are situations where two agents can rationally
 achieve (C,C) as opposed to (D,D), and reap the associated
-benefits.\textsuperscript{1}}
+benefits.\footnote{Eliezer Yudkowsky, \textit{Timeless Decision Theory},
+Unpublished manuscript (Machine Intelligence Research Institute,
+Berkeley, CA, 2010), http://intelligence.org/files/TDT.pdf.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  I'll explain some of my reasoning when I discuss
@@ -4288,11 +4250,6 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Eliezer Yudkowsky, \textit{Timeless Decision Theory},
-Unpublished manuscript (Machine Intelligence Research Institute,
-Berkeley, CA, 2010), http://intelligence.org/files/TDT.pdf.}
-
 \mysection{Sympathetic Minds}
 
 {
@@ -5020,7 +4977,9 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 tendencies. Someone who can remember starving will appreciate a loaf of
 bread more than someone who's never known anything but
 cake. This was George Orwell's hypothesis for why
-Utopia is impossible in literature and reality:\textsuperscript{1}}
+Utopia is impossible in literature and reality:\footnote{George Orwell, ``Why Socialists
+Don't Believe in Fun,''
+\textit{Tribune} (December 1943).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  It would seem that human beings are not able to describe, nor
@@ -5089,7 +5048,8 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 {
  So far as I know or can guess, David Pearce (\textit{The
 Hedonistic Imperative}) is very probably right about the
-\textit{feasibility} part, when he says:\textsuperscript{2}}
+\textit{feasibility} part, when he says:\footnote{David Pearce, \textit{The Hedonistic Imperative},
+http://www.hedweb.com/, 1995.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Nanotechnology and genetic engineering will abolish suffering in
@@ -5233,15 +5193,6 @@ \chapter{Value Theory}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. George Orwell, ``Why Socialists
-Don't Believe in Fun,''
-\textit{Tribune} (December 1943).}
-
-{
- 2. David Pearce, \textit{The Hedonistic Imperative},
-http://www.hedweb.com/, 1995.}
-
 \mysection{Value is Fragile}
 
 {
@@ -5967,7 +5918,10 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
  Once upon a time, three groups of subjects were asked how much
 they would pay to save 2,000 / 20,000 / 200,000 migrating birds from
 drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups respectively answered \$80,
-\$78, and \$88.\textsuperscript{1} This is \textit{scope insensitivity}
+\$78, and \$88.\footnote{William H. Desvousges et al., \textit{Measuring Nonuse Damages
+Using Contingent Valuation: An Experimental Evaluation of Accuracy},
+technical report (Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2010),
+doi:10.3768/rtipress.2009.bk.0001.1009.\comment{1}} This is \textit{scope insensitivity}
 or \textit{scope neglect}: the number of birds saved---the
 \textit{scope} of the altruistic action---had little effect on
 willingness to pay. }
@@ -5975,12 +5929,25 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 {
  Similar experiments showed that Toronto residents would pay little
 more to clean up all polluted lakes in Ontario than polluted lakes in a
-particular region of Ontario,\textsuperscript{2} or that residents of
+particular region of Ontario,\footnote{Daniel Kahneman, ``Comments by Professor
+Daniel Kahneman,'' in \textit{Valuing Environmental
+Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method}, ed. Ronald G.
+Cummings, David S. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze, vol. 1.B,
+Experimental Methods for Assessing Environmental Benefits (Totowa, NJ:
+Rowman \& Allanheld, 1986), 226--235,
+http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0280B-04.pdf/\$file/EE-0280B-04.pdf.\comment{2}} or that residents of
 four western US states would pay only 28\% more to protect all 57
 wilderness areas in those states than to protect a single
-area.\textsuperscript{3} People visualize ``a single
+area.\footnote{Daniel L. McFadden and Gregory K. Leonard,
+``Issues in the Contingent Valuation of Environmental
+Goods: Methodologies for Data Collection and
+Analysis,'' in \textit{Contingent Valuation: A
+Critical Assessment}, ed. Jerry A. Hausman, Contributions to Economic
+Analysis220 (New York: North-Holland, 1993), 165--215,
+doi:10.1108/S0573-8555(1993)0000220007.\comment{3}} People visualize ``a single
 exhausted bird, its feathers soaked in black oil, unable to
-escape.''\textsuperscript{4} This image, or
+escape.''\footnote{Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade, ``Economic
+Preferences or Attitude Expressions?''\comment{4}} This image, or
 \textit{prototype}, calls forth some level of emotional arousal that is
 primarily responsible for willingness-to-pay---and the image is the
 same in all cases. As for scope, it gets tossed out the window---no
@@ -6004,9 +5971,18 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
  We are insensitive to scope even when human lives are at stake:
 Increasing the alleged risk of chlorinated drinking water from 0.004 to
 2.43 annual deaths per 1,000---a factor of 600---increased
-willingness-to-pay from \$3.78 to \$15.23.\textsuperscript{5} Baron and
+willingness-to-pay from \$3.78 to \$15.23.\footnote{Richard T. Carson and Robert Cameron Mitchell,
+``Sequencing and Nesting in Contingent Valuation
+Surveys,'' \textit{Journal of Environmental Economics
+and Management} 28, no. 2 (1995): 155--173,
+doi:10.1006/jeem.1995.1011.\comment{5}} Baron and
 Greene found no effect from varying lives saved by a factor of
-10.\textsuperscript{6}}
+10.\footnote{Jonathan Baron and Joshua D. Greene,
+``Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in
+Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints,
+Availability, and Prominence,'' \textit{Journal of
+Experimental Psychology: Applied} 2, no. 2 (1996): 107--125,
+doi:10.1037/1076-898X.2.2.107.\comment{6}}}
 
 {
  A paper entitled ``Insensitivity to the value of
@@ -6020,7 +5996,10 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 a camp of 250,000. A potential disease cure had to promise to save far
 more lives in order to be judged worthy of funding, if the disease was
 originally stated to have killed 290,000 rather than 160,000 or 15,000
-people per year.\textsuperscript{7}}
+people per year.\footnote{David Fetherstonhaugh et al., ``Insensitivity
+to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical
+Numbing,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}
+14, no. 3 (1997): 283--300, doi:10.1023/A:1007744326393.\comment{7}}}
 
 {
  The moral: If you want to be an effective altruist, you have to
@@ -6033,55 +6012,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. William H. Desvousges et al., \textit{Measuring Nonuse Damages
-Using Contingent Valuation: An Experimental Evaluation of Accuracy},
-technical report (Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2010),
-doi:10.3768/rtipress.2009.bk.0001.1009.}
-
-{
- 2. Daniel Kahneman, ``Comments by Professor
-Daniel Kahneman,'' in \textit{Valuing Environmental
-Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method}, ed. Ronald G.
-Cummings, David S. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze, vol. 1.B,
-Experimental Methods for Assessing Environmental Benefits (Totowa, NJ:
-Rowman \& Allanheld, 1986), 226--235,
-http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0280B-04.pdf/\$file/EE-0280B-04.pdf.}
-
-{
- 3. Daniel L. McFadden and Gregory K. Leonard,
-``Issues in the Contingent Valuation of Environmental
-Goods: Methodologies for Data Collection and
-Analysis,'' in \textit{Contingent Valuation: A
-Critical Assessment}, ed. Jerry A. Hausman, Contributions to Economic
-Analysis220 (New York: North-Holland, 1993), 165--215,
-doi:10.1108/S0573-8555(1993)0000220007.}
-
-{
- 4. Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade, ``Economic
-Preferences or Attitude Expressions?''}
-
-{
- 5. Richard T. Carson and Robert Cameron Mitchell,
-``Sequencing and Nesting in Contingent Valuation
-Surveys,'' \textit{Journal of Environmental Economics
-and Management} 28, no. 2 (1995): 155--173,
-doi:10.1006/jeem.1995.1011.}
-
-{
- 6. Jonathan Baron and Joshua D. Greene,
-``Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in
-Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints,
-Availability, and Prominence,'' \textit{Journal of
-Experimental Psychology: Applied} 2, no. 2 (1996): 107--125,
-doi:10.1037/1076-898X.2.2.107.}
-
-{
- 7. David Fetherstonhaugh et al., ``Insensitivity
-to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical
-Numbing,'' \textit{Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}
-14, no. 3 (1997): 283--300, doi:10.1023/A:1007744326393.}
-
 \mysection{One Life Against the World}
 
 {
@@ -6218,7 +6148,13 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
  The Allais Paradox---as Allais called it, though
 it's not really a paradox---was one of the first
 conflicts between decision theory and human reasoning to be
-experimentally exposed, in 1953.\textsuperscript{1}
+experimentally exposed, in 1953.\footnote{Maurice Allais, ``Le Comportement de
+l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des
+Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole
+Americaine,'' \textit{Econometrica} 21, no. 4 (1953):
+2, doi:10.2307/1907921; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
+``Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
+Risk,'' \textit{Econometrica} 47 (1979): 263--292.\comment{1}}
 I've modified it slightly for ease of math, but the
 essential problem is the same: Most people prefer 1A to 1B, and most
 people prefer 2B to 2A. Indeed, in within-subject comparisons, a
@@ -6354,15 +6290,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Maurice Allais, ``Le Comportement de
-l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des
-Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole
-Americaine,'' \textit{Econometrica} 21, no. 4 (1953):
-2, doi:10.2307/1907921; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
-``Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
-Risk,'' \textit{Econometrica} 47 (1979): 263--292.}
-
 \mysection{Zut Allais!}
 
 {
@@ -6411,7 +6338,10 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 price the bets separately---ask for a price at which they would be
 indifferent between having that amount of money, and having a chance to
 play the gamble---people will put a higher price on 1 than on
-2.\textsuperscript{1}}
+2.\footnote{Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic,
+``Reversals of Preference Between Bids and Choices in
+Gambing Decisions,'' \textit{Journal of Experimental
+Psychology} 89, no. 1 (1971): 46--55.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  So first you sell them a chance to play bet 1, at their stated
@@ -6437,7 +6367,9 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 for real money, using a roulette wheel. And afterward, one of the
 researchers tried to explain the problem with the incoherence between
 their pricing and their choices. From the
-transcript:\textsuperscript{2,3}}
+transcript:\footnote{William Poundstone, \textit{Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value
+(and How to Take Advantage of It)} (Hill \& Wang, 2010).\comment{2}}\supercomma\footnote{Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic, eds., \textit{The
+Construction of Preference} (Cambridge University Press, 2006).\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  SARAH LICHTENSTEIN: ``Well, how about the bid for
@@ -6609,7 +6541,8 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 to imagine themselves \$500 richer, and ask if they would prefer a
 certain loss of \$100 or a 20\% chance of losing \$200,
 they'll usually take the chance of losing
-\$200.\textsuperscript{4} Same probability distribution over outcomes,
+\$200.\footnote{Kahneman and Tversky, ``Prospect Theory: An
+Analysis of Decision Under Risk.''\comment{4}} Same probability distribution over outcomes,
 different descriptions, different choices.}
 
 {
@@ -6708,24 +6641,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic,
-``Reversals of Preference Between Bids and Choices in
-Gambing Decisions,'' \textit{Journal of Experimental
-Psychology} 89, no. 1 (1971): 46--55.}
-
-{
- 2. William Poundstone, \textit{Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value
-(and How to Take Advantage of It)} (Hill \& Wang, 2010).}
-
-{
- 3. Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic, eds., \textit{The
-Construction of Preference} (Cambridge University Press, 2006).}
-
-{
- 4. Kahneman and Tversky, ``Prospect Theory: An
-Analysis of Decision Under Risk.''}
-
 \mysection{Feeling Moral}
 
 {
@@ -6791,9 +6706,9 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 is at stake. Just shut up and multiply.}
 
