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Correlate a visit from the same user over time #1
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I think this ties into anti-fingerprinting: the site should be able to reidentify a user until that user clears its storage, and then the site shouldn't be able to tell that it's the same user. +1 that it should be added to the document. |
jyasskin
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I framed the threats that came out of the TPAC discussion as the web's interpretation of the general threats in RFC 6973. This explicitly describes same-site visit correlation as requested by w3cping#1, although it doesn't do so in the low-level goals section.
jyasskin
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Dec 19, 2019
I framed the threats that came out of the TPAC discussion as the web's interpretation of the general threats in RFC 6973. This explicitly describes same-site visit correlation as requested by w3cping#1, although it doesn't do so in the low-level goals section.
jyasskin
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Dec 20, 2019
I framed the threats that came out of the TPAC discussion as the web's interpretation of the general threats in RFC 6973. This explicitly describes same-site visit correlation as requested by w3cping#1, although it doesn't do so in the low-level goals section.
jyasskin
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Jan 9, 2020
I framed the threats that came out of the TPAC discussion as the web's interpretation of the general threats in RFC 6973. This explicitly describes same-site visit correlation as requested by w3cping#1, although it doesn't do so in the low-level goals section.
jyasskin
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Jan 13, 2020
I framed the threats that came out of the TPAC discussion as the web's interpretation of the general threats in RFC 6973. This explicitly describes same-site visit correlation as requested by w3cping#1, although it doesn't do so in the low-level goals section.
jyasskin
added a commit
that referenced
this issue
Mar 9, 2020
I framed the threats that came out of the TPAC discussion as the web's interpretation of the general threats in RFC 6973. This explicitly describes same-site visit correlation as requested by #1, although it doesn't do so in the low-level goals section.
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For 6.1, the attacker might want to take a visit from a particular user and correlate that with another visit from the same user at a different time. Sites do this all the time to measure the number of unique visitors in a given time period.
Now, like with click tracking, we might decide that this is worth keeping, but it can be in the threat model.
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