 {
- A googol is 10\textsuperscript{100}{}---a 1 followed by one
+ A googol is $10^{100}$---a 1 followed by one
 hundred zeroes. A googolplex is an even more incomprehensibly large
-number---it's 10\textsuperscript{googol}, a 1
+number---it's $10^{googol}$, a 1
 \textit{followed by a googol zeroes}. Now pick some trivial
 inconvenience, like a hiccup, and some decidedly untrivial misfortune,
 like getting slowly torn limb from limb by sadistic mutant sharks. If
@@ -7052,7 +6967,9 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target
 amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both
 cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the
-contributions to the entire group.\textsuperscript{1}}
+contributions to the entire group.\footnote{Paul Slovic, ``Numbed by
+Numbers,'' \textit{Foreign Policy} (March 2007),
+http://foreignpolicy.com/2007/03/13/numbed-by-numbers/.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  There's other research along similar lines, but
@@ -7267,11 +7184,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Paul Slovic, ``Numbed by
-Numbers,'' \textit{Foreign Policy} (March 2007),
-http://foreignpolicy.com/2007/03/13/numbed-by-numbers/.}
-
 \mysection{Ends Don't Justify Means (Among Humans)}
 
 {
@@ -7600,7 +7512,8 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 escaping the Gestapo, and the watchman immediately agreed to overlook
 their presence. Haukelid ``considered warning their
 benefactor but decided that might endanger the mission and only thanked
-him and shook his hand.''\textsuperscript{1} So the
+him and shook his hand.''\footnote{Richard Rhodes, \textit{The Making of the Atomic Bomb} (New
+York: Simon \& Schuster, 1986).\comment{1}} So the
 civilian ferry \textit{Hydro} sank in the deepest part of the lake,
 with eighteen dead and twenty-nine survivors. Some of the Norwegian
 rescuers felt that the German soldiers present should be left to drown,
@@ -7883,10 +7796,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Richard Rhodes, \textit{The Making of the Atomic Bomb} (New
-York: Simon \& Schuster, 1986).}
-
 \mysection{Something to Protect}
 
 {
@@ -8147,7 +8056,7 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 {
  Only when you become more wedded to success than to any of your
 beloved techniques of rationality do you begin to appreciate these
-words of Miyamoto Musashi:\textsuperscript{1}}
+words of Miyamoto Musashi:\footnote{Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings}.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  You can win with a long weapon, and yet you can also win with a
@@ -8190,9 +8099,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings}.}
-
 \mysection{When (Not) to Use Probabilities}
 
 {
@@ -8532,10 +8438,15 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 Dilemma as a special case, which it is generally held to be.
 \textit{Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation:
 Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's
-Problem}\textsuperscript{1} is an edited volume that includes
+Problem}\footnote{Richmond Campbell and Lanning Snowden, eds., \textit{Paradoxes
+of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and
+Newcomb's Problem} (Vancouver: University of British
+Columbia Press, 1985).\comment{1}} is an edited volume that includes
 Newcomb's original essay. For those who read only
 online material, Ledwig's PhD thesis summarizes the
-major standard positions.\textsuperscript{2}}
+major standard positions.\footnote{Marion Ledwig, ``Newcomb's
+Problem'' (PhD diss., University of Constance,
+2000).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  I'm not going to go into the whole literature, but
@@ -8672,7 +8583,7 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 {
  You can win with a long weapon, and yet you can also win with a
 short weapon. In short, the Way of the Ichi school is the spirit of
-winning, whatever the weapon and whatever its size.\textsuperscript{3}}
+winning, whatever the weapon and whatever its size.\footnote{Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings}.\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  (Another example: It was argued by McGee that we must adopt
@@ -8730,7 +8641,9 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 {
  From James Joyce (no relation), \textit{Foundations of Causal
-Decision Theory}:\textsuperscript{4}}
+Decision Theory}:\footnote{James M. Joyce, \textit{The Foundations of Causal Decision
+Theory} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
+doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498497.\comment{4}}}
 
 {
  Rachel has a perfectly good answer to the ``Why
@@ -8888,15 +8801,19 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
  [Edit 2015: I've now written a book-length
 exposition of a decision theory that dominates causal decision theory,
 ``Timeless Decision
-Theory.''\textsuperscript{5} The cryptographer Wei
+Theory.''\footnote{Yudkowsky, \textit{Timeless Decision Theory}.\comment{5}} The cryptographer Wei
 Dai has responded with another alternative to causal decision theory,
 updateless decision theory, that dominates both causal and timeless
 decision theory. As of 2015, the best up-to-date discussions of these
 theories are Daniel Hintze's ``Problem
 Class Dominance in Predictive
-Dilemmas''\textsuperscript{6} and Nate Soares and
+Dilemmas''\footnote{Daniel Hintze, ``Problem Class Dominance in
+Predictive Dilemmas,'' Honors thesis (2014).\comment{6}} and Nate Soares and
 Benja Fallenstein's ``Toward Idealized
-Decision Theory.''\textsuperscript{7} ]}
+Decision Theory.''\footnote{Nate Soares and Benja Fallenstein, ``Toward
+Idealized Decision Theory,'' Technical report.
+Berkeley, CA: Machine Intelligence Research Institute (2014),
+http://intelligence.org/files/TowardIdealizedDecisionTheory.pdf.\comment{7}} ]}
 
 {
  You shouldn't find yourself distinguishing the
@@ -8928,38 +8845,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Richmond Campbell and Lanning Snowden, eds., \textit{Paradoxes
-of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and
-Newcomb's Problem} (Vancouver: University of British
-Columbia Press, 1985).}
-
-{
- 2. Marion Ledwig, ``Newcomb's
-Problem'' (PhD diss., University of Constance,
-2000).}
-
-{
- 3. Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings}.}
-
-{
- 4. James M. Joyce, \textit{The Foundations of Causal Decision
-Theory} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
-doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498497.}
-
-{
- 5. Yudkowsky, \textit{Timeless Decision Theory}.}
-
-{
- 6. Daniel Hintze, ``Problem Class Dominance in
-Predictive Dilemmas,'' Honors thesis (2014).}
-
-{
- 7. Nate Soares and Benja Fallenstein, ``Toward
-Idealized Decision Theory,'' Technical report.
-Berkeley, CA: Machine Intelligence Research Institute (2014),
-http://intelligence.org/files/TowardIdealizedDecisionTheory.pdf.}
-
 \mysectionnn{Interlude The Twelve Virtues of Rationality}
 
 {
@@ -8978,7 +8863,8 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 {
  The second virtue is relinquishment. P. C. Hodgell said:
 ``That which can be destroyed by the truth should
-be.''\textsuperscript{1} Do not flinch from
+be.''\footnote{Patricia C. Hodgell, \textit{Seeker's Mask}
+(Meisha Merlin Publishing, Inc., 2001).\comment{1}} Do not flinch from
 experiences that might destroy your beliefs. The thought you cannot
 think controls you more than thoughts you speak aloud. Submit yourself
 to ordeals and test yourself in fire. Relinquish the emotion which
@@ -9066,14 +8952,16 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 ``What does you in is not failure to apply some
 high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's
 overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the
-ball.''\textsuperscript{2} Do not be blinded by
+ball.''\footnote{Cleaver, \textit{Immediate Fiction: A Complete Writing
+Course}.\comment{2}} Do not be blinded by
 words. When words are subtracted, anticipation remains.}
 
 {
  The seventh virtue is simplicity. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry said:
 ``Perfection is achieved not when there is nothing
 left to add, but when there is nothing left to take
-away.''\textsuperscript{3} Simplicity is virtuous in
+away.''\footnote{Antoine de Saint-Exupery, \textit{Terre des Hommes} (Paris:
+Gallimard, 1939).\comment{3}} Simplicity is virtuous in
 belief, design, planning, and justification. When you profess a huge
 belief with many details, each additional detail is another chance for
 the belief to be wrong. Each specification adds to your burden; if you
@@ -9149,7 +9037,7 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 {
  Miyamoto Musashi wrote, in \textit{The Book of Five
-Rings}:\textsuperscript{4}}
+Rings}:\footnote{Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings}.\comment{4}}}
 
 {
  The primary thing when you take a sword in your hands is your
@@ -9219,20 +9107,6 @@ \chapter{Quantified Humanism}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Patricia C. Hodgell, \textit{Seeker's Mask}
-(Meisha Merlin Publishing, Inc., 2001).}
-
-{
- 2. Cleaver, \textit{Immediate Fiction: A Complete Writing
-Course}.}
-
-{
- 3. Antoine de Saint-Exupery, \textit{Terre des Hommes} (Paris:
-Gallimard, 1939).}
-
-{
- 4. Musashi, \textit{Book of Five Rings}.}
 
 
 
diff --git a/mere_reality.tex b/mere_reality.tex
index 4320226..2c26385 100644
--- a/mere_reality.tex
+++ b/mere_reality.tex
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ \part{Mere Reality}
 denizens as we ordinarily think of them. As Giulio Giorello put the
 point in an interview with Daniel Dennett: ``Yes, we
 have a soul. But it's made of lots of tiny
-robots.''\textsuperscript{1}}
+robots.''\footnote{Daniel C. Dennett, \textit{Freedom Evolves} (Viking Books,
+2003).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  \textit{Mere Reality} collects seven sequences of essays on this
@@ -89,7 +90,10 @@ \subsection{Minds in the World}
  Running with examples like these, philosophers like Thomas Nagel
 and David Chalmers have argued that third-person cognitive and neural
 models can never fully capture first-person
-consciousness.\textsuperscript{2,3} No matter how much we know about a
+consciousness.\footnote{David J. Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
+Fundamental Theory} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).\comment{2}}\supercomma\footnote{Thomas Nagel, ``What Is It Like to Be a
+Bat?,'' \textit{Philosophical Review} 83, no. 4
+(1974): 435--450, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914.\comment{3}} No matter how much we know about a
 physical system, it is always logically possible, on this view, that
 the system has no first-person experiences. Traditional dualism, with
 its immaterial souls freely floating around violating physical laws,
@@ -99,7 +103,24 @@ \subsection{Minds in the World}
 
 {
  A number of philosophers and scientists have found this line of
-reasoning persuasive.\textsuperscript{4} If we feel this
+reasoning persuasive.\footnote{In a survey of Anglophone professional philosophers, 56.5\%
+endorsed physicalism, 27.1\% endorsed anti-physicalism, and 16.4\%
+endorsed other views (e.g., ``I don't
+know'').\footnotemark Most philosophers reject
+the metaphysical possibility of Chalmers's
+``zombies,'' but there is no
+consensus about \textit{why}, exactly, Chalmers's
+zombie argument fails. Kirk summarizes contemporary positions on
+phenomenal consciousness, giving arguments that resemble
+Yudkowsky's against the possibility of knowing or
+referring to irreducible qualia.\footnotemark\comment{4}}
+\footback{2}
+\footnext\footnotetext{David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, ``What
+Do Philosophers Believe?,'' \textit{Philosophical
+  Studies} (2013): 1--36.\comment{11}}
+\footnext\footnotetext{Robert Kirk, \textit{Mind and Body}
+  (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).\comment{12}}
+If we feel this
 argument's intuitive force, should we grant its
 conclusion and ditch physicalism?}
 
@@ -184,7 +205,8 @@ \subsection{Worlds in the World}
 {
  Tegmark's \textit{Our Mathematical Universe}
 discusses a number of relevant ideas in philosophy and
-physics.\textsuperscript{5} Among Tegmark's more novel
+physics.\footnote{Max Tegmark, \textit{Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for
+the Ultimate Nature }\textit{of Reality} (Random House LLC, 2014).\comment{5}} Among Tegmark's more novel
 ideas is his argument that all consistent mathematical structures
 exist, including worlds with physical laws and boundary conditions
 entirely unlike our own. He distinguishes these Tegmark worlds from
@@ -200,21 +222,29 @@ \subsection{Worlds in the World}
 especially cosmologists. However, a number of physicists continue to
 reject it or maintain agnosticism. For a (mostly) philosophically
 mainstream introduction to this debate, see Albert's
-\textit{Quantum Mechanics and Experience}.\textsuperscript{6} See also
+\textit{Quantum Mechanics and Experience}.\footnote{David Z. Albert, \textit{Quantum Mechanics and Experience}
+(Harvard University Press, 1994).\comment{6}} See also
 the \textit{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}'s
 introduction to ``Measurement in Quantum
-Theory,''\textsuperscript{7} and their introduction
+Theory,''\footnote{Henry Krips, ``Measurement in Quantum
+Theory,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of
+Philosophy}, Fall 2013, ed. Edward N. Zalta.\comment{7}} and their introduction
 to several of the views associated with ``many
 worlds'' in
 ``Everett's Relative-State
-Formulation''\textsuperscript{8} and
+Formulation''\footnote{Jeffrey Barrett, \textit{Everett's
+Relative-State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics}, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
+http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/qm-everett/.\comment{8}} and
 ``Many-Worlds
-Interpretation.''\textsuperscript{9}}
+Interpretation.''\footnote{Lev Vaidman, ``Many-Worlds Interpretation of
+Quantum Mechanics,'' in \textit{The Stanford
+Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Fall 2008, ed. Edward N. Zalta.\comment{9}}}
 
 {
  On the less theoretical side, Epstein's
 \textit{Thinking Physics} is a great text for training physical
-intuitions.\textsuperscript{10} It's worth keeping in
+intuitions.\footnote{Lewis Carroll Epstein, \textit{Thinking Physics:
+Understandable Practical Reality, 3rd Edition} (Insight Press, 2009).\comment{10}} It's worth keeping in
 mind that just as one can understand most of cognitive science without
 understanding the nature of subjective awareness, one can understand
 most of physics without having a settled view of the ultimate nature
@@ -230,68 +260,6 @@ \subsection{Worlds in the World}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel C. Dennett, \textit{Freedom Evolves} (Viking Books,
-2003).}
-
-{
- 2. David J. Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
-Fundamental Theory} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).}
-
-{
- 3. Thomas Nagel, ``What Is It Like to Be a
-Bat?,'' \textit{Philosophical Review} 83, no. 4
-(1974): 435--450, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914.}
-
-{
- 4. In a survey of Anglophone professional philosophers, 56.5\%
-endorsed physicalism, 27.1\% endorsed anti-physicalism, and 16.4\%
-endorsed other views (e.g., ``I don't
-know'').\textsuperscript{11} Most philosophers reject
-the metaphysical possibility of Chalmers's
-``zombies,'' but there is no
-consensus about \textit{why}, exactly, Chalmers's
-zombie argument fails. Kirk summarizes contemporary positions on
-phenomenal consciousness, giving arguments that resemble
-Yudkowsky's against the possibility of knowing or
-referring to irreducible qualia.\textsuperscript{12}}
-
-{
- 5. Max Tegmark, \textit{Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for
-the Ultimate Nature }\textit{of Reality} (Random House LLC, 2014).}
-
-{
- 6. David Z. Albert, \textit{Quantum Mechanics and Experience}
-(Harvard University Press, 1994).}
-
-{
- 7. Henry Krips, ``Measurement in Quantum
-Theory,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of
-Philosophy}, Fall 2013, ed. Edward N. Zalta.}
-
-{
- 8. Jeffrey Barrett, \textit{Everett's
-Relative-State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics}, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
-http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/qm-everett/.}
-
-{
- 9. Lev Vaidman, ``Many-Worlds Interpretation of
-Quantum Mechanics,'' in \textit{The Stanford
-Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, Fall 2008, ed. Edward N. Zalta.}
-
-{
- 10. Lewis Carroll Epstein, \textit{Thinking Physics:
-Understandable Practical Reality, 3rd Edition} (Insight Press, 2009).}
-
-{
- 11. David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, ``What
-Do Philosophers Believe?,'' \textit{Philosophical
-Studies} (2013): 1--36.}
-
-{
- 12. Robert Kirk, \textit{Mind and Body}
-(McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).}
-
 \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 
 \mysection{Universal Fire}
@@ -300,7 +268,8 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
  In L. Sprague de Camp's fantasy story \textit{The
 Incomplete Enchanter} (which set the mold for the many imitations that
 followed), the hero, Harold Shea, is transported from our own universe
-into the universe of Norse mythology.\textsuperscript{1} This world is
+into the universe of Norse mythology.\footnote{Lyon Sprague de Camp and Fletcher Pratt, \textit{The Incomplete
+Enchanter} (New York: Henry Holt \& Company, 1941).\comment{1}} This world is
 based on magic rather than technology; so naturally, when Our Hero
 tries to light a fire with a match brought along from Earth, the match
 fails to strike. }
@@ -437,10 +406,6 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Lyon Sprague de Camp and Fletcher Pratt, \textit{The Incomplete
-Enchanter} (New York: Henry Holt \& Company, 1941).}
-
 \mysection{Universal Law}
 
 {
@@ -803,7 +768,9 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 
 {
  Let me introduce this issue by borrowing a complaint of the late
-great Bayesian Master, E. T. Jaynes:\textsuperscript{1}}
+great Bayesian Master, E. T. Jaynes:\footnote{Edwin T. Jaynes, ``Probability Theory as
+Logic,'' in \textit{Maximum Entropy and Bayesian
+Methods}, ed. Paul F. Fougère (Springer Netherlands, 1990).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Two medical researchers use the same treatment independently, in
@@ -821,7 +788,8 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 {
  Cyan directs us to chapter 37 of MacKay's
 excellent statistics book, free online, for a more thorough explanation
-of this problem.\textsuperscript{2}}
+of this problem.\footnote{David J. C. MacKay, \textit{Information Theory, Inference, and
+Learning Algorithms} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  According to old-fashioned statistical procedure---which I believe
@@ -1074,15 +1042,6 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Edwin T. Jaynes, ``Probability Theory as
-Logic,'' in \textit{Maximum Entropy and Bayesian
-Methods}, ed. Paul F. Fougère (Springer Netherlands, 1990).}
-
-{
- 2. David J. C. MacKay, \textit{Information Theory, Inference, and
-Learning Algorithms} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).}
-
 \mysection{Outside the Laboratory}
 
 {
@@ -2237,7 +2196,8 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 Beneath all Shadow.''}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Roger Zelazny, \textit{Prince of Chaos}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Roger Zelazny, \textit{Prince of Chaos}\footnote{Roger Zelazny, \textit{Prince of Chaos} (Thorndike Press,
+2001).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -2248,10 +2208,6 @@ \chapter{Lawful Truth}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Roger Zelazny, \textit{Prince of Chaos} (Thorndike Press,
-2001).}
-
 \chapter{Reductionism 101}
 
 \mysection{Dissolving the Question}
@@ -3308,11 +3264,11 @@ \chapter{Reductionism 101}
 
 {
  Studying mathematical logic may also help you learn to distinguish
-the quote and the referent. In mathematical logic, ${\vdash}$P (P is a
+the quote and the referent. In mathematical logic, ${\vdash}P$ ($P$ is a
 theorem) and
-${\vdash}[2610?]$\textsuperscript{[2308?]}P\textsuperscript{[2309?]}
+${\vdash} \, \Box \ulcorner P \urcorner$
 (it is provable that there exists an encoded proof of the encoded
-sentence P in some encoded proof system) are very distinct
+sentence $P$ in some encoded proof system) are very distinct
 propositions. If you drop a level of quotation in mathematical logic,
 it's like dropping a metric unit in physics---you can
 derive visibly ridiculous results, like ``The speed of
@@ -3983,7 +3939,8 @@ \chapter{Reductionism 101}
 
 {
  John Keats's \textit{Lamia}
-(1819)\textsuperscript{1} surely deserves some kind of award for Most
+(1819)\footnote{John Keats, ``Lamia,''
+\textit{The Poetical Works of John Keats} (London: Macmillan) (1884).\comment{1}} surely deserves some kind of award for Most
 Famously Annoying Poetry:}
 
 {
@@ -4221,10 +4178,6 @@ \chapter{Reductionism 101}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. John Keats, ``Lamia,''
-\textit{The Poetical Works of John Keats} (London: Macmillan) (1884).}
-
 \mysection{Fake Reductionism}
 
 {
@@ -4390,7 +4343,9 @@ \chapter{Reductionism 101}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Richard Feynman, \textit{The Feynman Lectures on
-Physics},\textsuperscript{1}\newline
+Physics},\footnote{Richard P. Feynman, Robert B. Leighton, and Matthew L. Sands,
+\textit{The Feynman Lectures on Physics}, 3 vols. (Reading, MA:
+Addison-Wesley, 1963).\comment{1}}\newline
  Vol I, p. 3--6 (line breaks added)
 \par}
 
@@ -4599,11 +4554,6 @@ \chapter{Reductionism 101}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Richard P. Feynman, Robert B. Leighton, and Matthew L. Sands,
-\textit{The Feynman Lectures on Physics}, 3 vols. (Reading, MA:
-Addison-Wesley, 1963).}
-
 \mysection{Joy in the Merely Real}
 
 {
@@ -5068,7 +5018,8 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 would be like believing in the postman.}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Terry Pratchett, \textit{Witches Abroad}\textsuperscript{1}
+ {}---Terry Pratchett, \textit{Witches Abroad}\footnote{Terry Pratchett, \textit{Witches Abroad} (London: Corgi Books,
+1992).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -5269,10 +5220,6 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Terry Pratchett, \textit{Witches Abroad} (London: Corgi Books,
-1992).}
-
 \mysection{Mundane Magic}
 
 {
@@ -5765,7 +5712,8 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 {
  What follows is taken primarily from Robert
 Cialdini's \textit{Influence: The Psychology of
-Persuasion}.\textsuperscript{1} I own three copies of this book: one
+Persuasion}.\footnote{Robert B. Cialdini, \textit{Influence: The Psychology of
+Persuasion: Revised Edition} (New York: Quill, 1993).\comment{1}} I own three copies of this book: one
 for myself, and two for loaning to friends. }
 
 {
@@ -5778,7 +5726,11 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 the open and the other behind a Plexiglas wall, the two-year-old will
 ignore the easily accessible toy and go after the apparently forbidden
 one. If the wall is low enough to be easily climbable, the toddler is
-no more likely to go after one toy than the other.\textsuperscript{2}}
+no more likely to go after one toy than the other.\footnote{Sharon S. Brehm and Marsha Weintraub,
+``Physical Barriers and Psychological Reactance:
+Two-year-olds' Responses to Threats to
+Freedom,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and Social
+Psychology} 35 (1977): 830--836.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  When Dade County forbade use or possession of phosphate
@@ -5787,7 +5739,13 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 residents not affected by the regulation, Dade residents rated
 phosphate detergents as gentler, more effective, more powerful on
 stains, and even believed that phosphate detergents poured more
-easily.\textsuperscript{3}}
+easily.\footnote{Michael B. Mazis, Robert B. Settle, and Dennis C. Leslie,
+``Elimination of Phosphate Detergents and
+Psychological Reactance,'' \textit{Journal of
+Marketing Research} 10 (1973): 2; Michael B. Mazis,
+``Antipollution Measures and Psychological Reactance
+Theory: A Field Experiment,'' \textit{Journal of
+Personality and Social Psychology} 31 (1975): 654--666.\comment{3}}}
 
 {
  Similarly, information that appears forbidden or secret seems more
@@ -5796,7 +5754,10 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 {
  When University of North Carolina students learned that a speech
 opposing coed dorms had been banned, they became more opposed to coed
-dorms (without even hearing the speech).\textsuperscript{4}}
+dorms (without even hearing the speech).\footnote{Richard D. Ashmore, Vasantha Ramchandra, and Russell A. Jones,
+``Censorship as an Attitude Change
+Induction,'' \textit{Paper presented at Eastern
+Psychological Association meeting} (1971).\comment{4}}}
 
 {
  When a driver said he had liability insurance, experimental jurors
@@ -5804,7 +5765,9 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 driver said he had no insurance. If the judge afterward informed the
 jurors that information about insurance was inadmissible and must be
 ignored, jurors awarded an average of thirteen thousand dollars more
-than if the driver had no insurance.\textsuperscript{5}}
+than if the driver had no insurance.\footnote{Dale Broeder, ``The University of Chicago Jury
+Project,'' \textit{Nebraska Law Review} 38 (1959):
+760--774.\comment{5}}}
 
 {
  Buyers for supermarkets, told by a supplier that beef was in
@@ -5814,7 +5777,10 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 scarce---that the shortage was not general knowledge---ordered six
 times as much beef. (Since the study was conducted in a real-world
 context, the information provided was in fact
-correct.)\textsuperscript{6}}
+correct.)\footnote{A. Knishinsky, ``The Effects of Scarcity of
+Material and Exclusivity of Information on Industrial Buyer Perceived
+Risk in Provoking a Purchase Decision'' (Doctoral
+dissertation, Arizona State University, 1982).\comment{6}}}
 
 {
  The conventional theory for explaining this is
@@ -5863,48 +5829,12 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robert B. Cialdini, \textit{Influence: The Psychology of
-Persuasion: Revised Edition} (New York: Quill, 1993).}
-
-{
- 2. Sharon S. Brehm and Marsha Weintraub,
-``Physical Barriers and Psychological Reactance:
-Two-year-olds' Responses to Threats to
-Freedom,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and Social
-Psychology} 35 (1977): 830--836.}
-
-{
- 3. Michael B. Mazis, Robert B. Settle, and Dennis C. Leslie,
-``Elimination of Phosphate Detergents and
-Psychological Reactance,'' \textit{Journal of
-Marketing Research} 10 (1973): 2; Michael B. Mazis,
-``Antipollution Measures and Psychological Reactance
-Theory: A Field Experiment,'' \textit{Journal of
-Personality and Social Psychology} 31 (1975): 654--666.}
-
-{
- 4. Richard D. Ashmore, Vasantha Ramchandra, and Russell A. Jones,
-``Censorship as an Attitude Change
-Induction,'' \textit{Paper presented at Eastern
-Psychological Association meeting} (1971).}
-
-{
- 5. Dale Broeder, ``The University of Chicago Jury
-Project,'' \textit{Nebraska Law Review} 38 (1959):
-760--774.}
-
-{
- 6. A. Knishinsky, ``The Effects of Scarcity of
-Material and Exclusivity of Information on Industrial Buyer Perceived
-Risk in Provoking a Purchase Decision'' (Doctoral
-dissertation, Arizona State University, 1982).}
-
 \mysection{The Sacred Mundane}
 
 {
  So I was reading (around the first half of) Adam
-Frank's \textit{The Constant Fire},\textsuperscript{1}
+Frank's \textit{The Constant Fire},\footnote{Adam Frank, \textit{The Constant Fire: Beyond the Science vs.
+Religion Debate} (University of California Press, 2009).\comment{1}}
 in preparation for my Bloggingheads dialogue with him. Adam
 Frank's book is about the experience of the sacred. I
 might not usually call it that, but of course I know the experience
@@ -6078,10 +6008,6 @@ \chapter{Joy in the Merely Real}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Adam Frank, \textit{The Constant Fire: Beyond the Science vs.
-Religion Debate} (University of California Press, 2009).}
-
 \mysection{To Spread Science, Keep It Secret}
 
 {
@@ -7083,7 +7009,9 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
  I should note, in fairness to philosophers, that there are
 philosophers who have said these things. For example, Hilary Putnam,
 writing on the ``Twin Earth''
-thought experiment:\textsuperscript{1}}
+thought experiment:\footnote{Hilary Putnam, ``The Meaning of
+Meaning,'' in \textit{The Twin Earth Chronicles}, ed.
+Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg (M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 3--52.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is
@@ -7167,11 +7095,6 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Hilary Putnam, ``The Meaning of
-Meaning,'' in \textit{The Twin Earth Chronicles}, ed.
-Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg (M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 3--52.}
-
 \mysection{Brain Breakthrough! It's Made of Neurons!}
 
 {
@@ -8318,7 +8241,7 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 
 {
  As the most formidable advocate of zombie-ism, David Chalmers,
-writes:\textsuperscript{1}}
+writes:\footnote{Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind}.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Think of my zombie twin in the universe next door. He talks about
@@ -8963,9 +8886,6 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind}.}
-
 \mysection{Zombie Responses}
 
 {
@@ -9338,7 +9258,8 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---René Descartes, \textit{Discours de la
-Méthode}\textsuperscript{1}
+Méthode}\footnote{René Descartes, \textit{Discours de la Méthode}, vol. 45
+(Librairie des Bibliophiles, 1887).\comment{1}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -9469,8 +9390,8 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 does not affect you in \textit{any} IPED way? All the particles in the
 switch are interacting with the particles composing your body and
 brain. There are gravitational effects---tiny, but real and IPED. The
-gravitational pull from a one-gram switch ten meters away is around 6
-{\texttimes} 10\textsuperscript{{}-16} m/s\textsuperscript{2}.
+gravitational pull from a one-gram switch ten meters away is around $6 \times
+ 10^{-16}\, \mathrm{m/s}^2$.
 That's around half a neutron diameter per second per
 second, far below thermal noise, but way above the Planck level.}
 
@@ -9854,15 +9775,13 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. René Descartes, \textit{Discours de la Méthode}, vol. 45
-(Librairie des Bibliophiles, 1887).}
-
 \mysection{GAZP vs. GLUT}
 
 {
  In ``The Unimagined Preposterousness of
-Zombies,'' Daniel Dennett says:\textsuperscript{1}}
+Zombies,'' Daniel Dennett says:\footnote{Daniel C. Dennett, ``The Unimagined
+Preposterousness of Zombies,'' \textit{Journal of
+Consciousness Studies} 2 (4 1995): 322--26.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  To date, several philosophers have told me that they plan to
@@ -9889,8 +9808,7 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 {
  Giant Lookup Tables get very large, very fast. A GLUT of all
 possible twenty-ply conversations with ten words per remark, using only
-850-word Basic English, would require 7.6 {\texttimes}
-10\textsuperscript{585} entries.}
+850-word Basic English, would require $7.6 \times 10^{585}$ entries.}
 
 {
  Replacing a human brain with a Giant Lookup Table of all possible
@@ -10014,7 +9932,9 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 So it's because the Sun is shining that all these
 things are moving.'' That would get the concept
 across that motion is simply the \textit{transformation} of the
-Sun's power.\textsuperscript{2}}
+Sun's power.\footnote{Richard P. Feynman, ``Judging Books by Their
+Covers,'' in \textit{Surely You're
+Joking, Mr. Feynman!} (New York: W. W. Norton \& Company, 1985).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  When you get a little older, you learn that energy is conserved,
@@ -10290,16 +10210,6 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Daniel C. Dennett, ``The Unimagined
-Preposterousness of Zombies,'' \textit{Journal of
-Consciousness Studies} 2 (4 1995): 322--26.}
-
-{
- 2. Richard P. Feynman, ``Judging Books by Their
-Covers,'' in \textit{Surely You're
-Joking, Mr. Feynman!} (New York: W. W. Norton \& Company, 1985).}
-
 \mysection{Belief in the Implied Invisible}
 
 {
@@ -10424,13 +10334,13 @@ \chapter{Physicalism 201}
 that obeys the equation doesn't affect how long it
 takes to write the equation down. If you encode the equation into a
 file, and the file is 100 bits long, then there are
-2\textsuperscript{100} other models that would be around the same file
+$2^{100}$ other models that would be around the same file
 size, and you'll need roughly 100 bits of supporting
 evidence. You've got a limited amount of probability
 mass; and a priori, you've got to divide that mass up
 among all the messages you could send; and so postulating a model from
-within a model space of 2\textsuperscript{100} alternatives, means
-you've got to accept a 2\textsuperscript{{}-100} prior
+within a model space of $2^{100}$ alternatives, means
+you've got to accept a $2^{-100}$ prior
 probability penalty---but having more galaxies doesn't
 add to this.}
 
@@ -11769,7 +11679,17 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 in,'' to the amplitude that goes to the
 configurations of ``a photon coming out
 straight'' or ``a photon being
-deflected.''\textsuperscript{1}}
+deflected.''\footnote{\textbf{Editor's Note:} Strictly speaking, a
+standard half-silvered mirror would yield a rule
+``multiply by -1 when the photon turns at a right
+angle,'' not ``multiply by
+i.'' The basic scenario described by the author is
+not physically impossible, and its use does not affect the substantive
+argument. However, physics students may come away confused if they
+compare the discussion here to textbook discussions of Mach--Zehnder
+interferometers. We've left this idiosyncrasy in the
+text because it eliminates any need to specify which side of the mirror
+is half-silvered, simplifying the experiment.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  So we pipe the amplitude of the configuration ``a
@@ -11841,8 +11761,8 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 {
  We \textit{do} have a magical measuring tool that can tell us the
 \textit{squared modulus} of a configuration's
-amplitude. If the original complex amplitude is (a + bi), we can get
-the positive real number (a\textsuperscript{2} + b\textsuperscript{2}).
+amplitude. If the original complex amplitude is $(a + bi)$, we can get
+the positive real number $(a^{2} + b^{2})$.
 Think of the Pythagorean theorem: if you imagine the complex number as
 a little arrow stretching out from the origin on a two-dimensional
 plane, then the magic tool tells us the squared length of the little
@@ -12249,19 +12169,6 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. \textbf{Editor's Note:} Strictly speaking, a
-standard half-silvered mirror would yield a rule
-``multiply by -1 when the photon turns at a right
-angle,'' not ``multiply by
-i.'' The basic scenario described by the author is
-not physically impossible, and its use does not affect the substantive
-argument. However, physics students may come away confused if they
-compare the discussion here to textbook discussions of Mach--Zehnder
-interferometers. We've left this idiosyncrasy in the
-text because it eliminates any need to specify which side of the mirror
-is half-silvered, simplifying the experiment.}
-
 \mysection{Joint Configurations}
 
 {
@@ -12444,22 +12351,18 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 {
  E.g.:}
 
-{\centering
- S\_M((2 + i) + (1 $-$ i)) = S\_M(3 + 0i)\newline
- = 3\textsuperscript{2} + 0\textsuperscript{2}\newline
- = 9,
-\par}
-
+\begin{align*}
+ S\_M((2 + i) + (1 - i)) &= S\_M(3 + 0i)\\
+ &= 3^2 + 0^2\\
+ &= 9,
+\end{align*}
 
-\bigskip
 
-{\centering
- S\_M(2 + i) + S\_M(1 $-$ i) = (2\textsuperscript{2} +
-1\textsuperscript{2})+ ( 1\textsuperscript{2} +
-(-1)\textsuperscript{2})\newline
- = (4 + 1) + (1 + 1)\newline
- = 7.
-\par}
+\begin{align*}
+ S\_M(2 + i) + S\_M(1 - i) &= (2^2 + 1^2)+ ( 1^2 + (-1)^2)\\
+ &= (4 + 1) + (1 + 1)\\
+ &= 7.
+\end{align*}
 
 
 \bigskip
@@ -13312,10 +13215,10 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 
 {
  If you add ten details to X, each of which could potentially be
-true or false, then that story must compete with 2\textsuperscript{10}
-- 1 other equally detailed stories for precious probability. If on the
+true or false, then that story must compete with $2^{10}
+- 1$ other equally detailed stories for precious probability. If on the
 other hand it suffices to \textit{just} say X, you can sum your
-probability over 2\textsuperscript{10} stories}
+probability over $2^{10}$ stories}
 
 {\centering
  ((X and Y and Z and \ldots) or (X and {\textlnot}Y and Z and \ldots)
@@ -13426,7 +13329,7 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 other valid computer program (``prefix-free
 code''), e.g. because it contains a stop code. Then
 the prior probability of any program P is simply
-2\textsuperscript{{}-L(P)} where L(P) is the length of P in bits.}
+$2^{-L(P)}$ where $L(P)$ is the length of P in bits.}
 
 {
  The program P itself can be a program that takes in a (possibly
@@ -14293,10 +14196,12 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 to normality.}}
 
 {
- (After Greg Egan, in \textit{Quarantine}.\textsuperscript{1})}
+ (After Greg Egan, in \textit{Quarantine}.\footnote{Greg Egan, \textit{Quarantine} (London: Legend Press, 1992).\comment{1}})}
 
 {
- Frank Sulloway said:\textsuperscript{2}}
+ Frank Sulloway said:\footnote{Robert S. Boynton, ``The Birth of an Idea: A
+Profile of Frank Sulloway,'' \textit{The New Yorker}
+(October 1999).\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  Ironically, psychoanalysis has it over Darwinism precisely because
@@ -14540,14 +14445,6 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Greg Egan, \textit{Quarantine} (London: Legend Press, 1992).}
-
-{
- 2. Robert S. Boynton, ``The Birth of an Idea: A
-Profile of Frank Sulloway,'' \textit{The New Yorker}
-(October 1999).}
-
 \mysection{Quantum Non{}-Realism}
 
 {
@@ -14925,8 +14822,8 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
  Sure, when the dust settles, it could turn out that apples
 don't exist, Earth doesn't exist,
 reality doesn't exist. But the nonexistent apples will
-still fall toward the nonexistent ground at a meaningless rate of 9.8
-m/s\textsuperscript{2}.}
+still fall toward the nonexistent ground at a meaningless rate of $9.8 \,
+\mathrm{m/s}^{2}$.}
 
 {
  You say the universe doesn't exist? Fine, suppose
@@ -16187,7 +16084,7 @@ \chapter{Quantum Physics and Many Worlds}
 differently, and hence many \textit{many} particles in different
 positions. They are very distant in the configuration space, and will
 communicate to an exponentially infinitesimal degree. Not the 30th
-decimal place, but the 10\textsuperscript{30}th decimal place. No
+decimal place, but the $10^{30}$th decimal place. No
 particular mind, no particular cognitive causal process, sees a blurry
 superposition of cats.}
 
@@ -17776,7 +17673,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
  John McCarthy's Wikiquotes page has him saying,
 ``Your statements amount to saying that if AI is
 possible, it should be easy. Why is
-that?''\textsuperscript{1} The Wikiquotes page
+that?''\footnote{No longer on Wikiquotes, but included in
+McCarthy's personal quotes page.\comment{1}} The Wikiquotes page
 doesn't say what McCarthy was responding to, but I
 could venture a guess.}
 
@@ -17788,7 +17686,10 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 as I used to think---with all the strangely varied anecdotal evidence
 coming in from respected sources, why the \textit{hell}
 isn't anyone testing Seth Roberts's
-theory of appetite suppression?\textsuperscript{2})}
+theory of appetite suppression?\footnote{Seth Roberts, ``What Makes Food Fattening?: A
+Pavlovian Theory of Weight Control'' (Unpublished
+manuscript, 2005),
+http://media.sethroberts.net/about/whatmakesfoodfattening.pdf.\comment{2}})}
 
 {
  Another confusion factor may be that if you test Pharmaceutical X
@@ -17845,16 +17746,6 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. No longer on Wikiquotes, but included in
-McCarthy's personal quotes page.}
-
-{
- 2. Seth Roberts, ``What Makes Food Fattening?: A
-Pavlovian Theory of Weight Control'' (Unpublished
-manuscript, 2005),
-http://media.sethroberts.net/about/whatmakesfoodfattening.pdf.}
-
 \mysection{Science Isn't Strict Enough}
 
 {
@@ -18634,7 +18525,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 {
  \textit{New Scientist} on changing the definition of science,
-ungated here:\textsuperscript{1}}
+ungated here:\footnote{Robert Matthews, ``Do We Need to Change the
+Definition of Science?,'' \textit{New Scientist} (May
+2008).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Others believe such criticism is based on a misunderstanding.
@@ -18717,11 +18610,6 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Robert Matthews, ``Do We Need to Change the
-Definition of Science?,'' \textit{New Scientist} (May
-2008).}
-
 \mysection{Faster Than Science}
 
 {
@@ -18731,7 +18619,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 non-scientist will ignore it anyway.) }
 
 {
- Max Planck was even less optimistic:\textsuperscript{1}}
+ Max Planck was even less optimistic:\footnote{Max Planck, \textit{Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers}
+(New York: Philosophical Library, 1949).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
@@ -18934,10 +18823,6 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Max Planck, \textit{Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers}
-(New York: Philosophical Library, 1949).}
-
 \mysection{Einstein's Speed}
 
 {
@@ -19285,7 +19170,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 rationalists that they study evolutionary psychology simply to get a
 glimpse of what careful reasoning looks like. See particularly Tooby
 and Cosmides's ``The Psychological
-Foundations of Culture.''\textsuperscript{1}}
+Foundations of Culture.''\footnote{Tooby and Cosmides, ``The Psychological
+Foundations of Culture.''\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  As for the possibility that \textit{only} Einstein could do what
@@ -19324,10 +19210,6 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Tooby and Cosmides, ``The Psychological
-Foundations of Culture.''}
-
 \mysection{That Alien Message}
 
 {
@@ -19458,8 +19340,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 + 512). Which you wouldn't expect if the message was a
 2D picture projected onto a symmetrical grid. Then you would expect the
 average bitwise distance between two 32-bit groups to go as the 2-norm
-of the grid separation: ${\surd}$(h\textsuperscript{2} +
-v\textsuperscript{2}).}
+of the grid separation: ${\surd}(h^2 + v^2)$.}
 
 {
  There also forms a general consensus that a certain binary
@@ -20103,7 +19984,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 {
  Once I unthinkingly thought this way too, with respect to Einstein
 in particular, until reading Julian Barbour's
-\textit{The End of Time} cured me of it.\textsuperscript{1}}
+\textit{The End of Time} cured me of it.\footnote{Julian Barbour, \textit{The End of Time: The Next Revolution in
+Physics}, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  Barbour laid out the history of anti-epiphenomenal physics and
@@ -20378,10 +20260,6 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Julian Barbour, \textit{The End of Time: The Next Revolution in
-Physics}, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).}
-
 \mysection{Class Project}
 
 {
@@ -20656,7 +20534,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 {
  As Jaynes emphasizes, the theorems of Bayesian probability theory
 are just that---\textit{mathematical theorems} that follow inevitably
-from Bayesian axioms.\textsuperscript{1} One might naively think that
+from Bayesian axioms.\footnote{Edwin T. Jaynes, \textit{Probability Theory: The Logic of
+Science}, ed. George Larry Bretthorst (New York: Cambridge University
+Press, 2003), doi:10.2277/0521592712.\comment{1}} One might naively think that
 there would be no controversy about mathematical theorems. But when do
 the theorems apply? How do we use the theorems in real-world problems?
 The Intuitive Explanation tries to avoid controversy, but the Technical
@@ -20683,7 +20563,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 probability amplitudes. When I grew up, I read the \textit{Feynman
 Lectures on Physics} and took the time to understand
 ``the wave
-equation.''\textsuperscript{2} And then I realized
+equation.''\footnote{Feynman, Leighton, and Sands, \textit{The Feynman Lectures on
+Physics}.\comment{2}} And then I realized
 that up to that point, I had not understood or believed
 ``sound is waves'' in anything like
 the way a physicist means and believes that sentence.}
@@ -20917,8 +20798,12 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
  One rule with this proper property is to pay a dollar minus the
 squared error of the bet, rather than the bet itself---if you bet 30
 cents on the winning light, your error would be 70 cents, your squared
-error would be 49 cents (0.7\textsuperscript{2} = 0.49), and a dollar
-minus your squared error would be 51 cents.\textsuperscript{3}
+error would be 49 cents $(0.7^2 = 0.49)$, and a dollar
+minus your squared error would be 51 cents.\footnote{Readers with calculus may verify that in the simpler case of a
+light that has only two colors, with p being the bet on the first color
+and f the frequency of the first color, the expected payoff $f
+\times (1 - (1 - p)^2) + (1 - f) \times (1 - p^2)$, with $p$ variable and $f$ constant, has its global
+maximum when we set $p = f$.\comment{3}}
 (Presumably your play money is denominated in the square root of cents,
 so that the squared error is a monetary sum.)}
 
@@ -20941,7 +20826,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 and then blue wins. The experimenter would assign the first score based
 on our probability assignments for P(green\textsubscript{1}) and the
 second score based on
-P(blue\textsubscript{2}{\textbar}green\textsubscript{1}).\textsuperscript{4}
+P(blue\textsubscript{2}{\textbar}green\textsubscript{1}).\footnote{Don't remember how to read P(A{\textbar}B)? See
+An Intuitive Explanation of Bayesian Reasoning.\comment{4}}
 We would make two predictions, and get two scores. Our first prediction
 was the probability we assigned to the color that won on the first
 round, green. Our second prediction was our probability that blue would
@@ -21221,21 +21107,20 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 you assigned to the final outcome is 1/2 to the tenth power, which is
 0.001 or 1/1,024. The probability I assigned to the final outcome is
 90\% to the eighth power times 10\% to the second power,
-0.9\textsuperscript{8} {\texttimes} 0.1\textsuperscript{2}, which works
+$0.9^8 \times 0.1^2$, which works
 out to 0.004 or 0.4\%. Your calibration is perfect and mine
 isn't, but my better \textit{discrimination} between
 right and wrong answers more than makes up for it. My final score is
 higher---I assigned a greater joint probability to the final outcome of
 the entire experiment. If I'd been less overconfident
 and better calibrated, the probability I assigned to the final outcome
-would have been 0.8\textsuperscript{8} {\texttimes}
-0.2\textsuperscript{2}, which works out to 0.006 or 6\%.}
+would have been $0.8^8 \times 0.2^2$, which works out to 0.006 or 6\%.}
 
 {
  Is it possible to do even better? Sure. You could have guessed
 every single answer correctly, and assigned a probability of 99\% to
 each of your answers. Then the probability you assigned to the entire
-experimental outcome would be 0.99\textsuperscript{10} ${\approx}$
+experimental outcome would be $0.99^{10}$ ${\approx}$
 90\%.}
 
 {
@@ -21265,7 +21150,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 ``million-to-one.'' But no simple
 transform can increase your \textit{actual} discrimination such that
 your reply distinguishes 95 correct answers and 5 incorrect answers.
-From Yates et al.:\textsuperscript{5} ``Whereas good
+From Yates et al.:\footnote{J. Frank Yates et al., ``Probability Judgment
+Across Cultures,'' in Gilovich, Griffin, and
+Kahneman, \textit{Heuristics and Biases}, 271--291.\comment{5}} ``Whereas good
 calibration often can be achieved by simple mathematical
 transformations (e.g., adding a constant to every probability
 judgment), good discrimination demands access to solid, predictive
@@ -21294,7 +21181,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 roughly a million (1,048,576) possible sequences of twenty coinflips,
 and I have only 1.0 of probability mass to play with. So I assign to
 each \textit{individual} possible sequence a probability of
-(1$/$2)\textsuperscript{20}{}---odds of about a million to one; -20
+$(1/2)^{20}$---odds of about a million to one; -20
 bits or -60 decibels.}
 
 {
@@ -21400,7 +21287,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 bets, allows many possibilities that would falsify the precise theory.
 This is not the virtue of a scientific theory. Philosophers of science
 tell us that theories should be bold, and subject themselves willingly
-to falsification if their prediction fails.\textsuperscript{6} Now we
+to falsification if their prediction fails.\footnote{Karl R Popper, \textit{The Logic of Scientific Discovery} (New
+York: Basic Books, 1959).\comment{6}} Now we
 see why. The precise theory concentrates its probability mass into a
 sharper point and thereby leaves itself vulnerable to falsification if
 the real outcome hits elsewhere; but if the predicted outcome is
@@ -21493,7 +21381,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 {
  Of course, it is a severe error to say that a \textit{phenomenon}
 is precise or vague, a case of what Jaynes calls the Mind Projection
-Fallacy.\textsuperscript{7} Precision or vagueness is a property of
+Fallacy.\footnote{Jaynes, \textit{Probability Theory}.\comment{7}} Precision or vagueness is a property of
 maps, not territories. Rather we should ask if the price in the
 supermarket stays constant or shifts about. A hypothesis of the
 ``vague'' sort is a good description
@@ -21618,7 +21506,10 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 powers of chaos, unpredictability, spontaneity, ignorance of what your
 own AI is doing, et cetera. (See The Imagination Engine for an example;
 according to their sales literature they sell wounded and dying neural
-nets.\textsuperscript{8}) But how sad is an algorithm if you can
+nets.\footnote{Imagination Engines, Inc., ``The Imagination
+Engine{\texttrademark}; or
+Imagitron{\texttrademark},'' 2011,
+http://www.imagination-engines.com/ie.htm.\comment{8}}) But how sad is an algorithm if you can
 \textit{increase} its performance by injecting entropy into
 intermediate processing stages? The algorithm must be so deranged that
 some of its work goes into concentrating probability mass \textit{away}
@@ -21707,7 +21598,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 the priest in Conservation of Expected Evidence, put it,
 ``The investigating committee would feel disgraced if
 it acquitted a woman; once arrested and in chains, she has to be
-guilty, by fair means or foul.''\textsuperscript{9}}
+guilty, by fair means or foul.''\footnote{Friedrich Spee, \textit{Cautio Criminalis; or, A Book on Witch
+Trials}, ed. and trans. Marcus Hellyer, Studies in Early Modern German
+History (1631; Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003).\comment{9}}}
 
 {
  The way human psychology seems to work is that first we see
@@ -21891,7 +21784,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 {\raggedleft
  {}---Democritus, 420 BCE, from Robinson and
-Groves\textsuperscript{10}
+Groves\footnote{quoted in Dave Robinson and Judy Groves, \textit{Philosophy
+for Beginners}, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1998).\comment{10}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -21940,7 +21834,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 ``just a theory'' or non-rigorous or
 non-technical or in any way not confirmed by an unimaginably huge mound
 of experimental evidence---I recommend reading the \textit{TalkOrigins
-FAQ}\textsuperscript{11} and studying evolutionary biology with math.}
+FAQ}\footnote{TalkOrigins Foundation, ``Frequently Asked
+Questions about Creationism and Evolution,''
+http://www.talkorigins.org/origins/faqs-qa.html.\comment{11}} and studying evolutionary biology with math.}
 
 {
  But imagine going back in time to the nineteenth century, when the
@@ -21977,13 +21873,14 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 physics go one better through vast mountains of \textit{precise}
 experimental confirmation? Observations of neutron stars confirm the
 predictions of General Relativity to within one part in a hundred
-trillion (10\textsuperscript{14}). What does evolutionary theory have
+trillion $(10^{14})$. What does evolutionary theory have
 to match that?}
 
 {
  Daniel Dennett once said that measured by the simplicity of the
 theory and the amount of complexity it explained, Darwin had the single
-greatest idea in the history of time.\textsuperscript{12}}
+greatest idea in the history of time.\footnote{Daniel C. Dennett, \textit{Darwin's Dangerous
+Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life} (Simon \& Schuster, 1995).\comment{12}}}
 
 {
  Once there was a conflict between nineteenth century physics and
@@ -21993,7 +21890,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 energy. There was no energy source known to nineteenth century physics
 that would permit longer burning. Nineteenth century physics was not
 \textit{quite} as powerful as modern physics---it did not have
-predictions accurate to within one part in 10\textsuperscript{14}. But
+predictions accurate to within one part in $10^{14}$. But
 nineteenth century physics still had the mathematical character of
 modern physics, a discipline whose models produced detailed, precise,
 quantitative predictions. Nineteenth century evolutionary theory was
@@ -22016,7 +21913,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 modification by natural selection.''}
 
 {\raggedleft
- {}---Lord Kelvin, from Lyle Zapato\textsuperscript{13}
+ {}---Lord Kelvin, from Lyle Zapato\footnote{quoted in Lyle Zapato, ``Lord Kelvin
+Quotations,'' 2008,
+http://zapatopi.net/kelvin/quotes/.\comment{13}}
 \par}
 
 
@@ -22127,7 +22026,13 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 accept the theory, misunderstood evolution frequently and seriously.
 The usual process of science was then required to correct their
 mistakes. It is incredible how few errors of reasoning
-Darwin\textsuperscript{14} made in \textit{The Origin of Species} and
+Darwin\footnote{Charles Darwin, \textit{On the Origin of Species by Means of
+Natural Selection; or, The Preservation of Favoured Races in the
+Struggle for Life}, 1st ed. (London: John Murray, 1859),
+http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text\&itemID=F373\&pageseq=1;
+Charles Darwin, \textit{The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation
+to Sex}, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1874),
+http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=F944\&viewtype=text\&pageseq=1.\comment{14}} made in \textit{The Origin of Species} and
 \textit{The Descent of Man}, compared to they who followed.}
 
 {
@@ -22138,7 +22043,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 ``for the good of the species,'' or
 suggested that individuals would restrain their reproduction to prevent
 species overpopulation of a habitat. The best evolutionary theorists
-knew better, but average theorists did not.\textsuperscript{15}}
+knew better, but average theorists did not.\footnote{Williams, \textit{Adaptation and Natural Selection}.\comment{15}}}
 
 {
  So it is \textit{far} better to have a technical theory than a
@@ -22216,7 +22121,8 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 the example of someone who claims that a dragon lives in their garage.
 Sagan originally drew the lesson that poor hypotheses need to do fast
 footwork to avoid falsification---to maintain an appearance of
-``fit.''\textsuperscript{16}}
+``fit.''\footnote{Carl Sagan, \textit{The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a
+Candle in the Dark}, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1995).\comment{16}}}
 
 {
  I would point out that the claimant obviously has a good model of
@@ -22362,7 +22268,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
  Astronomers recorded the unexplained perihelion advance of
 Mercury, unaccounted for under Newtonian physics---or rather, Newtonian
 physics predicted 5,557 seconds of arc per century, where the observed
-amount was 5,600.\textsuperscript{17} But should the scientists of that
+amount was 5,600.\footnote{Kevin Brown, \textit{Reflections On Relativity} (Raleigh, NC:
+printed by author, 2011), 405-414,
+http://www.mathpages.com/rr/rrtoc.htm.\comment{17}} But should the scientists of that
 day have junked Newtonian gravitation based on such small, unexplained
 counterevidence? What would they have used instead? Eventually,
 Newton's theory of gravitation \textit{was} set aside,
@@ -22382,7 +22290,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 Newton's standard theory---and predicted
 Neptune's location to within one degree of arc,
 dramatically \textit{confirming} Newtonian
-gravitation.\textsuperscript{18}}
+gravitation.\footnote{Ibid., 405-414.\comment{18}}}
 
 {
  Only \textit{after} General Relativity precisely produced the
@@ -22439,7 +22347,10 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 {
  Every genuine scientific theory then, in Popper's
 view, is prohibitive, in the sense that it forbids, by implication,
-particular events or occurrences.\textsuperscript{19}}
+particular events or occurrences.\footnote{Stephen Thornton, ``Karl
+Popper,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of
+Philosophy}, Winter 2002, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University),
+http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/popper/.\comment{19}}}
 
 {
  On Popper's philosophy, the strength of a
@@ -22493,7 +22404,9 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 as fundamental. (Claiming that a mathematical law lacks an
 ``underlying mechanism'' is one of
 the entries on the \textit{Crackpot Index} by John
-Baez.\textsuperscript{20}) The ``underlying
+Baez.\footnote{John Baez, ``The Crackpot
+Index,'' 1998,
+http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/crackpot.html.\comment{20}}) The ``underlying
 mechanism'' the crackpot proposes in answer is vague,
 verbal, and yields no increase in predictive power---otherwise we would
 not classify the claimant as a crackpot.}
@@ -22603,7 +22516,7 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 {
  As it stands, even if the Sun rises every morning, every year our
-Final Judgment will decrease by a factor of 0.999\textsuperscript{365}
+Final Judgment will decrease by a factor of $0.999^{365}$
 = 0.7, roughly -0.52 bits. Every two years, our Final Judgment will
 decrease more than if we found ourselves ignorant of a
 coinflip's outcome! Intolerable. If we increase our
@@ -22992,101 +22905,5 @@ \chapter{Science and Rationality}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. Edwin T. Jaynes, \textit{Probability Theory: The Logic of
-Science}, ed. George Larry Bretthorst (New York: Cambridge University
-Press, 2003), doi:10.2277/0521592712.}
-
-{
- 2. Feynman, Leighton, and Sands, \textit{The Feynman Lectures on
-Physics}.}
-
-{
- 3. Readers with calculus may verify that in the simpler case of a
-light that has only two colors, with p being the bet on the first color
-and f the frequency of the first color, the expected payoff f
-{\texttimes} (1 - (1 - p)\textsuperscript{2}) + (1 - f) {\texttimes} (1
-- p\textsuperscript{2}), with p variable and f constant, has its global
-maximum when we set p = f.}
-
-{
- 4. Don't remember how to read P(A{\textbar}B)? See
-An Intuitive Explanation of Bayesian Reasoning.}
-
-{
- 5. J. Frank Yates et al., ``Probability Judgment
-Across Cultures,'' in Gilovich, Griffin, and
-Kahneman, \textit{Heuristics and Biases}, 271--291.}
-
-{
- 6. Karl R Popper, \textit{The Logic of Scientific Discovery} (New
-York: Basic Books, 1959).}
-
-{
- 7. Jaynes, \textit{Probability Theory}.}
-
-{
- 8. Imagination Engines, Inc., ``The Imagination
-Engine{\texttrademark}; or
-Imagitron{\texttrademark},'' 2011,
-http://www.imagination-engines.com/ie.htm.}
-
-{
- 9. Friedrich Spee, \textit{Cautio Criminalis; or, A Book on Witch
-Trials}, ed. and trans. Marcus Hellyer, Studies in Early Modern German
-History (1631; Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003).}
-
-{
- 10. quoted in Dave Robinson and Judy Groves, \textit{Philosophy
-for Beginners}, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1998).}
-
-{
- 11. TalkOrigins Foundation, ``Frequently Asked
-Questions about Creationism and Evolution,''
-http://www.talkorigins.org/origins/faqs-qa.html.}
-
-{
- 12. Daniel C. Dennett, \textit{Darwin's Dangerous
-Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life} (Simon \& Schuster, 1995).}
-
-{
- 13. quoted in Lyle Zapato, ``Lord Kelvin
-Quotations,'' 2008,
-http://zapatopi.net/kelvin/quotes/.}
-
-{
- 14. Charles Darwin, \textit{On the Origin of Species by Means of
-Natural Selection; or, The Preservation of Favoured Races in the
-Struggle for Life}, 1st ed. (London: John Murray, 1859),
-http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text\&itemID=F373\&pageseq=1;
-Charles Darwin, \textit{The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation
-to Sex}, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1874),
-http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=F944\&viewtype=text\&pageseq=1.}
-
-{
- 15. Williams, \textit{Adaptation and Natural Selection}.}
-
-{
- 16. Carl Sagan, \textit{The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a
-Candle in the Dark}, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1995).}
-
-{
- 17. Kevin Brown, \textit{Reflections On Relativity} (Raleigh, NC:
-printed by author, 2011), 405-414,
-http://www.mathpages.com/rr/rrtoc.htm.}
-
-{
- 18. Ibid., 405-414.}
-
-{
- 19. Stephen Thornton, ``Karl
-Popper,'' in \textit{The Stanford Encyclopedia of
-Philosophy}, Winter 2002, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University),
-http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/popper/.}
-
-{
- 20. John Baez, ``The Crackpot
-Index,'' 1998,
-http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/crackpot.html.}
 
 
diff --git a/rationality_from_ai_to_zombies.tex b/rationality_from_ai_to_zombies.tex
index 6443905..a09eac6 100644
--- a/rationality_from_ai_to_zombies.tex
+++ b/rationality_from_ai_to_zombies.tex
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 % see http://writer2latex.sourceforge.net for more info
 \documentclass[letterpaper]{book}
 %\usepackage[latin1]{inputenc}
+%\usepackage{bigfoot}
 \usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
 \usepackage[english]{babel}
 \usepackage{amsmath}
@@ -22,18 +23,21 @@
 \newcommand{\mysection}[1]{
   \stepcounter{mysection}
   \section{#1}
+  \setcounter{footnote}{0}
 }
 
 %Section with no number
 \newcommand{\mysectionnn}[1]{
   \section*{#1}
   \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{#1}
+  \setcounter{footnote}{0}
 }
 
 %Section with no number and short title
 \newcommand{\mysectiontwo}[2]{
   \section*{#2}
   \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{#1}
+  \setcounter{footnote}{0}
 }
 
 %Used for graphics
@@ -51,6 +55,20 @@
 \par}
 }
 
+%comma in a superscript
+\newcommand{\supercomma}{\textsuperscript{,}}
+
+%move the footnote counter back
+\newcommand{\footback}[1]{\addtocounter{footnote}{-#1}}
+
+%move the footnote counter +1
+\newcommand{\footnext}{\addtocounter{footnote}{1}}
+
+%\DeclareNewFootnote{A}
+%\DeclareNewFootnote{B}[alph]
+\newcommand{\comment}[1]{
+}
+
 %\newcommand\textsubscript[1]{\ensuremath{{}_{\text{#1}}}}
 % Outline numbering
 \setcounter{secnumdepth}{1}
@@ -407,7 +425,20 @@
 do it to chastise them for being unfair or partial. \textit{Cognitive}
 bias is a different beast altogether. Cognitive biases are a basic part
 of how humans in general think, not the sort of defect we could blame
-on a terrible upbringing or a rotten personality.\textsuperscript{1}}
+on a terrible upbringing or a rotten personality.\footnote{The idea of personal bias, media bias, etc. resembles
+statistical bias in that it's an \textit{error}. Other
+ways of generalizing the idea of
+``bias'' focus instead on its
+association with nonrandomness. In machine learning, for example, an
+\textit{inductive} bias is just the set of assumptions a learner uses
+to derive predictions from a data set. Here, the learner is
+``biased'' in the sense that
+it's pointed in a specific direction; but since that
+direction might be \textit{truth}, it isn't a bad thing
+for an agent to have an inductive bias. It's valuable
+and necessary. This distinguishes inductive
+``bias'' quite clearly from the
+other kinds of bias.\comment{1}}}
 
 {
  A cognitive bias is a systematic way that your innate patterns of
@@ -449,7 +480,11 @@ \subsection{Rational Feelings}
 rely on intuitions or impulses, and is easily dumbfounded and
 outmaneuvered upon encountering an erratic or
 ``irrational''
-opponent.\textsuperscript{2}}
+opponent.\footnote{A sad coincidence: Leonard Nimoy, the actor who played Spock,
+passed away just a few days before the release of this book. Though we
+cite his character as a classic example of fake
+``Hollywood rationality,'' we mean
+no disrespect to Nimoy's memory.\comment{2}}}
 
 {
  There's a completely different notion of
@@ -473,7 +508,13 @@ \subsection{Rational Feelings}
 overthink things. When selecting a poster to put on their wall, or
 predicting the outcome of a basketball game, experimental subjects have
 been found to perform \textit{worse} if they carefully analyzed their
-reasons.\textsuperscript{3,4} There are some problems where conscious
+reasons.\footnote{Timothy D. Wilson et al., ``Introspecting
+About Reasons Can Reduce Post-choice Satisfaction,''
+\textit{Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin} 19 (1993):
+331--331.\comment{3}}\supercomma\footnote{Jamin Brett Halberstadt and Gary M. Levine,
+``Effects of Reasons Analysis on the Accuracy of
+Predicting Basketball Games,'' \textit{Journal of
+Applied Social Psychology} 29, no. 3 (1999): 517--530.\comment{4}} There are some problems where conscious
 deliberation serves us better, and others where snap judgments serve us
 better.}
 
@@ -482,7 +523,11 @@ \subsection{Rational Feelings}
 brain's ``System 1''
 processes (fast, implicit, associative, automatic cognition) from its
 ``System 2'' processes (slow,
-explicit, intellectual, controlled cognition).\textsuperscript{5} The
+explicit, intellectual, controlled cognition).\footnote{Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West,
+``Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications
+for the Rationality Debate?,'' \textit{Behavioral and
+Brain Sciences} 23, no. 5 (2000): 645--665,
+http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract\_S0140525X00003435.\comment{5}} The
 \textit{stereotype} is for rationalists to rely entirely on System 2,
 disregarding their feelings and impulses. Looking past the stereotype,
 someone who is actually being rational---actually achieving their
@@ -495,7 +540,11 @@ \subsection{Rational Feelings}
 guide to ``when should I trust System
 1?'' Our untrained intuitions don't
 tell us when we ought to stop relying on them. Being biased and being
-unbiased \textit{feel} the same.\textsuperscript{6}}
+unbiased \textit{feel} the same.\footnote{Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar, and Nancy Brekke,
+``Mental Contamination and the Debiasing
+Problem,'' in \textit{Heuristics and Biases: The
+Psychology of Intuitive Judgment}, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin,
+and Daniel Kahneman (Cambridge University Press, 2002).\comment{6}}}
 
 {
  On the other hand, as behavioral economist Dan Ariely notes:
@@ -525,7 +574,11 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 and Kahneman found that experimental subjects considered it less likely
 that a strong tennis player would ``lose the first
 set'' than that he would ``lose the
-first set but win the match.''\textsuperscript{7}
+first set but win the match.''\footnote{Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
+``Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
+Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment,''
+\textit{Psychological Review} 90, no. 4 (1983): 293--315,
+doi:10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293.\comment{7}}
 Making a comeback seems more \textit{typical} of a strong player, so we
 overestimate the probability of this complicated-but-sensible-sounding
 narrative compared to the probability of a strictly simpler scenario.}
@@ -535,13 +588,16 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 \textit{base rate neglect}, where we ground our judgments in how
 intuitively ``normal'' a combination
 of attributes is, neglecting how common each attribute is in the
-population at large.\textsuperscript{8} Is it more likely that Steve is
+population at large.\footnote{Richards J. Heuer, \textit{Psychology of Intelligence Analysis}
+(Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
+1999).\comment{8}} Is it more likely that Steve is
 a shy librarian, or that he's a shy salesperson? Most
 people answer this kind of question by thinking about whether
 ``shy'' matches their stereotypes of
 those professions. They fail to take into consideration how much more
 common salespeople are than librarians---seventy-five times as common,
-in the United States.\textsuperscript{9}}
+in the United States.\footnote{Wayne Weiten, \textit{Psychology: Themes and Variations,
+Briefer Version, Eighth Edition} (Cengage Learning, 2010).\comment{9}}}
 
 {
  Other examples of biases include \textit{duration neglect}
@@ -550,7 +606,58 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 you've spent resources on in the past, when you should
 be cutting your losses and moving on), and \textit{confirmation bias}
 (giving more weight to evidence that confirms what we already
-believe).\textsuperscript{10,11}}
+believe).\footnote{Raymond S. Nickerson, ``Confirmation Bias: A
+Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,''
+\textit{Review of General Psychology} 2, no. 2 (1998): 175.\comment{10}}\supercomma\footnote{\textit{Probability neglect} is another cognitive bias. In the
+months and years following the September 11 attacks, many people chose
+to drive long distances rather than fly. Hijacking
+wasn't \textit{likely}, but it now felt like it was on
+the table; the mere possibility of hijacking hugely impacted decisions.
+By relying on black-and-white reasoning (cars and planes are either
+``safe'' or
+``unsafe,'' full stop), people
+actually put themselves in much more danger. Where they should have
+weighed the probability of dying on a cross-country car trip against
+the probability of dying on a cross-country flight---the former is
+hundreds of times more likely---they instead relied on their general
+feeling of worry and anxiety (the affect heuristic). We can see the
+same pattern of behavior in children who, hearing arguments for and
+against the safety of seat belts, hop back and forth between thinking
+seat belts are a completely good idea or a completely bad one, instead
+of trying to compare the strengths of the pro and con
+considerations.\footnotemark%
+
+ Some more examples of biases are: the \textit{peak/end rule}
+(evaluating remembered events based on their most intense moment, and
+how they ended); \textit{anchoring} (basing decisions on recently
+encountered information, even when it's
+irrelevant)\footnotemark and \textit{self-anchoring} (using
+yourself as a model for others' likely characteristics,
+without giving enough thought to ways you're
+atypical);\footnotemark and \textit{status quo bias}
+(excessively favoring what's normal and expected over
+what's new and different).\footnotemark\comment{11}}
+\footback{3}
+\footnotetext{Cass R. Sunstein, ``Probability Neglect:
+Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,'' \textit{Yale Law
+Journal} (2002): 61--107.\comment{21}}
+\footnext
+\footnotetext{Dan Ariely, \textit{Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces
+That Shape Our Decisions} (HarperCollins, 2008).\comment{22}}
+}
+\footnext
+\footnotetext{Boaz Keysar and Dale J. Barr,
+``Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users
+Do Not Do What They
+`Should,''' in
+\textit{Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment},
+ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (New York:
+Cambridge University Press, 2002), 150--166, doi:10.2277/0521796792.\comment{23}}
+\footnext
+\footnotetext{Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall,
+``Bias in Favor of the Status Quo,''
+\textit{Social and Personality Psychology Compass} 6, no. 3 (2012):
+270--281.\comment{24}}
 
 {
  Knowing about a bias, however, is rarely enough to protect you
@@ -563,17 +670,66 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 control group. When asked \textit{afterward}, however, the very same
 subjects claimed that their assessments of the paintings had been
 objective and unaffected by the bias---in all
-groups!\textsuperscript{12,13}}
+groups!\footnote{Katherine Hansen et al., ``People Claim
+Objectivity After Knowingly Using Biased
+Strategies,'' \textit{Personality and Social
+Psychology Bulletin} 40, no. 6 (2014): 691--699.\comment{12}}\supercomma\footnote{Similarly, Pronin writes of gender bias blindness:
+
+ In one study, participants considered a male and a female
+candidate for a police-chief job and then assessed whether being
+``streetwise'' or
+``formally educated'' was more
+important for the job. The result was that participants favored
+whichever background they were told the male candidate possessed (e.g.,
+if told he was ``streetwise,'' they
+viewed that as more important). Participants were completely blind to
+this gender bias; indeed, the more objective they believed they had
+been, the more bias they actually showed.\footnotemark
+
+ Even when we know about biases, Pronin notes, we remain
+``naive realists'' about our own
+beliefs. We reliably fall back into treating our beliefs as
+distortion-free representations of how things actually
+are.\footnotemark\comment{13}}
+\footback{1}
+\footnotetext{Eric Luis Uhlmann and Geoffrey L. Cohen,
+```I think it, therefore
+it's true': Effects of Self-perceived
+Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination,''
+\textit{Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes} 104, no.
+2 (2007): 207--223.\comment{25}}%
+\footnext
+\footnotetext{Emily Pronin, ``How We See Ourselves and How
+We See Others,'' \textit{Science} 320 (2008):
+1177--1180,
+http://psych.princeton.edu/psychology/research/pronin/pubs/2008\%20Self\%20and\%20Other.pdf.\comment{26}}
+
+}
 
 {
  We're especially loathe to think of our views as
 inaccurate compared to the views of others. Even when we correctly
 identify others' biases, we have a special \textit{bias
-blind spot} when it comes to our own flaws.\textsuperscript{14} We fail
+blind spot} when it comes to our own flaws.\footnote{In a survey of 76 people waiting in airports, individuals
+rated themselves much less susceptible to cognitive biases on average
+than a typical person in the airport. In particular, people think of
+themselves as unusually unbiased when the bias is socially undesirable
+or has difficult-to-notice consequences.\footnotemark Other
+studies find that people with personal ties to an issue see those ties
+as enhancing their insight and objectivity; but when they see
+\textit{other people} exhibiting the \textit{same} ties, they infer
+that those people are overly attached and biased.\comment{14}}\footnotetext{Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin, and Lee Ross,
+``The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self
+versus Others,'' \textit{Personality and Social
+Psychology Bulletin} 28, no. 3 (2002): 369--381.\comment{27}} We fail
 to detect any ``biased-feeling
 thoughts'' when we introspect, and so draw the
 conclusion that we must just be more objective than everyone
-else.\textsuperscript{15}}
+else.\footnote{Joyce Ehrlinger, Thomas Gilovich, and Lee Ross,
+``Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot:
+People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and
+Others,'' \textit{Personality and Social Psychology
+Bulletin} 31, no. 5 (2005): 680--692.\comment{15}}}
 
 {
  Studying biases can in fact make you \textit{more} vulnerable to
@@ -581,7 +737,12 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 of cognitive biases all around you---in everyone but yourself. And the
 bias blind spot, unlike many biases, is \textit{especially severe}
 among people who are \textit{especially intelligent, thoughtful, and
-open-minded}.\textsuperscript{16,17}}
+open-minded}.\footnote{Richard F. West, Russell J. Meserve, and Keith E. Stanovich,
+``Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate the Bias
+Blind Spot,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and
+Social Psychology} 103, no. 3 (2012): 506.\comment{16}}\supercomma\footnote{\ldots Not to be confused with people who think
+they're unusually intelligent, thoughtful, etc. because
+of the illusory superiority bias.\comment{17}}}
 
 {
  This is cause for concern.}
@@ -591,7 +752,10 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 It's known that we can reduce base rate neglect by
 thinking of probabilities as frequencies of objects or events. We can
 minimize duration neglect by directing more attention to duration and
-depicting it graphically.\textsuperscript{18} People vary in how
+depicting it graphically.\footnote{Michael J. Liersch and Craig R. M. McKenzie,
+``Duration Neglect by Numbers and Its Elimination by
+Graphs,'' \textit{Organizational Behavior and Human
+Decision Processes} 108, no. 2 (2009): 303--314.\comment{18}} People vary in how
 strongly they exhibit different biases, so there should be a host of
 yet-unknown ways to influence how biased we are.}
 
@@ -619,7 +783,9 @@ \subsection{The Many Faces of Bias}
 requires that one fully understand the underlying rationale of the
 respective bias, is able to spot it in the particular setting, and also
 has the appropriate tools at hand to counteract the
-bias.\textsuperscript{19}}
+bias.\footnote{Sebastian Serfas, \textit{Cognitive Biases in the Capital
+Investment Context: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical
+Experiments on Violations of Normative Rationality} (Springer, 2010).\comment{19}}}
 
 {
  The goal of this book is to lay the groundwork for creating
@@ -809,7 +975,8 @@ \subsection{Map and Territory}
  There is a passage in the \textit{Zhuangzi}, a proto-Daoist
 philosophical text, that says: ``The fish trap exists
 because of the fish; once you've gotten the fish, you
-can forget the trap.''\textsuperscript{20}}
+can forget the trap.''\footnote{Zhuangzi and Burton Watson, \textit{The Complete Works of
+Zhuangzi} (Columbia University Press, 1968).\comment{20}}}
 
 {
  I invite you to explore this book in that spirit. Use it like
@@ -837,224 +1004,6 @@ \subsection{Acknowledgments}
 
 \bigskip
 
-{
- 1. The idea of personal bias, media bias, etc. resembles
-statistical bias in that it's an \textit{error}. Other
-ways of generalizing the idea of
-``bias'' focus instead on its
-association with nonrandomness. In machine learning, for example, an
-\textit{inductive} bias is just the set of assumptions a learner uses
-to derive predictions from a data set. Here, the learner is
-``biased'' in the sense that
-it's pointed in a specific direction; but since that
-direction might be \textit{truth}, it isn't a bad thing
-for an agent to have an inductive bias. It's valuable
-and necessary. This distinguishes inductive
-``bias'' quite clearly from the
-other kinds of bias.}
-
-{
- 2. A sad coincidence: Leonard Nimoy, the actor who played Spock,
-passed away just a few days before the release of this book. Though we
-cite his character as a classic example of fake
-``Hollywood rationality,'' we mean
-no disrespect to Nimoy's memory.}
-
-{
- 3. Timothy D. Wilson et al., ``Introspecting
-About Reasons Can Reduce Post-choice Satisfaction,''
-\textit{Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin} 19 (1993):
-331--331.}
-
-{
- 4. Jamin Brett Halberstadt and Gary M. Levine,
-``Effects of Reasons Analysis on the Accuracy of
-Predicting Basketball Games,'' \textit{Journal of
-Applied Social Psychology} 29, no. 3 (1999): 517--530.}
-
-{
- 5. Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West,
-``Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications
-for the Rationality Debate?,'' \textit{Behavioral and
-Brain Sciences} 23, no. 5 (2000): 645--665,
-http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract\_S0140525X00003435.}
-
-{
- 6. Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar, and Nancy Brekke,
-``Mental Contamination and the Debiasing
-Problem,'' in \textit{Heuristics and Biases: The
-Psychology of Intuitive Judgment}, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin,
-and Daniel Kahneman (Cambridge University Press, 2002).}
-
-{
- 7. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
-``Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
-Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment,''
-\textit{Psychological Review} 90, no. 4 (1983): 293--315,
-doi:10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293.}
-
-{
- 8. Richards J. Heuer, \textit{Psychology of Intelligence Analysis}
-(Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
-1999).}
-
-{
- 9. Wayne Weiten, \textit{Psychology: Themes and Variations,
-Briefer Version, Eighth Edition} (Cengage Learning, 2010).}
-
-{
- 10. Raymond S. Nickerson, ``Confirmation Bias: A
-Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,''
-\textit{Review of General Psychology} 2, no. 2 (1998): 175.}
-
-{
- 11. \textit{Probability neglect} is another cognitive bias. In the
-months and years following the September 11 attacks, many people chose
-to drive long distances rather than fly. Hijacking
-wasn't \textit{likely}, but it now felt like it was on
-the table; the mere possibility of hijacking hugely impacted decisions.
-By relying on black-and-white reasoning (cars and planes are either
-``safe'' or
-``unsafe,'' full stop), people
-actually put themselves in much more danger. Where they should have
-weighed the probability of dying on a cross-country car trip against
-the probability of dying on a cross-country flight---the former is
-hundreds of times more likely---they instead relied on their general
-feeling of worry and anxiety (the affect heuristic). We can see the
-same pattern of behavior in children who, hearing arguments for and
-against the safety of seat belts, hop back and forth between thinking
-seat belts are a completely good idea or a completely bad one, instead
-of trying to compare the strengths of the pro and con
-considerations.\textsuperscript{21}}
-
-{
- Some more examples of biases are: the \textit{peak/end rule}
-(evaluating remembered events based on their most intense moment, and
-how they ended); \textit{anchoring} (basing decisions on recently
-encountered information, even when it's
-irrelevant)\textsuperscript{22} and \textit{self-anchoring} (using
-yourself as a model for others' likely characteristics,
-without giving enough thought to ways you're
-atypical);\textsuperscript{23} and \textit{status quo bias}
-(excessively favoring what's normal and expected over
-what's new and different).\textsuperscript{24}}
-
-{
- 12. Katherine Hansen et al., ``People Claim
-Objectivity After Knowingly Using Biased
-Strategies,'' \textit{Personality and Social
-Psychology Bulletin} 40, no. 6 (2014): 691--699.}
-
-{
- 13. Similarly, Pronin writes of gender bias blindness:}
-
-{
- In one study, participants considered a male and a female
-candidate for a police-chief job and then assessed whether being
-``streetwise'' or
-``formally educated'' was more
-important for the job. The result was that participants favored
-whichever background they were told the male candidate possessed (e.g.,
-if told he was ``streetwise,'' they
-viewed that as more important). Participants were completely blind to
-this gender bias; indeed, the more objective they believed they had
-been, the more bias they actually showed.\textsuperscript{25}}
-
-{
- Even when we know about biases, Pronin notes, we remain
-``naive realists'' about our own
-beliefs. We reliably fall back into treating our beliefs as
-distortion-free representations of how things actually
-are.\textsuperscript{26}}
-
-{
- 14. In a survey of 76 people waiting in airports, individuals
-rated themselves much less susceptible to cognitive biases on average
-than a typical person in the airport. In particular, people think of
-themselves as unusually unbiased when the bias is socially undesirable
-or has difficult-to-notice consequences.\textsuperscript{27} Other
-studies find that people with personal ties to an issue see those ties
-as enhancing their insight and objectivity; but when they see
-\textit{other people} exhibiting the \textit{same} ties, they infer
-that those people are overly attached and biased.}
-
-{
- 15. Joyce Ehrlinger, Thomas Gilovich, and Lee Ross,
-``Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot:
-People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and
-Others,'' \textit{Personality and Social Psychology
-Bulletin} 31, no. 5 (2005): 680--692.}
-
-{
- 16. Richard F. West, Russell J. Meserve, and Keith E. Stanovich,
-``Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate the Bias
-Blind Spot,'' \textit{Journal of Personality and
-Social Psychology} 103, no. 3 (2012): 506.}
-
-{
- 17. \ldots Not to be confused with people who think
-they're unusually intelligent, thoughtful, etc. because
-of the illusory superiority bias.}
-
-{
- 18. Michael J. Liersch and Craig R. M. McKenzie,
-``Duration Neglect by Numbers and Its Elimination by
-Graphs,'' \textit{Organizational Behavior and Human
-Decision Processes} 108, no. 2 (2009): 303--314.}
-
-{
- 19. Sebastian Serfas, \textit{Cognitive Biases in the Capital
-Investment Context: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical
-Experiments on Violations of Normative Rationality} (Springer, 2010).}
-
-{
- 20. Zhuangzi and Burton Watson, \textit{The Complete Works of
-Zhuangzi} (Columbia University Press, 1968).}
-
-{
- 21. Cass R. Sunstein, ``Probability Neglect:
-Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,'' \textit{Yale Law
-Journal} (2002): 61--107.}
-
-{
- 22. Dan Ariely, \textit{Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces
-That Shape Our Decisions} (HarperCollins, 2008).}
-
-{
- 23. Boaz Keysar and Dale J. Barr,
-``Self-Anchoring in Conversation: Why Language Users
-Do Not Do What They
-`Should,''' in
-\textit{Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment},
-ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (New York:
-Cambridge University Press, 2002), 150--166, doi:10.2277/0521796792.}
-
-{
- 24. Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall,
-``Bias in Favor of the Status Quo,''
-\textit{Social and Personality Psychology Compass} 6, no. 3 (2012):
-270--281.}
-
-{
- 25. Eric Luis Uhlmann and Geoffrey L. Cohen,
-```I think it, therefore
-it's true': Effects of Self-perceived
-Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination,''
-\textit{Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes} 104, no.
-2 (2007): 207--223.}
-
-{
- 26. Emily Pronin, ``How We See Ourselves and How
-We See Others,'' \textit{Science} 320 (2008):
-1177--1180,
-http://psych.princeton.edu/psychology/research/pronin/pubs/2008\%20Self\%20and\%20Other.pdf.}
-
-{
- 27. Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin, and Lee Ross,
-``The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self
-versus Others,'' \textit{Personality and Social
-Psychology Bulletin} 28, no. 3 (2002): 369--381.}
-
 \input{map_and_territory.tex}
 \input{change_mind.tex}
 \input{machine_in_ghost.tex}
@@ -2440,3 +2389,4 @@ \subsection{Acknowledgments}
 \clearpage
 \bigskip
 \end{document}
+